Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973

COMMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA

India

Bhabani Sen Gupta Donald S. Zagoria

Sri Lanka

Charles S. Blackton

NORTH KOREA

Economic Development

Ilpyong J. Kim

Foreign Policy

Rinn-sup Shinn

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Cover: Passers-by read a wall poster of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Calcutta on the eve of the March 1971 general elections. Photo by Piedro Farrini for Gamma.

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Communism in South Asia

EDITORS' NOTE: In their quest for the optimal revolutionary strategy, competing Communist factions in India and in Ceylon (now the Republic of Sri Lanka) have generally committed themselves to some form of parliamentary political action—a course which has brought them both power and influence, including participation in coalition governments at the provincial and even national level. This gradualist and constitutional approach has, however, faced challenges from Marxist groups of more violent bent: most recently, in the case of India, from the Maoist Naxalite movement; and for the first time, in the case of Ceylon, from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front). The three articles below delve into the principal sources of support of the major Communist groups in the two countries and examine the evolving political strategies of these movements. Mr. Sen Gupta delineates the growing divergence between the strategies of the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as both have sought to clarify the rationale for and the goals of their participation in Indian parliamentary politics. Mr. Zagoria, in turn, analyzes the differing social bases of communism in the two Indian states—Kerala and West Bengal—where Communist politicians have registered marked electoral successes. In the final contribution, Mr. Blackton traces the roots and prospects of the major Communist movements in Sri Lanka and the threat posed to their parliamentarianism by the youthful and insurrectionary JVP.

India's Rival Communist Models

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

Marxism is the first system of social science conceived primarily, indeed almost exclusively, in terms of models of development.[1] By relating development to social interests, Marxism —as Irving Horowitz has pointed out—fed the streams of both modern political ideology and modern sociological inquiry. Marx not only asked the question: what is development?; he also found his answer in the context of political ideology and tried to identify and stimulate specific agencies of economic, social, and political development. In Marxist social science, development became a class task. It could not be accomplished harmoniously through the reconciliation of conflicting interests, or mechanically by way of tested inputs. Development had to come through class struggle, through the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule by the prole-

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[1] The term "development model" is used in this article to mean both political and economic development. The central problems of development, particularly of developing societies, are always political rather than economic. For Communists, there can be no economic development without resolving the principal political contradictions of a given society in favor of the proletariat.

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tariat led by its vanguard. Only when bourgeois society and bourgeois consciousness yielded to a proletarian society and proletarian consciousness could there be national—and even international—development as a general social phenomenon.[2]

In the 20th century, Marxism, as applied by the Communist leaders of the USSR, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and other socialist countries to their respective societies, has claimed to provide the motor force for the rapid development of relatively backward communities into modern industrial nations. One may accept or reject the proposition that communism promises a better civilization than capitalism in terms of the totality of man's relations to society. One has to recognize, however, that communism does provide development and growth.

In recent years, indeed, social scientists have begun to look at Communist models of development as viable alternatives to the gradualist, incremental models of growth based on private enterprise. This new and more objective approach to Marxist social science stems partly from the current international climate of détente and partly from the learning process generated by the experience of developing societies. Some scholars tend to regard Marxism as an integral part of the mainstream of western history and to view 20th-century Communist revolutions as a form of the westernization of eastern peasant societies.[3] At the same time, some recent studies of China treat Maoism essentially as a development model that is conspicuously different from the Soviet model of social engineering.[4] Indeed, the Sino-Soviet break has effectively laid to rest the myth of a single, monolithic communism. Instead of one communism there are now many, and at least each Communist country which has been through a "sovereign revolution" [5] has fashioned its own development model, using Marxist doctrine—in Leninist fashion—as a guide to action. Furthermore, the history of the international Communist movement has clearly demonstrated that just as no revolutionary model can be exported successfully except in the context of war, so also no Communist development model can be successfully transplanted from one society to another without serious distortions that often lead to stagnation and decay.[6] Studies of comparative communism therefore have to encompass several different models of development—a field that has hitherto been largely unexplored.

Competing Communist Models

The following pages offer a comparative study of Indian Communist models of development. Several factors make this study relevant to an understanding of contemporary Communist movements. India is the largest non-Communist developing society, and it is also the world's largest democracy, in which British concepts and institutions of parliamentary government have now become almost completely Indianized. At the same time, India for a quarter-century has adhered to the capitalist model of development, albeit with trappings of centralized planning and a great deal of socialist rhetoric;[7] yet, while the economy has undoubtedly made significant progress, India remains the poorest nation in the world, with 220 million, or nearly 40 percent, of its population living below the poverty line on earnings of less than four dollars a month at current prices.[8] The process

[2] Irving L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 54–55.

[3] *E.g.*, see Robert L. Heilbroner, "The Revolution of Economic Development," *The American Scholar* (Washington, D.C.), Autumn 1962.

[4] *E.g.*, Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971; Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1971.

[5] The author's *Communism in Indian Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; see Introduction and chap. 1) uses the term "sovereign revolutions" to designate those Communist revolutions which were carried out without significant external assistance, such as the revolutions in Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam. The Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe belong to a different category as they were imposed by the victorious Soviet army. Each "sovereign revolution" has employed its own methodology for gaining power and its own model of social engineering.

[6] The Polish Communists explicitly recognized this following the 1956 upheaval in Poland. See the Minutes of the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in *The Polish Road*, translated and edited by A. Dressler, Leeds, 1957, pp. 43–55.

[7] Indian "socialism" has hardly been taken seriously outside India. In the Soviet Union, there was a brief attempt after the 20th CPSU Congress to regard India as a country that was taking a "non-capitalist" path of development, but this interpretation was quickly abandoned. Khrushchev, in his speech at the Romanian Party Congress in 1960, described India as a "capitalist country." Moscow, however, considered Indian capitalism to be pursuing, on the whole, a path of independent development, and at times has identified "certain socialist elements" in it. See the author's *The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR*, New York, Pegasus, 1970, esp, chap. 5.

[8] Speaking in the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1972, India's Minister of State for Planning, Mohan Daria, stated that "the absolute number of people below the poverty line today is just as large as it was two decades ago, and these people living in abject poverty constitute between two-fifths and one-half of the Indian population." *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Aug. 10, 1972. For an in-depth study of Indian poverty, see V.M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath, "Poverty in India: Policies and Programmes," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Jan. 9 and 16, 1971.

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of development has, in fact, led to greater disparities of income and wealth. Thus, the political system, despite its apparent stability, rests on an explosive foundation of mass poverty and increasing stratification. As a consequence, the development model followed by the government is being continuously questioned and attacked from both the right and the left, but it is only the Communists who are putting forward more or less well-structured alternative models for the nation's political and economic development.

India's Communists, however, are split into three separate parties: the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India, or CPI; the independent Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M); and the Peking-oriented Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L). There are, in addition, a number of minor Maoist groups outside the CPI(M-L).[9] India therefore provides a unique case study of *competitive* communism.[10] The rival Communist groups engage one another in debate not only over the ideological interpretation of the Indian state and the correlation of class forces, but also over strategy, tactics and techniques of mobilization. In other words, each of the three Communist factions has its own model of revolution, and the two larger groups —the CPI and CPI(M)—have their own conflicting models of development.[11]

The existence of these competing Communist models is more significant in the Indian context than outside observers might think, for one of the many paradoxes of the Indian scene is that while the Communist movement is split and still weak and ill-organized as an entity, its impact on politics is far from negligible. The original CPI is as old as the Chinese Communist Party, but unlike the latter it never succeeded in capturing leadership of the nationalist movement and remained outside the mainstream of the Congress-led freedom struggle.[12] It was only in the early 1950's that the CPI, by resolving to operate as a parliamentary party within the limits of the bourgeois constitution, earned legitimacy in the eyes of large sections of the politically aware Indian public.

Nevertheless, after only five years of experience in parliamentary politics, the CPI in 1957 was actually elected to power in the state of Kerala, where it ruled for a little over two years before being forced out by a massive, Congress-backed "liberation movement." By the time the fourth general elections took place in 1967, the Communists had split into the rival CPI and CPI(M). Even so, the CPI did well enough in the elections in Bihar and Punjab to necessitate its inclusion in non-Congress coalition governments in those two states, while the CPI(M) emerged as the strongest political force both in Kerala, where it organized a "left" coalition government, and in West Bengal, where it was the dominant element in a "leftist united front" state regime. In the "mid-term" elections of 1969 and 1971 in

[9] The united CPI split in 1964, when a minority rebelled against the Moscow-oriented leadership over the issue of the leadership's "nationalist" position on conflicts between India and China and established a separate party, the CPI(M). After the CPI(M) itself moved away from its pro-Peking orientation toward an "independent" line that accepted parliamentary methods, a Maoist splinter group broke away from the CPI(M) in 1967 and formally organized the CPI(M-L) in 1969. The CPI(M-L) shunned parliamentary politics and operated exclusively as a secret organization for a brief period. It broke up into a number of rival factions in 1970–71, and its leaders were either taken into custody or killed by the police. The party practically ceased functioning after the arrest and death of its chairman, Charu Mazumdar, in the summer of 1972. For details of the Maoist movements in India, see Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971; the author's *Communism in Indian Politics*, *op. cit.*, chap. 9; and the author's "China and Indian Communism," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 50, April–June, 1972.

[10] The author has put forward the concept of "competitive communism" as a special field of study because the Soviet and Chinese models of revolution and development now are competitive models that not only operate, respectively, in the two largest Communist states, but also compete against each other in the world Communist movement and in individual developing countries.

[11] Because of its brief existence, the CPI(M-L) has no clear development model of its own. In general, the party's ideological documents echo the writings of Mao Tse-tung and call for an agrarian revolution in India with the rural proletariat as the main motive force. The main contradiction in the countryside is said to be between the feudal landlords and the peasants, and only by using peasant armed forces under working-class leadership to set up liberated zones can this contradiction be resolved. The Maoists of Andhra Pradesh, who "liberated" a large part of the hill areas of Srikakulam District between 1967 and 1969, tried to establish "base areas" on the Chinese model, but these were flushed out by the government's armed police in 1970–71.

[12] Indicative of the growth and maturity of Indian communism is the emergence in recent years of a growing body of Indian literature on the movement. This author's *Communism in Indian Politics* happens to be the first academic study of Indian communism in the larger context of Indian politics as a whole. Mohan Ram's *Indian Communism: Split Within a Split*, Delhi, Vikas, 1970, is an illuminating study of the issues and problems that led to the split in the CPI in 1964 and in the CPI(M) in 1967–69; and his *Maoism in India (op. cit.)* throws considerable light on the genesis and operations of the CPI(M-L) and the Maoist movement in Andhra Pradesh. A less objective study of Indian Maoism is J. C. Johari's *Naxalite Politics in India*, Delhi, Research Publications, 1972. Meanwhile, the CPI has undertaken the publication of documents relating to the history of Indian communism, and the first volume, *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, 1917–1922*, edited by G. Adhikari, was published by the People's Publishing House, New Delhi, in 1970. Also of historical value is Muzaffar Ahmad's *Myself and the Communist Party of India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1970. The best overall historical study of the CPI, however, is still Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1959.

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certain states, the CPI(M) retained its dominant position in the strategic state of West Bengal, while the CPI, by entering into electoral pacts with the Congress party, managed to increase its representation in several state legislatures as well as in the Lok Sabha (1971).[13]

In the most recent, March 1972 elections to the state assemblies in most of the states, the fortunes of both Communist parties suffered in varying degrees as the Congress, riding the wave of nationalist sentiment generated by India's victory in the war with Pakistan and the liberation of Bangla Desh, won sweeping majorities nearly everywhere that elections took place.[14] The setback to the CPI(M) was by far the more severe. In West Bengal, where the CPI joined the Congress party in a "democratic front" to fight the "united left front" led by the CPI(M), the Marxist party was reduced to only 14 seats in the state legislature as compared with the 114 it had won in 1971;[15] however, in terms of the popular vote, the party did better than this would seem to indicate, as its candidates polled an aggregate of nearly 28 percent of the total votes cast, or only 5 percent less than in the 1971 election. While the electoral fortunes of the CPI also suffered to some extent, the party nevertheless retains its position as a major partner of the Congress in a coalition government in Kerala, and it has been accorded the status of an influential ally in return for its "qualified" support of Congress-led governments in West Bengal, Bihar and Punjab.[16] Since the elections, moreover, Mrs. Gandhi has included several former CPI leaders in her Council of Ministers, entrusting some of them with strategic portfolios.

Thus, despite the existence of three competing

A CPI (M) election rally in Calcutta in February 1971.

—Piedro Farrini—Gamma.

Communist parties and the setbacks suffered in the March 1972 elections, Indian communism seems to have done better than communism anywhere else in Asia outside the Communist-ruled states. In the Philippines, Malayasia, Thailand and Burma, Communist-led insurgencies have been more or less contained, and in Indonesia the once-mighty PKI has been reduced to almost nothing. In India, however, the Communists, even though divided and still a regional rather than a national element, have nevertheless emerged as a political force second only to the Congress party.[17]

Actual Communist voting strength is obscured by the fact that India's "winner-takes-all" electoral system prevents the mass followings of the CPI and CPI(M) from being accurately reflected in the numbers of seats they capture in the Lok Sabha and the state legislatures.[18] However, election studies confirm that the Communists have the largest number of regular voters next to the Congress party, and that they alone, among the non-Congress groups, have a distinctly heterogeneous and differentiated support base. Although the bulk of their votes come from the working class and the poorer elements of the peasantry, they have managed to gain significant electoral support among the educated middle class and the youth, and even among the well-to-do and

[13] For a detailed account of the electoral fortunes of the CPI and CPI(M) between 1967 and 1971, see the author's *Communism in Indian Politics, op. cit.*, esp. chap. 3.

[14] Mrs. Gandhi's party regained the commanding position that the undivided Congress (which split in 1969) had held in the national and local legislatures from 1947 until 1967. As a result of its success, the Congress party now heads the government in all states except the following: (1) Tamilnadu, where a local party—*Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*, or DMK— is in power; and (2) Kerala, where the CPI heads a coalition government in which, however, the Congress is the dominant element. In Orissa, the Congress failed to win an obsolute majority but is now in power with the support of a group of former dissidents.

[15] The CPI(M) charged the Congress party with the "wholesale rigging of an entire election" and resolved to boycott the state assembly as well as by-elections.

[16] The Congress party consulted the CPI in its selection of chief ministers for these and certain other states, and in West Bengal the CPI was included in a consultative committee that was set up to lay down policy guidelines for the government and keep watch over their implementation.

[17] This view is supported by Rajni Kothari, who calls it "significant that the two Communist parties have been the most successful [in Indian politics] of all the non-Congress parties." See his *Politics In India*, Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970, p. 15.

[18] Both the CPI and CPI(M) have been pressing for the adoption of a new electoral system providing for proportional representation in the national parliament as well as the state legislatures.

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the rich.[19] They also take second place only to the Congress party in having well-organized and disciplined front bodies at their command to mobilize and politicize urban workers, the middle classes, the peasants, the youth, and women. Even more significant, recent years have seen Communist moves to mobilize the poorer elements of the peasantry, who constitute the bulk of the population, in support of more militant tactical lines ranging from "armed defense against armed attack" (the CPI[M] line) to armed guerrilla insurgency from rural bases (the line of the CPI[M-L] in 1967–69, and of several Maoist groups in Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab and Kerala). These developments have imparted a new dimension to Indian politics.[20]

Rival Party Positions of 1964

In undertaking a comparative analysis of the alternative development models offered by the two Indian Communist parties, it may be well to start from a general understanding of how such models come into being. To put it in a nutshell, a Communist party's model of development grows out of the interaction between its theoretical formulations of strategic goals and its actual tactical operations to achieve those goals. In the first instance, there must be a "scientific" analysis and conceptualization of the balance of class forces in the given political universe, and these class forces must be related to those operating on the wider, global scale. There is generally a hierarchy of strategic goals, each one leading to the next higher objective until the final goal of socialism is reached. The model of political development derives from the economic model, which in turn is shaped by class ownership and control of the productive forces. Some Communist development models have been fashioned from actual experience in administering large liberated areas, as in China and Vietnam. Thus, Mao Tse-tung's strategic concept of "New Democracy" grew out of the actual experience of the CCP in fighting Japanese imperialism and administering the liberated base areas. In any case, the actual political experience of a Communist party is of paramount importance in shaping its strategic-tactical lines and therefore its overall model of development.

After the 1964 split, the rival CPI and CPI(M) held almost simultaneous national congresses in Bombay and Calcutta, respectively, and it was at these congresses that the two parties formulated their respective political lines. The following comparative analysis of these lines will be based on the resolutions and documents of the respective congresses, using as far as possible the actual language of the congress formulations.[21]

Class Analysis of the Indian State. In their differing interpretations of the Indian state, the CPI saw the state as the "organ of class rule of the national bourgeoisie as a whole," while the CPI(M) saw it as controlled by the big bourgeoisie in alliance with the big landowners. Both viewed India as overtaken by the crisis of capitalist development, which they saw reflected in the rising cost of living, food scarcity, hoarding and profiteering, corruption among politicians and civil servants, and the increasing misery of the masses.

The CPI, however, took a less negative view of the capitalist crisis than its rival. In the CPI's estimation, capitalist growth in India had strengthened the economic base of nationalism; in other words, India had by and large proceeded on a line of *independent* capitalist growth. According to the CPI(M) interpretation, on the contrary, capitalist development had led to a strengthening of the monopolists, to an increasing penetration of foreign—especially American—capital, and to a growing Indian dependence on foreign imperialist economic aid. For the CPI, the "ushering in of the bourgeois democratic state" constituted "a historic advance" from the former "imperialist-bureaucratic rule over our country." The CPI(M), on the other hand, saw the strategy of capitalist development being followed by the Indian monopolists, with the aid of foreign imperialist capital, as presenting a threat to the country's national independence.

The two parties differed just as sharply in their estimates of the national bourgeoisie and its relation to the landlord class. Picturing the big landowners

[19] *Party System and Election Studies*, Occasional Paper No. 1, Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1967.

[20] See the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1, January–February, 1972, pp. 1–17.

[21] For the CPI, see *Proceedings of the Seventh Congress*, Vols. 1 and 2, Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1965. For the CPI(M), see *Programme of the Communist Party of India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1965; *Fight Against Revisionism*, Calcutta, 1965; and *Statement of Policy*, Calcutta, 1965. See also the CPI weekly *New Age* (New Delhi), Jan. 5 and 12, 1965; and the CPI(M) weekly *People's Democracy* (Calcutta), Nov. 8, 15 and 24, 1964.

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as joint class-owners of the Indian state, the CPI(M) laid the blame for this at the door of the national bourgeoisie, which "compromises with the landlords [and] admits them in the ministries and governmental compositions especially at the state levels," thus enabling them "to hamper the adoption and implementation of laws and measures of land reform and . . . to secure concessions at the cost of the peasantry." The CPI(M) further held that the national bourgeoisie was compromising with imperialism in both domestic and foreign policy. The CPI, on the other hand, took a less monolithic view of the national bourgeoisie, contending that the upper bourgeoisie was becoming more and more differentiated from the rest, and that only the monopolist groups and feudal circles continued to constitute the main anti-democratic and reactionary forces.

Political Strategies. These differing analyses of the balance of class forces resulted in divergent strategies for advancing the revolution in India. As the CPI saw it, before embarking on the socialist road, India must first complete the stage of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, national democratic revolution. Since, however, this task was beyond the capability of the existing government, what was necessary to begin with was the creation of a national democratic front "bringing together all the patriotic forces of the country: namely, the working class, the entire peasantry including the rich peasants and agricultural laborers, the intelligentsia, and the non-monopolist bourgeoisie." The national democratic state in the hands of the national democratic front would be a transitional stage in which power would be jointly exercised by all classes interested in eradicating imperialist interests, routing the semi-feudal elements, and breaking the power of monopolies. In this class alliance, according to the CPI, leadership would no longer belong exclusively to the bourgeoisie, but neither would exclusive leadership yet be in the hands of the working class, though the latter would "increasingly come to occupy the leading position in the alliance."

The CPI(M), on the other hand, viewed the Indian revolution as presently in an agrarian stage "which is directed not only against the landlords and imperialists but also against the Indian bourgeoisie." The immediate objective was to "replace the present anti-democratic and anti-popular government by a new government of 'people's democracy'," which would be a "coalition of all democratic, anti-feudal, and anti-capitalist forces in the country." Such a government, according to the CPI(M), must be

capable of effectively guaranteeing the rights of the people, of giving land to the peasants gratis, of protecting our national industries against the competition of foreign goods and of ensuring the industriali-



A scene from the 1964 breakaway "Seventh Congress" of the Communist Party of India in Calcutta, where the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was established.

—Wide World Photos.

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zation of the country, of securing a higher standard of living for the working class, of ridding the people of unemployment and thus placing the country on the wide road of progress, cultural development, and independence.

In order to wage the struggle for "people's democracy," the CPI(M) envisaged the construction of a "people's democratic front" composed essentially of the "democratic classes" and the political parties and organizations reflecting these classes. The front was to be built through the staging of mass struggles of the trade union, peasant, and other mass organizations, which would have the objective of heightening the people's political consciousness, exposing "the futility of the capitalist path of development," and placing "the alternative path of people's democratic development . . . clearly . . . before the people, so that more and more they come to accept the program of people's democracy."

To recapitulate the two parties' conflicting interpretations of the current situation and what needed to be done to further the revolution, the CPI recognized the national-bourgeois state of India to constitute a solid achievement toward independence and maintained that the next step should be its conversion into a "national democratic state" through a "national democratic front" *from above*. The CPI(M), on the other hand, considered the state, under the joint control of the big bourgeosie and landlords, to be "anti-people" and aimed at replacing it with a "people's democracy" to be brought about through a "people's democratic front" built *from below* on the basis of mass struggles against the existing ruling forces. Neither party promised socialism in the immediate future, and both assured sections of the bourgeoisie and landlords a secure position in the new society they contemplated. The CPI excluded only the big bourgeoisie—*i.e.*, the monopolists—from its contemplated "national democratic front," whereas both the upper bourgeoisie and big landholders were to be excluded from the CPI(M)'s "people's democratic front."

The Issue of Parliamentarism. There also were differences between the respective parties with regard to the usefulness of working through parliamentary institutions. Taking the basic position that a "national democratic state" could be achieved through parliamentary processes, the CPI argued that the Indian parliament had provided a forum whereby the people could, to a degree, influence the affairs of the state, voice their aspirations for peace, national freedom and democracy, oppose "imperialist conspiracies," and demand social transformations such as land reforms, guarantees of working-class rights, and curbs on monopolies. The party acknowledged, however, that the class tendencies of the bourgeoisie as a whole imposed limitations on the utility of parliament. It saw a growing struggle among the various sections of the national bourgeoisie "to get hold of the parliamentary machine" in order to shape the budget and other economic measures and policies in their own group interests, as well as an attempt by "monopolist groups and feudal circles" to shift parliamentary and government policies to the right and "undermine the parliamentary system . . . by making it an instrument of their narrow class interests." Under these circumstances, the CPI maintained that "the democratic and socialist forces" should back parliamentary democracy and the strengthening, under democratic control, of the state sector of the economy. Thus, the party

defends the parliamentary and democratic institutions and strives to preserve and develop them further, to make democracy full and real for all.

The CPI further recognized that extraparliamentary mass struggles could be an "effective vehicle for influencing and changing the course of parliamentary policies in favor of the masses and against the monopolists." Such struggles, it declared, would mean, in effect, "the defense of democracy and of parliament itself." In essence, then, the CPI elevated the parliamentary way to the level of a full-fledged strategy for advancing the revolution in India.

The CPI(M), on the other hand, saw little if any hope of bringing about fundamental structural changes in Indian society via the parliamentary process. This skepticism, it claimed, was based on the Indian experience itself:

There are a large number of people who think that this government can be replaced by a people's democratic government by utilizing the parliament ushered in by the new Constitution. . . . Even a liberal, let alone the Communist party and other democrats and revolutionaries, would now feel ashamed to maintain that this government and the classes that keep it in power will ever allow us to carry out a fundamental democratic transformation in the country by parliamentary methods alone. Hence, the road

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that will lead us to freedom and peace, land and bread . . . has to be found elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the party considered it useful, on the tactical level, to contest parliamentary as well as state assembly elections, and with this in view it envisaged efforts to forge electoral alliances with socialist and leftist democratic parties, groups, and progressive individuals on the basis of a common program. Without compromising its political principles, the CPI(M) stated, the party must adopt flexible tactics designed to enhance its representation in both the state legislatures and the national parliament. In justification of this line, the party argued that certain limited tactical objectives could be attained if it were successful in gaining control of governments at the state level:

While it will be a dangerous illusion to imagine that a state government formed by the Communist Party together with its allies can transform the economic and political setup in the state, nonetheless the formation of such a government will be of great importance in today's conditions. It can play a positive role. . . . Apart from enabling the solution of a limited number of local problems, its existence and functioning will bring greater morale to the democratic masses everywhere and thus strengthen the democratic movement. It can become a weapon in the hands of the masses in the struggle against the "anti-people" policies of the central government. It will at the same time further intensify the struggle between the forces of progress and reaction inside the ruling party itself.

Peaceful vs. Armed Struggle. On the question of using violence to attain Communist objectives, neither the CPI nor the CPI(M) took a clear-cut and unequivocal position. The CPI did not raise the issue in any of the resolutions and documents adopted at its 1964 Bombay congress, presumably because the party's explicit adherence to the parliamentary road to power ruled out any admission of the deliberate use of violence as a tactical weapon. However, the party's attitude on the subject was clarified to some extent by G. Adhikari in an article published after the congress in the *World Marxist Review*.[22] The CPI, Adhikari wrote, did not set forth the objective of the "immediate" overthrow of the existing government; however, it had to "develop struggle against the government" in order to prevent a reversal of progressive policies and to "isolate and eliminate the reactionary forces." This fight was to be waged on the basis of an alternative, non-capitalist path of Indian development which the party would put across to the people by making maximum use of bourgeois freedoms as well as by conducting mass mobilization struggles. The CPI hoped that the masses, once they were confronted with the dire consequences of capitalist policies and became activized through participation in these struggles, would progressively be brought to vote for the party and its alternative program of national democracy. However, if this did not happen, if capitalism grew stronger and erosion of the progressive policies of the national bourgeois government continued, Adhikari warned, the party might be forced to reconsider its strategy and tactics, including the question of using non-peaceful methods:

Everything would depend on whether the force of peaceful mass struggle, isolating the ruling class, compels them to surrender or whether they hit back with their armed might at one stage or another. The proletariat and its party must never lose sight of this possibility, and it should be prepared for it. Given such a basic preparation, a switchover to non-peaceful methods, when required, should not be difficult.

The CPI(M)'s position on the use of non-peaceful methods, as laid down at the Calcutta congress, was not explicitly different from that set forth by Adhikari for the CPI. It stressed the party's intention to strive for a peaceful transformation of Indian society, but intimated that the "revolutionary forces" must be prepared for any contingency if the ruling classes resisted such change:

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) strives to achieve the establishment of people's democracy and socialist transformation through peaceful means. By developing a powerful mass revolutionary movement, by combining parliamentary and extraparliamentary forms of struggle, the working class and its allies will try their utmost to overcome the resistance of the reactionary forces and to bring about the

[22] G. Adhikari, "The Problem of the Non-Capitalist Path of Development of India and the State of National Democracy," *World Marxist Review* (English-language version of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Prague), November 1964, pp. 43–48. Basing his article on the Statement of the 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties, Adhikari virtually echoed the formulations of the CPSU on the "national democratic front" and the "state of national democracy," as well as on such other crucial issues as the parliamentary path and peaceful transition to socialism.

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transformation through peaceful means. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the ruling classes never relinquish their power voluntarily. They seek to defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by lawlessness and violence. It is, therefore, necessary for the revolutionary forces to be vigilant and so orientate their work that they can face up to all circumstances, to all twists and turns in the political life of the country.

One can discern little deviation here from the CPI position. If, however, this affirmation of the Calcutta congress is read in conjunction with the somewhat obscure stand on violence which the unified CPI had adopted in 1951, and which the Calcutta gathering now invoked, the CPI(M) in 1964 would at least seem to have been less sanguine than its rival party about the possibility of a peaceful transformation of India's capitalist-semifeudal society. In citing the 1951 document, the Calcutta congress approvingly described the position taken in it as "Leninist." The document had called upon Indian Communists to cultivate a "Leninist understanding" of the Indian situation and declared that such an understanding would persuade them that the "main question" was not whether the revolution in India would be violent or peaceful or whether or not there should be armed struggle. The document added:

It is the reactionary ruling classes who resort to force and violence against the people and who create the issue of whether our creed is violence or non-violence. Such an issue is an issue of Gandhian ideology, which, in practice, misleads the masses, and is an issue of which we must steer clear. Marxism and history have once and for all decided the question for the party and for the people of every country in the world long ago. All actions of the masses in defense of their interests and to achieve their liberation are sacrosanct. History sanctions all that the people decide to do to clear the debris of decadence and reaction that blocks their path to progress and freedom.[23]

Views of the Ruling Party. The main difference between the two parties' 1964 evaluations of the Indian situation lay in their conflicting perspectives of the ruling party of the national bourgeoisie, the Indian National Congress. Taking a much kindlier view than that of the CPI(M), the CPI acknowledged that the role played by the Congress party under Nehru's leadership had consolidated India's independence and given it a mass base extending "to all classes, including large sections of the working class, peasantry, artisans, intellectuals, and others," and it recognized that the influence of the Congress, though much reduced from what it had been in the days of the freedom struggle, was "still a very important factor in the political life of the country." While pointing to the existence of contradictions within the Congress between the "anti-people" forces dominating the government and the party's mass base, the CPI saw the division between "the masses that follow the Congress party" and the "masses that follow the democratic opposition" as the "most important division in our democratic forces today." To heal this division, the CPI proposed to strive for programmatic cooperation with "progressive" leaders of the Congress mass base.

On the other hand, the CPI(M) rejected the view that the Congress party could any longer be regarded as a progressive force. "Despite the relatively progressive policy declarations of the Congress party, and despite the subjective good intentions of some of its leaders," the CPI(M) declared, "the fact remains that the Congress party as a whole is dominated by reactionary elements, the bulk of whom are in it." The Marxists agreed, however, with the CPI's assessment of the tensions present in the mass base of the ruling party and noted that certain sections of the Congress membership were interested in bringing about "a leftward shift in government policies." The CPI(M) estimated that the bulk of the masses who could be won over to democratic policies and to cooperation in a democratic front were "more or less equally divided" between those who presently followed the Congress party and those who rallied around the non-Communist opposition parties. On the basis of this evaluation, the CPI(M) ruled out any kind of "united front from above" with the Congress party, whereas the CPI had seemingly regarded at least a limited form of such a front as possible.

Toward the right-wing Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties and the smaller parties of the left, the CPI and CPI(M) took almost identical attitudes. Cooperation with the rightist parties was ruled out, but the smaller socialist parties and groups were considered eligible to participate in either the national or the

[23] *Political Resolution* (1951), as reprinted by the CPI(M), Calcutta, 1965, p. 22. CPI(M) leaders have always denied the party's adoption of a line of armed violence or armed struggle. See *Reply from Prison*, Calcutta, CPI(M), 1965; and *Communism in Indian Politics*, *op. cit.*, chaps. 6, 8, 11.

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people's democratic front, as the case might be, even though their leaders were seen as sometimes pursuing reactionary and opportunistic policies.

Foreign and Defense Policies. Disagreement between the two Communist parties was also sharp in their assessments of current Indian foreign and defense policies. The CPI affirmed that the Congress government's foreign policy was "in the main, a policy of peace, nonalignment, and anticolonialism" which "conforms to the interests of the national bourgeoisie, meets the needs of India's economic development, and reflects the sentiments of the mass of people." The party acknowledged that there sometimes were "lapses and compromises," but it declared that "the main character of the policy has been generally preserved." For most of the lapses and compromises, the CPI blamed Peking.

The Marxists, on the other hand, took the position that the "pro-monopolist" and "pro-imperialist" policies of the government were influencing its foreign and defense policies as well. They saw the government as steadily surrendering the rights and prerogatives of an independent India to the advancing interests of the imperialists, particularly of "US imperialism." In the judgment of the CPI(M), the government had gone back substantially on its anti-imperialism and was paying only lip service to nonalignment.

Post-1964 Adjustments

Such, then, were the differing strategic and tactical lines of the two major Indian Communist parties as laid down at their initial post-split national congresses in 1964. Over the intervening eight years, both have generally adhered to the essentials of their 1964 lines while adjusting them to the currents and rapids of Indian politics. The CPI has in the main tried to hew to the strategic-tactical line of the 20th CPSU Congress or, more precisely, the statement of the 1960 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. The CPI(M), on the other hand, has differed on major issues with both the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties; more specifically, during 1967–71, it sought to fashion what it called a "Leninist method of parliamentary politics" and, more important, a non-Chinese way of mobilizing the poorer elements of the peasantry.

The latter initiative, in particular, introduced an entirely new element into Indian politics. The CPI(M), by encouraging poor landless peasants and agricultural workers to seize land "owned" by landlords in excess of the ceilings prescribed by existing land "reform" laws, strove to activize the peasant masses and establish large rural "bases" of party strength.[24] This effort threatened to alter radically the prevailing balance of forces in the countryside, and hence the principal support base of all other political factions, including the Congress party. It consequently brought the CPI(M) into sharp conflict with the ruling party, as well as with the CPI and—even more important—with the newly founded Maoist Communist party, the CPI(M-L).

The conflict reached its greatest intensity in West Bengal and, in its initial stages, principally involved the CPI(M) and the CPI(M-L). The latter, after a brief attempt to organize Chinese-style peasant guerrilla bases in the West Bengal countryside, transferred its activities to the urban complex of greater Calcutta, where it launched urban guerrilla operations directed in large part against the CPI(M)—then dominating a coalition West Bengal government—and individual "class enemies." The often bloody violence caused a general breakdown of law and order in Calcutta as well as other parts of West Bengal and thus provided the central Congress government with enough grounds to oust the coalition government from power in March 1970 and substitute direct "presidential rule."

During 1970–71, when West Bengal was ruled either directly by the central government or by short-lived Congress-led coalitions, the CPI(M) rural bases became the main target of the government's "cleansing operations," which involved the large-scale deployment of Indian Army units and the armed Central Reserve Police. Although in some cases the operations were ostensibly designed to flush out the Maoist peasant guerrilla bases, it was actually the peasant bases of the CPI(M) that bore the brunt of the government drive.[25] The government's action, moreover, won substantial popular support because broad elements of the urban middle classes had become alienated from the CPI(M) as a consequence of government charges, echoed by the

[24] See *Communism in Indian Politics, op. cit.*, chap. 6. Writing in the CPI(M) weekly *People's Democrary* (July 30, 1972), P. Sundarayya stated: "It is only by developing a powerful mass movement culminating in land seizure that we will ultimately get 'the land to the tiller'."

[25] Sunanda K. Dutt-Ray, "Steeplechase in Birbhum," *The Statesman*, Aug. 24, 1971; Dilip Mukherji, "Danger in the Rear," *The Times of India* (Bombay), May 25, 1971. See also the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *loc. cit. supra.*

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

The terrorist Marxist-Leninist faction among India's Communists leaves its message on the wall of a Calcutta factory.

—Sydney Schanberg of *The New York Times.*

mass media as well as by the CPI, laying primary responsibility for the "politics of murder" at the door of the Marxist party. Another factor that strengthened the government's hand was the feeling among the public that the "flushing out" operations were necessary before India could effectively support the Bangla Desh liberation movement in East Pakistan. Thus, the ethos of nationalism once again worked to the serious disadvantage of an Indian Communist party.

These events undoubtedly contributed to the sharp setback that the CPI(M) suffered in the March 1972 elections in West Bengal. Despite its reduction to an insignificant minority of seats in the state assembly, however, the party could take some solace from the fact that—as noted earlier—it had received an aggregate popular vote only five percent below that of March 1971. The bulk of these votes, moreover, came from the rural areas—an indication that the party's new strategy of building strong "rural bases" had not been without effect.

The CPI Perspective Today

In any event, it is clear the CPI and CPI(M) now have very different perspectives of the Indian political system and of the ruling party of the national bourgeoisie. Encouraged by the leftward drift of the Indira Gandhi Congress, by the forging of closer relations with the USSR as exemplified by the August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship,[26] and by the parallel estrangement between India and the United States, the CPI has become more hopeful of leading the country toward its immediate goal—a "national democratic" state—through tactics of mobilizing "left and democratic" elements both within and outside the ruling party. The CPI(M), on the other hand, appears convinced that India is moving toward "one-party dictatorship", that the ruling classes are already using "semi-fascist" methods to destroy their class enemies, and that nothing short of the replacement of the present government by a government of "people's democracy" can place the country firmly on the road of political and economic development.

In simpler terms, the CPI's political line makes it a partner of the present political system. The party maintains, in accordance with its theory of "national democracy," that the system can be radically transformed *from above* through the agency of parliament in conjunction with the mobilization of mass support for radical policies. It therefore takes an incremental view of development, raising the banner of "rapid social change"—a slogan coined by CPSU leaders to conceptualize the politics of peaceful transition.[27] For the party, each "socialistic" measure taken by the Indian Government represents a step in the direction of its own strategic goal; thus it regards such measures as the nationalization of 14 banks and of general (non-life) insurance companies, abolition of the privileges given to the former Indian princes at the time their principalities were

[26] The CPI and CPI(M) positions with regard to the Indo-Soviet treaty present an interesting contrast. CPI spokesman Bhupesh Gupta, writing in *New Age* (Feb. 13, 1972), referred to "the great Indo-Soviet treaty, which not only makes our freedom safer and security more invincible but also offers comprehensive, expanded opportunity for economic, scientific and technological cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. This gives a new dimension to India's struggle for self-reliance both in political and economic terms. It broadens the road of cooperation with the world socialist system, in which the Soviet Union occupies the pivotal position." On the other hand, writing in the CPI(M) organ *People's Democracy* (Sept. 26, 1971), M. Basavapunnaiah denied that the Indian government's conclusion of the treaty attested to the "non-monopolist" character of the Indian national bourgeoisie. "The Indo-Soviet pact," he wrote, "is not, [and] can never be the touchstone [of] whether the class character of the state in question [i.e., the Indian state] is monopolist or anti-monopolist . . . it would be stupid for one to prove from it [the treaty] that the present Indian state is led by the non-monopolist bourgeoisie."

[27] See, *e.g.*, R. Ulyanovsky, "The 'Third World'—Problems of Socialist Orientation," *Soviet Review* (Moscow), Sept. 28, 1971; V. Tyagunenko, "Paramount Task Before Developing Countries," *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 28, 1971; and V. Solodovnikov, "Some Features of the African Countries' Non-Capitalist Development," *Social Science* (Moscow), April–June 1971.

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integrated into the Indian Union, and the constitutional amendment removing from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court certain legislation restricting, or taking over, private property with or without compensation, as concrete fruits of its political line.[28] But the factor which the CPI considers most propitious of all to the realization of its goal of national democracy for India is the Indo-Soviet treaty. It sees the treaty as having "radically altered the balance of forces" within the country and as an instrument which it can effectively utilize to usher the country steadily in the direction of socialism. The party's task is perceived to be the mobilization of leftist and democratic forces so as to maintain sufficient pressure on the government to prevent any "slideback" from its publicly-committed course.[29]

In spite of its disappointment with the results of the 1971 and 1972 elections, in which it had hoped to gain enough parliamentary and state assembly seats to force the ruling Congress to include it in "left coalition" governments, the CPI continues to take an optimistic view of its political prospects—especially in view of the earlier-mentioned concessions made by Mrs. Gandhi and the ruling party after the 1972 elections. These concessions, coupled with the leftward trend in the government's domestic and foreign policies,[30] have enabled the CPI leaders to differentiate between the character of the sweeping majorities the Congress enjoyed in the national and state legislatures before 1967 and that of the equally large majorities won by Mrs. Gandhi's party in 1971 and 1972. A CPI spokesman put it this way:

The truth is that despite the big majorities the Congress won in the two general elections of 1971 and 1972, what we experienced after the general elections of 1957 or 1962, when also Congress won practically all the states and secured a big majority in the Lok Sabha, has not been reproduced. This history here is not repeating itself. The last two general elections [1971 and 1972] have brought in their wake greater positive response to the democratic urges and demands of the people, and this is partially reflected at the policymaking levels too. One should not of course have any illusions about the governments that have come into existence. But at the same time the unprecedented new opportunity for the democratic movement to go forward should also not be overlooked.[31]

Indeed, the CPI has not been remiss in its efforts to take advantage of the favorable popular trends it has discerned since 1971. Already at its Ninth Congress at Cochin in 1971, the party resolved to press on with its political line while placing increased stress on mass mobilization efforts to prevent any retreat by the Congress from "democratic" policies. In 1972 a crisis in the Indian economy presented the party with an opportunity to step up these efforts. An unprecedented rise in prices, coupled with stagnation in industrial output and a sharp shortfall in food production, led to widespread unrest among both the urban and the rural population, especially among unionized labor. The CPI National Council promptly laid the blame for the crisis at the door of "Indian monopoly capital" and its control over basic consumer industries, charging the "monopolists" with deliberate sabotage of production and the consequent creation of an artificial scarcity of essential consumer goods, as well as with "manipulation of speculative activities and of black money." [32] As the Council saw it, the national bourgeoisie was trying to "capitalize on its new prestige and power" in order to bring about a "slideback" in policy, and the government was about to succumb and make important concessions to the monopolies and big landlords. To prevent this from happening, the CPI Council resolved to organize mass struggles in collaboration with other left and democratic forces, including the "progressive" elements in the ruling party. Accordingly, protest demonstrations

[28] Writing in the CPI weekly *New Age*, Nov. 28, 1971, N. K. Krishnan referred to these and other government measures, as well as to the Indo-Soviet treaty, and asked rhetorically whether they could all be regarded as "measures taken by a government 'led by the big bourgeoisie increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital'."

[29] See "Fight Against Slideback," *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1972.

[30] In addition to the Indo-Soviet treaty, such recent Indian government actions as the upgrading of diplomatic relations with Hanoi, the adoption of a stiffer anti-US line on the Vietnam war, and recognition of the German Democratic Republic are seen by the CPI as further evidences of the leftward trend in Indian foreign policy.

[31] Bhupesh Gupta, "Masterpiece of Left Opportunism," *New Age*, May 14, 1972. Gupta wrote further: "It is for all to see that the state governments are now far more tangibly under the impact of the left and democratic pressures than at any time in the past . . . The country's political life is certainly not drifting in the direction of dictatorship or semi-fascism . . . The present period is marked by the advance of the broad democratic forces and by the growth of democratic trends on a national scale."

[32] *National Council Resolution*, Supplement to *New Age*, Sept. 3, 1972. ("Black money" is money that circulates alongside the printed currency officially accounted for. The owners use it in various kinds of transactions and pay no income tax on the profits.)

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and rallies were mounted in several states in the autumn of 1972. The CPI also threatened to withdraw its support from the Congress government in the state of Bihar, which was gripped by urban unrest, and thereby forced the local government to make certain concessions.

At the time of writing, the CPI remains convinced that a government "slideback" can be prevented, and the turn toward the left maintained and accelerated. It is therefore pressing forward aggressively with an economic program which calls for the nationalization of 75 "monopoly [*i.e.*, big business] houses" as well as of foreign-owned concerns such as the three American oil companies, the expansion and strengthening of the public sector of the economy, radical agrarian reforms providing for the distribution of land to the landless and tenant farmers, the gradual integration of the Indian economy with those of the socialist countries, severe restrictions on economic relations with the United States and other capitalist countries, and a moratorium on foreign debts.

Current Outlook of the CPI (M)

The CPI(M), on the contrary, rejects the main premise of CPI's strategy, namely, that the Congress party of Indira Gandhi reflects a leftward shift of the balance of social forces in India. In a resolution adopted by the party's Ninth Congress, held at Cochin in 1972,[33] the Marxists insist that the Congress party is still the party of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, and that the "progressive" measures it has taken since 1969 are deceptive in nature, hollow in content, and actually designed to serve the class interests of the "bourgeois-landlord" state better and more efficiently. For instance, the party claims that the nationalization of banks was, in the main, "intended to centralize banking resources in the hands of the government in the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, without at the same time injuring the interests of the monopolists," and that nationalization, in the hands of the "bourgeois-landlord" government, can never be an effective instrument to control capitalist industry and meet the needs of the common people. In the view of the CPI(M), the ruling party has now secured a virtual "monopoly of power," and its "impatience and intolerance" toward all opposition indicate that it will not surrender that power easily, thus foreshadowing "a likely trend toward one-party dictatorship."

An estimated 50,000 farmers from the environs of Calcutta demonstrate in September 1970 under leadership of the Communist Party of India to protest shortages of land, homes and jobs.

—Keystone.

The Ninth CPI(M) Congress resolution points to the conduct of the 1971–72 elections—particularly the tactics employed by the ruling party in West Bengal—as clear-cut evidence of the Congress leaders' readiness to cast parliamentary democracy aside whenever "it ceases to serve their purpose." As the Marxists see it, the Congress party was able to overwhelm its right-wing adversaries and win big electoral majorities in most of the states by virtue of its adoption of a progressive and socialist "pose." On the other hand, in West Bengal, where it faced a serious challenge from the "united left forces," it did not hesitate to resort to "fraudulent means" and "semi-fascist terror" in order to assure its electoral success. The Marxists therefore contend that what the Congress leaders fear most—and hence the main target of their offensive—is really the "genuinely democratic forces" led by the CPI(M).

However, the CPI(M) does not regard the big Congress majorities in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures as indicative of stability and believes that the ruling party's hold on the masses is actually declining. Moreover, it foresees the inability of the government to resolve India's pressing economic and social problems and the re-eruption of factional squabbles in the Congress leadership. Under these conditions, the party maintains that the main task of the revo-

[33] *Political Resolution*, Ninth CPI(M) Congress, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.

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lutionary movement is to forge the broadest possible unity of left and democratic forces from below by means of patient mass struggle based on a common program responsive to the needs and demands of the people.

The CPI(M)'s interpretation of the "present situation" in India stems mainly from its own political experience of the last several years. The Marxists learned in the course of that period, particularly during 1969–71, that only by politicizing the rural poor could they build up a strong and effective base of support. But they also realized that the party's effort to accomplish this must necessarily arouse intense resistance because the creation of a militant agrarian movement under CPI(M) leadership would unleash a revolutionary force of tremendous power that would drastically alter the balance of political forces and hence undermine the foundations of the existing order. The Marxists further learned from the events in West Bengal that the uneven, localized pattern of the radical peasant movement had made it relatively easy for the government to flush out the party's rural bases in that state, and that the CPI(M) could hardly expect to stage a successful comeback via the parliamentary process unless it could build up sizable support bases in several states—preferably contiguous to each other. Nevertheless, the party appears as yet unprepared to resort to non-parliamentary methods as its main tactical line, although there is apparently a strong minority in the leadership and among the party cadres who are highly skeptical of the relevance of the parliamentary path to the realization of the party's revolutionary goals. The CPI(M) thus finds itself subjected to two contrary pulls—a rightward pull toward adherence to the parliamentary path, and a leftward pull toward a resort to non-parliamentary methods of militant struggle.

A February 1971 election rally of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in a West Bengal village.

—Piedro Farrini—Gamma.

Meanwhile, the party has formulated a new position on the "nationalities question" that completely reverses the Communists' traditional attitude on this issue. The united CPI championed and often stood at the forefront of movements of the various ethnic-linguistic groups to redraw India's state boundaries largely on the basis of language. Thus, the Communists spearheaded the movements for separate states for the Telugus, Maharashtrians, and Gujaratis, and they thereby gained considerable popular support among these groups. However, as soon as a particular movement succeeded in attaining its objective, the Communists found that their supporters deserted them to go over to the party of the national bourgeoisie. In light of this experience, the Ninth Congress of the CPI(M) resolved not to support "bourgeois movements" for linguistic states, on the ground that the real question at issue was "not one oppressor nation dominating, economically and politically, one or several oppressed nations, but a question of the big-bourgeois-landlord classes of different big and small nationalities of the Indian Union holding political power and pursuing the capitalist path of development in collaboration with foreign finance capital." The resolution stated:

What we find is more in the nature of class exploitation and oppression by the big bourgeoisie, landlords, and foreign monopolists rather than political oppression *of the Indian people by the foreign imperialists or the oppression of different Indian nationalities at the hands of one or the other oppressor nations of India. . . . A clear and careful study would reveal that most of the demands raised and voiced by several bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, though they assume national trappings, are really class demands born out of the class rule and exploitation of the bourgeois-landlord regime and its bankrupt path of capitalist development. While the proletariat and its genuine Communist Party shall have to unequivocally champion the real equality and autonomy of the states in the Indian Union and oppose any and every manifestation of national oppression, it cannot but take serious note of the alarming developments that seriously threaten the unity of the working class and the toiling people of*

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India at the hands of narrow nationalists and chauvinists of the different nationalities.[34]

In line with the party's rejection of the CPI thesis that the present Indian state can be transformed into a state of "national democracy," the Ninth Congress also drew up the outlines of a new Indian constitution embodying the CPI(M)'s own concept of an alternative state of "people's democracy." This document, which in effect represents the party's model for India's political and economic development, calls for the Indian Union to be a federation "based on democratic centralism," with all the states enjoying "real autonomy and equal power." It further provides that the "supreme authority in exercising state power shall be the people's representatives elected on the basis of adult franchise and the principle of proportional representation and subject to recall"; and that elections to parliament, the state assemblies, and local bodies shall all be held on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage and the secret ballot. "Full civil liberties" will be guaranteed, including freedom of conscience, of religious belief and worship, of speech, press, and assembly, of strike and combination, and of movement and choice of occupation"; and all national languages will have an equal status in parliament and the central administration.[35]

[34] *National Question in India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.
[35] *Ninth Congress Resolutions*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.

Should the Marxists ever succeed in setting up their "people's democratic" state in India, it is quite likely that many of these promised constitutional rights and freedoms will be denied to the people in actual practice. The main point of interest here, however, is that neither Indian Communist group articulates a preference for any form of proletarian dictatorship—that both continue to speak in terms of representative institutions. Thus, India's political experience as a parliamentary democracy casts a visible influence on the alternative models of development sketched out by both parties.

The crucial question is whether the Communists can successfully acquire a share in governing power, and ultimately perhaps even capture power entirely, by working mainly through the parliamentary process. For the present, both Communist groups evidently remain convinced that parliamentary institutions can effectively be used to advance their goals, and while there is a growing emphasis on extraparliamentary tactics of mass mobilization, these tactics are primarily intended to radicalize the parliamentary process rather than to replace it with a proletarian dictatorship. If, however, India's Communists should come to feel that they are being denied the gains they can justifiably expect to make via the electoral route, then it is conceivable that they may be tempted to revise their political strategy as well as their basic position with respect to representative institutions.

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Kerala and West Bengal

By Donald S. Zagoria

Over a 20-year period the Communist movement has managed to put down substantial roots in two states of India—Kerala and West Bengal. Data from two recent sets of polls taken by the very reputable, New Delhi-based Indian Institute of Public Opinion provide some illuminating insights and contrasts concerning the character of communism in these areas.

Much has been written about the split in the Indian Communist movement in 1964 and the subsequent emergence of two major contending factions —the "left-wing" Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), and the "right-wing" Communist Party of India, or CPI.[1] Over the years these parties have developed dramatically different patterns of strategy, organization and leadership, a subject to be treated in detail in a companion piece by Bhabani Sen Gupta. To add a brief word so as to set the context here, the split in Indian communism has to some degree resulted from factional disputes sparked by the Sino-Soviet rift; but to a much greater extent it has reflected an internal debate that has gone on ever since India achieved independence, centering on differing conceptions of the class character of the dominant Congress party and differing revolutionary strategies which follow from those conceptions. The "left-wing" CPI(M) has consistently viewed the Congress party and government as a tool of the reactionary "bourgeois-landlord" class coalition, while the "right-wing" CPI has viewed the Congress as representing in part, at least, the "progressive" sections of the national bourgeoisie who need to be supported in their struggle against more reactionary groups. In more practical terms, the debate has centered on whether the Indian Communists could better win state power—or at least exercise influence—by cooperating with the "left wing" of the Congress or by seeking to replace the Congress with a coalition of anti-Congress parties.[2] Whatever one's view of these strategic conceptions, the fact is that the CPI(M) has been more successful than the CPI in developing a mass following because it has maintained an identity separate from that of the Congress and because it has, far more than the CPI, grasped the importance of the peasantry as a potential revolutionary force.

This much said and done, the intriguing fact is that the polls in question strongly suggest there are greater differences between the character of communism in Kerala and in West Bengal than there are differences between the followers of the CPI and the CPI(M) in each state. In analyzing the information that has emerged, the author's intention is not to minimize the crucial divergences between the two parties in terms of strategy, organization and leadership, but rather to assert the *greater* importance of long-range factors which have shaped the nature of communism and its appeal in the two states.

[1] A third faction split away from the CPI(M) in 1969 after disavowing electoral politics and embracing a strategy of guerrilla warfare. This group, called the "Naxalites," formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI (M-L). It was rather quickly reduced to insignificance as a political force as a result of a government crackdown on its activities and its own counterproductive tactics.

[2] For a more detailed discussion, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1972, as well as his article in this issue. Also see Mohan Ram, *Indian Communism*, New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1969. For a good history of communism in West Bengal, see Marcus S. Franda, *Radical Politics in West Bengal*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971; for a history of communism in Kerala, see Robert Hardgrave, "The Origins of the Communist Party in Kerala," in Paul R. Brass and Marcus Franda, *Radical Movements in South Asia*, MIT Press, 1972.

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Among other things, data from the polls confirm that communism in West Bengal is essentially a middle- and lower-middle-class phenomenon of the towns and cities, while communism in Kerala has succeeded to a much greater extent in establishing a base among the low-caste, low-income groups who actually till the soil.[3] Moreover, the typical Communist voter in Kerala, although a lower-caste peasant, is more politically conscious than the typical middle-class Communist voter in West Bengal.

It has long been recognized among students of Indian communism that the social base of communism in West Bengal differs from the social base of communism in Kerala. In this respect, the writer may simply be reaffirming what is generally known. At the same time, the data available from the polls allow three lines of investigation that to the writer's knowledge have not been pursued before. First, it is now possible to specify fairly precisely the backgrounds of the Communist voters in both states in terms of education, income and occupation. Second, since the polls were taken in 1971 and 1972, it is possible to test the hypothesis advanced by some observers that the Communists in West Bengal, although previously confined largely to the cities and towns, have made big inroads into the countryside as a result of the "land-grab" movement they sanctioned while in power in 1969-70. Third, it is possible to compare the political attitudes of the Communist voters in the two states on a whole spectrum of issues ranging from their attitudes toward the Congress and Indira Gandhi to their views on bringing about social change.

[3] There is a considerable, if not precise, relationship between caste and class in India, particularly in the countryside. About 50 percent of the landless laborers are "untouchables," and the remainder are disproportionately from low-caste groups. Conversely, most of the landowners, particularly the wealthier ones, belong to upper castes. For example, in the villages in the southern part of Kerala (where the writer conducted a first-hand investigation of rural politics in the spring of 1972), the landowners were almost exclusively from the Nair caste, the "dominant" caste in Kerala, and the poor peasants were largely "untouchables" or Christians who had converted to Christianity to escape "untouchable" status. As Barrington Moore, Jr. has suggested, caste has been a convenient tool which the upper classes in the Indian countryside have used to preserve their privileges; it has also been an obstacle to any radical movement seeking to unify the poor peasants on the basis of their low-class status. Unfortunately, only a few anthropologists and political scientists have studied class, as opposed to caste, relations in rural India. This gap has helped to obscure enormous class differences and considerable class exploitation in the countryside and has indirectly helped to provide misleading conclusions about the problem of "modernization." Only quite recently has the Indian government begun to turn serious attention to the need for radical land reform.

The first of the two polls was conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (hereafter IIPO) prior to the national parliamentary elections of March 1971, the second prior to state assembly elections in March 1972. The polls were run on a state-to-state basis and of course reflected all shades of Indian political opinion. To enable the present writer to undertake this analysis, the IIPO was kind enough to rerun the coded responses so as to single out the samples of those who indicated an advance intention to vote for candidates of one of the two Communist parties in the two sets of elections. The terms "Communist voters" and "Communist following," used throughout this paper, refer to these samples (and do not necessarily denote party membership). The data on Communist voters in West Bengal are taken wherever possible from the 1972 poll since the sample of such voters was considerably greater for that year than in the 1971 poll. The data on Communist voters in Kerala are extracted from the 1971 poll, since assembly elections were not held in Kerala in 1972 and therefore no poll was taken in that state.

A word must be said about the reliability of the samples. Let us consider first the two polls in West Bengal. The total number of respondents to the 1971 poll was 500, of whom 164, or 32.8 percent, indicated an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and 44, or 9 percent, indicated an intention to vote for the CPI. These figures compare with actual shares of 32.4 percent of the March 1971 vote for the CPI(M) and 8.7 percent for the CPI. The closeness of the percentages suggests that the random sample of 500 voters in West Bengal did in fact include a representative proportion of CPI(M) and CPI voters. Since the Communist voters were selected on a random basis, the samples of the CPI(M) and CPI voters also would appear to be representative within the normal statistical limits of their sizes. The total number of respondents to the 1972 poll in West Bengal was 1,000, of whom there were 339 CPI(M) voters and 80 CPI voters. Thus, 33.9 percent of the sample expressed an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and 8 percent for the CPI. These figures compare with actual shares of 27.5 percent of the March 1972 vote for the CPI(M) and 8.4 percent for the CPI. The discrepancy in the case of the CPI(M) may be attributable to what its leaders have called—not without some justification—a "reign of unbridled terror and physical attacks" against CPI(M) candidates and supporters, particularly in areas where the party has traditionally been strong. While this is not the place

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Table 1: Occupational Breakdown of CPI(M) and CPI Voters in West Bengal

	CPI(M) Urban	CPI Urban	CPI(M) Rural	CPI Rural	CPI(M) Total	CPI Total	CPI(M) Percentage	CPI Percentage
Professionals, including salaried and self-employed professionals	4	4	—	—	4	4	1	5
Business and retail traders	23	3	19	2	42	5	12	6
Govt. officials and business executives	12	1	—	—	12	1	4	1
White-collar workers, including clerks, assistants and school teachers	64	11	30	8	94	19	28	25
Skilled workers and foremen	15	4	17	1	32	5	10	5
Unskilled workers and farm laborers	13	3	20	3	33	6	10	8
Owner cultivators	—	—	4	2	4	2	1	2
Non-owner cultivators (sharecroppers and tenants)	—	—	24	4	24	4	7	5
Unemployed	12	6	6	1	18	7	5	9
Housewives	30	8	37	15	67	23	20	29
Students	6	1	2	3	8	4	2	5
Others	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—
TOTAL	179	41	160	39	339	80	100	100

SOURCE: Indian Institute of Public Opinion poll taken in January–February 1972 on the eve of the State Assembly elections.

to examine charges of election irregularities which are now being investigated in India, the tremendous losses suffered by the CPI(M) in 1972 in constituencies of traditional strength lends credence to its complaints.[4]

The total number of respondents to the 1971 Kerala poll was 350, of whom there were 106 CPI(M) voters and 34 CPI voters. Thus, about 33 percent of those queried said that they intended to vote for the CPI(M), and almost 10 percent of the total indicated that they planned to vote for the CPI. In reality, 22.5 percent of the electorate voted for the CPI(M) in March 1971, and 9.2 percent voted for the CPI. The discrepancy with respect to the percentage of CPI(M) voters could be the result of two basic factors. A number of those polled may ultimately have changed their minds about how they would cast their ballots or did not answer the investigator truthfully, or the situation may have been due to statistical chance. In view both of the random character of the sample and of the commitment involved in expressing a preference for the non-ruling CPI(M), the latter factor would seem the more likely explanation. Such a situation does not, however, undermine the representativeness of the sample of the CPI(M) voters; it merely affords a larger sample of the total. As the Communist voters were picked on a random basis, the samples of the CPI(M) and the CPI appear to be representative within the normal statistic limits of their sizes.[5]

[4] With a sample of 164, the results of the 1971 poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in an investigation of all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 5 percent two times out of ten; with a sample of 44, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters could have differed from that obtained in an investigation of all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 10 percent two times out of ten. The margin for error in the 1971 poll is therefore fairly high.

The margin for error in the 1972 poll is much less, particularly in the case of the CPI(M). With a sample of 339, the results of the poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in an investigation of all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 5 percent only 7 times out of 100; with a sample of 80, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters in 1972 could have differed from that obtained in an investigation of all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 9 percent one time out of ten. For a complete discussion of sampling techniques, and the table on which these and subsequent calculations are based, see E. Terrence Jones, *Conducting Political Research*, New York, Harper and Row, 1971, p. 65.

[5] With a sample of 106, the results of the poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in questioning all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 8 percent one time out of 10; with a sample of 34, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters could have differed from that obtained in querying all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 15 percent one time in 10.

Despite the statistically high margins for error because of the relatively small number of respondents in the polls (though this is less true in the case of the 1972 poll in West Bengal), several factors justify some degree of confidence in the various results. These factors include the very close relationship between the proportion of respondents indicating an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and the CPI and the actual outcome of the elections; the fact that these were random samples; and the fact that all the income groups in the state were more or less well represented in the samples. Moreover, the general findings do not conflict with what is generally known about the social bases of the Communist movement in West Bengal and Kerala.

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Let us turn now to an examination in detail of information yielded by the polls—first, with respect to the bases of Communist support in the two states, and then with respect to the attitudes of the voters.

The Communist Base in West Bengal

The first fact to be noted from Table I is that 55 percent of the CPI(M) voters and 42 percent of the CPI voters in West Bengal are white-collar workers, business and retail traders, skilled workers, professionals, and government officials—*i.e.,* those in the first five categories of the table, listed roughly in order of their respective strength. Together, these groups fall solidly in the urban and rural middle classes. To them must be added a significant portion of voters listing themselves as "housewives," who, it appears likely, are largely from middle-class homes. Thus it seems fair to estimate that about two-thirds of the voters for both the CPI(M) and the CPI in West Bengal come from the urban and rural middle class.

A slight majority of the CPI(M) and CPI voters in West Bengal are from urban areas. Of those who come from rural areas, most are non-cultivators; they are retail traders, white-collar workers, skilled workers or housewives. Only about one-third of the CPI(M)'s rural constituency and about one-fourth of the CPI's rural constituency in West Bengal are cultivators, sharecroppers, farm laborers or rural unemployed.

Table 2: Income of Communist Voters in West Bengal

	CPI		CPI(M)	
Income (Monthly in rupees*)	No.	%	No.	%
Up to 150	22	28	121	35
151 to 300	27	34	84	25
301 to 500	10	12	81	24
501 to 750	8	10	25	7
751 to 1000	—	—	9	3
Above 1000	3	4	3	1
Refused [to report]	10	12	16	5
TOTAL	80	100	339	100

* 1 rupee = $.14 at the official exchange rate.

SOURCE: IIPO 1972 poll.

Table 3: Education of Communist Voters in West Bengal

	CPI		CPI(M)	
Amount of Education	No.	%	No.	%
Illiterate	5	6	52	15
Primary or less	29	36	76	23
Some secondary	15	19	72	21
Secondary completed	17	21	95	28
University degree or some university	14	18	44	13
TOTAL	80	100	339	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1972 poll.

That communism in West Bengal remains largely a middle-class phenomenon can be demonstrated by examining the incomes of the Bengal Communist voters. As Table 2 shows, only 35 percent of the CPI(M) voters, and 28 percent of the CPI voters, come from the lowest income group. Some 49 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal earn between 151 and 500 rupees a month, or 1,800-6,000 rupees a year, an appreciable income in India. While no detailed analyses have been made of rural or urban income in India as a whole, one recent study concludes that most urban workers earn less than 100 rupees per month and few more than 200.[6] Rural incomes are unquestionably lower.

In terms of education, too, Table 3 shows that the typical West Bengal Communist voter does not come from the lowest rung of society. While the proportion of illiterates is substantially higher than in Kerala (as we shall see), it can nevertheless be seen that 62 percent of the CPI(M) voters and 58 percent of the CPI voters have had more than primary education, and about 40 percent of each party's voters have completed secondary education, have had some university education, or have earned a university degree.

In sum, a preponderant majority of the Communist voters in West Bengal, come from middle- and lower middle-class occupations, from middle-income groups, and from the relatively well-educated. On the basis of poll results, it also seems clear that neither the CPI(M) nor the CPI in West Bengal has yet established a significant following among the

[6] George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, p. 47.

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rural poor—potentially the most revolutionary class in India. This situation contrasts markedly with the social base of the Communist parties in the state of Kerala.

The Kerala Communist Base Compared

Whether examined in terms of rural *vs.* urban support, occupation, income, or education, the social base of both the CPI(M) and the CPI in Kerala is quite different from that of the same parties in West Bengal. First, as Table 4 shows, some 90 percent of the CPI(M) following and some 80 percent of the CPI following in Kerala is rural, compared to about half of the CPI(M) and CPI following in West Bengal (as shown in Table I). Even if we allow for definitional problems as to what constitutes "rural," the data make unmistakably clear that the strength of communism in Kerala is not in the large cities and urban areas, as it is in West Bengal.

The occupational breakdown in Table 4 also shows that 45-47 percent, or close to half, of the total CPI(M) and CPI base in Kerala comes from farm laborers, cultivators (most of whom, we shall see later, own less than three acres), sharecroppers or rural unemployed. Both Communist parties in Kerala also have a sizable base among the rural middle classes—*i.e.*, rural teachers, government servants in rural areas, etc. This contrasts with the largely urban middle-class Communist base in West Bengal.

In terms of income, as Table 5 shows, 59 percent of the CPI voters and 51 percent of the CPI(M) voters in Kerala come from the lowest income groups. This compares to 28 percent of the CPI base and 35 percent of the CPI(M) base in West Bengal. With respect to voters earning more than 301 rupees per month, the CPI in Kerala has only 9 percent of its following in the higher income categories, in contrast to 26 percent of its following in West Bengal. In the same income categories the CPI(M) in Kerala has only 7 percent of its following, in contrast to 35 percent of its following in West Bengal.

In terms of education, too, there is a marked difference between the Communist voters in the two states. The West Bengal Communist electorate has a much higher percentage of illiterate voters, amounting to 15 percent of the CPI(M) and 6 percent of the CPI. In Kerala, illiterate voters represent a virtually insignificant 1 percent of the CPI(M) and a nil percentage of the CPI. By contrast, at the other end of the educational scale, West Bengal Communist voters have completed more higher education than their counterparts in Kerala. Thus, only 4 percent of the CPI voters in Kerala have a university degree or some university schooling, while the equivalent figure in West Bengal is 13 percent. Similarly, only 3 percent of the CPI voters in Kerala have a university education, compared to 18 percent of the CPI voters in West Bengal.

Table 4: Occupational Breakdown of CPI(M) and CPI Voters in Kerala

	CPI(M) Urban	CPI Urban	CPI(M) Rural	CPI Rural	CPI(M) Total	CPI Total	CPI(M) Percentage	CPI Percentage
Professionals, including salaried and self-employed professionals	—	—	5	2	5	2	5	6
Business and retail traders	2	1	13	2	15	3	14	9
Government officials and business executives	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—
White-collar workers, including clerks, assistants and school teachers	3	—	14	4	17	4	16	12
Skilled workers and foremen	2	2	11	4	13	6	12	17
Unskilled workers and farm laborers	1	1	19	7	20	8	19	23
Owner cultivators	—	—	9	2	9	2	8	6
Non-owner cultivators (share-croppers and tenants)	—	—	2	—	2	—	2	—
Unemployed	1	1	16	5	17	6	16	18
Housewives	2	1	5	2	7	3	7	9
Students	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	11	6	95	28	106	34	100	100

SOURCE: Indian Institute of Public Opinion poll taken in January–February 1971, on the eve of the national parliamentary election.

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Table 5: Income of Communist Voters in Kerala

Income (Monthly in rupees)	CPI		CPI(M)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Up to 150	20	59	54	51
151 to 300	10	29	25	23
301 to 500	3	9	5	5
501 to 750	—	—	1	1
751 to 1000	—	—	1	1
Above 1000	—	—	—	—
Unspecified	1	3	20	19
TOTAL	34	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 6: Education of Communist Voters in Kerala

Amount of Education	CPI		CPI(M)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Illiterate	—	—	1	1
Primary or less	16	47	45	42
Some secondary	11	32	23	22
Secondary completed	6	18	33	31
University degree or some university	1	3	4	4
TOTAL	34	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

To sum up thus far, the Kerala Communist voters, as compared to the West Bengal Communist voters, are more overwhelmingly rural, more likely to come from the lowest classes in the countryside who are landless or land-poor, more likely to come from the lowest income groups, but at the same time much more likely to be literate though not highly educated. In other words, communism in Kerala is much more of a mass phenomenon, particularly in the countryside, than communism in West Bengal, which remains top-heavy in terms of the class, caste, and education of its supporters, and which has not established a statewide mass base among the rural poor.

These findings raise an interesting question. Several analysts (including Bhabani Sen Gupta [7]) have suggested that there was the beginning of a breakthrough by the Communists among the rural poor in West Bengal as a result of the "land-grab" movement sanctioned by the CPI(M) when it was in power for several months in 1969-70. It has been alleged that the 1971 elections in West Bengal demonstrated much greater CPI(M) strength in the countryside than did previous elections. Still, of a total 1972 sample of 339 CPI(M) voters in West Bengal, almost half of whom are rural, only a maximum of 54 voters —or 16 percent—are agricultural laborers, poor cultivators, sharecroppers or rural unemployed (see Table 1). It may well be that this 16 percent of the total CPI(M) constituency is larger now than ever before; the writer has not analyzed earlier polls in order to test the proposition. But even allowing for the likelihood that the party has begun to make inroads among the rural poor, one must conclude from the poll data that on a statewide basis the CPI(M) in West Bengal remains overwhelmingly a party with a middle-class following. The same is true of the CPI in West Bengal. What seems likely is that the land-grab movement helped the CPI(M) spread its influence among the rural poor in a few districts where the party was already strong in nearby urban areas—but not in the rural areas of the state in general. This in turn reflects another important difference between communism in Kerala and West Bengal. In Kerala, Communist influence is more evenly spread throughout and within all nine districts of the state. In West Bengal, Communist influence is still very weak and even non-existent in some of the 16 districts of the state, particularly in the north, and it also has an uneven impact in those districts where communism is strong.[8]

[7] Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *loc. cit.*

[8] In the nine districts of Kerala, the percent of the vote won by the CPI(M) and CPI combined, averaging returns for the elections of 1957, 1962 and 1967, was: Trivandrum, 38.1; Quilon, 38.1; Kottayam, 36.3; Alleppey, 38.2; Ernakulam, 34.0; Trichur, 38.2; Kozhikode, 19.9; Cannanore, 38.5; Palghat, 46.0. The writer has not incorporated averages since 1967, but the percentage of the Communist vote in each district has remained quite stable ever since 1957. In sum, in eight of nine districts, the combined Communist vote is higher than 30 percent, and in the remaining district it is about 20 percent.

Of 16 districts in West Bengal, the combined average percent of the vote won by the CPI(M) and CPI in 1957, 1962 and 1967 was: Cooch Behar, 13.8; Jaipalguri, 14.2; Darjeeling, 21.1; West Dinjapur, 14.9; Malda, 17.3; Murshidabad, 3.9; Nadia, 20.8; 24 Parganas, 29.7; Calcutta, 34.2; Howrah, 23.6; Hooghly, 27.6; Midnapore, 21.1; Purulia, 5.1; Bankura, 18.7; Burdwan, 50.3; Birbhum, 12.0. Thus, in two districts the Communist vote was 30 percent or higher, in six districts it was between 20 and 30 percent, in six districts it was between 10 and 20 percent, and in two districts it was below 10 percent.

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Table 7: Landholdings of Communist Voters in Kerala and West Bengal

	CPI				CPI(M)			
	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
Size of Landholding	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One acre or below	—	—	3	9	3	2	16	15
Two acres	2	5	1	3	2	1	11	10
Three acres	—	—	1	3	—	—	7	7
Four acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	2	2
Five acres	1	2	—	—	4	2	2	2
Six to ten acres	—	—	2	6	2	1	3	3
11 to 15 acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	—	—
More than 15 acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	—	—
Unspecified	—	—	—	—	5	3	1	1
Nil	38	87	27	79	145	88	64	60
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: The data for Kerala are taken from the same sample used elsewhere. The data from West Bengal are taken from the 1971 poll in that state because the 1972 West Bengal poll did not include a question on the size of landholdings. See explanation of samples on pp. 17-18. The "nil" category includes both urban dwellers without land and landless laborers in the countryside.

Another difference between communism in West Bengal and Kerala is revealed in Table 7. The Kerala landholders who support the Communists are mainly those with three acres or less of land; the West Bengal landholders who support the Communists are as likely to have more than five acres as to have less. This suggests that class polarization has gone further in Kerala than in West Bengal, where many relatively large landowners probably continue to support the Communists as a means of exercising pressure on the nationally-dominant Congress party. It can be presumed that support of this sort is more typical of those districts in West Bengal where the Communists have not yet begun to mobilize the poor against the larger owners. Wherever they have commenced to do so—as they have in most of Kerala—it seems unlikely that relatively large owners would continue to support them.

Political Attitudes

Paralleling divergences in the respective social bases of communism in Kerala and West Bengal, the attitudes of Communist voters in the two states also reveal a wide range of differences. On many questions, the Kerala Communist voters repeatedly exhibit a higher degree of "political consciousness" than their counterparts in West Bengal. This fact is underscored by the consistently large number of "don't know" responses from Communist voters in West Bengal to questions on which the Communist parties have clearly articulated views—and on which the Communist voters in Kerala profess sharp preferences which follow party lines. Some examples are given in Tables 8 and 9 (both of which are based on the 1971 poll, as are the remaining tables in this article).

It seems remarkable that 52 percent of the CPI and CPI(M) voters in West Bengal indicated they did not know whether the Old Congress represented the rich or the poor, despite years of anti-Congress propaganda in Communist media stressing that the Old Congress was the tool of big business. An additional 7 or 8 percent of the West Bengal Communist voters said they thought the Old Congress represented all classes or the poor. The overwhelming majority of Kerala Communist voters, on the other hand, had few doubts that the Old Congress represented the rich. It is similarly remarkable that the Communist voters in West Bengal were consistently unable or unwilling to state whether well-known Congress leaders represented the rich, or the poor, or all classes. Morarji Desai, in particular, has been a *bête noire* of Communist propaganda for the past two decades. While a bit of confusion on some lesser known Congress leaders might be understandable, one would scarcely expect a Communist voter to have any doubts at all about the political position of Desai. Yet 36 percent of the CPI voters and 60 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal indicated they did not know whether Desai represented

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the poor, the rich, or all classes. Altogether more than 50 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal responded "don't know" to the queries on Mrs. Gandhi, Chavan, Jagjivan Ram, and Desai. By contrast, the highest proportion of "don't know" responses from CPI(M) voters in Kerala on the politics of any of these leaders was 17 percent.

The West Bengal Communist voters were also less willing or able to generalize from their own experiences than the Kerala Communist voters. For example, one question asked how the individual voter would be treated if he had to talk about a problem with a government official. The responses are indicated in Table 10. Besides the larger number of "don't knows" from West Bengal voters, the table shows a greater degree of alienation from government in Kerala than in West Bengal. A large number of Kerala Communist voters were convinced that they would be treated in a hostile way by the government official, while a large percentage of West Bengal Communist voters were convinced that they would be treated politely.

The typical Communist supporter in Kerala appears to be not only more decisive and more alienated from government, but also more loyal to his party, more aware of the importance of voting, and generally more politicized than his counterpart in West Bengal. This is reflected in Tables 11, 12, and 13. Table 11 shows that Communist voters in Kerala are more likely to go to the polls for their party than Communist voters in West Bengal. Loyalty to party is strong in both states but extraordinarily strong in Kerala, where more than 90 percent of CPI and CPI(M) voters think it is important to vote.

Table 12 shows the reaction to a question asking respondents what they felt could be done to prevent the government from taking a decision they regarded as unjust or harmful. Kerala Communist supporters, to a much greater degree than those in West Bengal, thought they could get results by working through a party (meaning, presumably, their own Communist organization). The West Bengal Communist voters chose other ways first, such as working with friends or neighbors or working through *any*

Table 8: Political Opinions of Communist Voters

	CPI				CPI(M)			
	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
Questions	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
New Congress represents—								
The poor	6	14	20	59	8	5	11	10
The rich	8	18	2	6	54	33	49	46
All classes	8	18	10	29	21	13	26	25
Don't Know	22	50	2	6	81	49	20	19
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100
Old Congress represents—								
The poor	1	2	1	3	4	2	1	1
The rich	18	41	30	88	66	40	84	79
All classes	2	5	—	—	9	6	5	5
Don't know	23	52	3	9	85	52	16	15
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100
Do you agree that, with the split in the Congress, the Government at the Center cannot be stable unless a National Government of like-minded parties is formed?								
Agree	22	50	27	79	58	35	90	85
Disagree	4	9	2	6	10	6	2	2
Can't say	18	41	5	15	96	59	14	13
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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Table 9: Political Opinions of Communist Voters

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
Which of the following in your opinion apply to these leaders?	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Mrs. Gandhi represents—								
The poor	7	16	25	71	8	5	26	25
The rich	8	18	1	3	41	25	39	37
All classes	13	30	4	12	24	15	29	27
Don't know	16	36	—	—	88	54	8	8
Y. B. Chavan represents—								
The poor	2	5	3	9	3	2	1	1
The rich	11	25	8	24	48	29	49	46
All classes	11	25	4	12	12	7	3	3
Don't know	17	39	5	15	97	59	17	16
Jagjivan Ram represents—								
The poor	4	9	12	35	2	1	13	12
The rich	12	27	2	6	49	30	37	35
All classes	8	18	5	15	11	7	6	6
Don't know	17	39	5	15	96	58	18	17
Morarji Desai represents—								
The poor	1	2	1	3	—	—	—	—
The rich	23	52	25	74	59	36	73	69
All classes	2	5	2	6	3	2	2	2
Don't know	16	36	5	15	98	60	14	13

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll. (Percentage columns do not add up to 100 because some people did not answer all questions. There were, incidentally, other questions which the writer has not felt it necessary to list here. These alternatives permitted further identification of the leaders named as "rightist," "leftist," or "centrist," and as "a person of strong convictions" or "an opportunist." Responses to the rightist, leftist, or centrist identification generally paralleled the answers to the alternatives listed in the table.)

organization. The Kerala Communist voters were also much more willing than their West Bengal counterparts to entertain the notion of a demonstration.[9]

Table 13 again attests to the greater alienation as well as politicization of the Kerala Communist voters, as shown in their responses to the question whether people should always obey the laws of the country. In West Bengal, the largest number of voters responded either with an unqualified "yes" or with a "not sure." In Kerala, the most common responses were either "yes, conditionally" or "no, conditionally."

To sum up the findings on attitudes, the Kerala voters for both the CPI and CPI(M) are more militant, more decisive, more hostile to—and alienated from—government, more willing to generalize from their own experience, and more loyal to the Communist cause than their counterparts in West Bengal.

Explanatory Factors

There are several possible explanations for the various findings outlined above. First is the aforementioned higher level of literacy in Kerala than in West Bengal—a literacy, moreover, which is more broadly diffused throughout the electorate.[10] In West Bengal there is a large educated and semi-educated urban class on the one hand, and a large class of

[9] It is worth noting that the only option which received more than 50 percent support from any one of the four groups of Communist voters was the option chosen by the CPI(M) followers in Kerala to work through a political party, presumably meaning their own. This is a good indication of the strong degree of attachment of CPI(M) voters in Kerala to the party organization.

[10] The importance of literacy as a factor increasing the political consciousness of the peasantry is analyzed by the present writer in an article entitled "Landlessness, Literacy and Agrarian Communism in India," *European Journal of Sociology* (Paris, semi-annual journal, published in French, German and English), Vol. 13, No. 2, 1972.

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illiterates on the other. In Kerala, many of the landless laborers are literate and very much aware of the outside world. This high rate of literacy has gone hand in hand with a receptivity to new and alien ideas, both of which phenomena can be attributed in part to Kerala's unusual geography and history. Over a 2,000-year period, the Kerala coast has been subjected to a series of intrusions by sea from the Middle East and from Europe more varied and more numerous than those experienced by any other people in India and perhaps in the whole Far East. The impact of these successive exposures has made the population aware of and receptive to change—a fact that was evident long before the Communists arrived on the scene.

Second, the lower classes in Kerala—particularly the Ezhava caste of agricultural laborers and poor peasants, who provide the largest single element of support for the Kerala Communists—are not only literate but have been oriented toward political struggle throughout most of this century. They were first politicized by Hindu reformers campaigning against caste discrimination in the 1920's and 1930's, and then by the Kerala Communists in the 1940's and 1950's. By contrast, the untouchable landless laborers in West Bengal are mainly illiterate and politically ignorant. There is no large, homogeneous, literate, low-caste group in West Bengal which could serve as the functional equivalent of the Ezhavas in Kerala.[11]

Third, the Ezhava community, in the process of struggling for social and political rights, produced leaders from its own ranks, many of whom were converted to Marxism and went over to the Communists. As a result, the gap between leaders and led is much smaller in Kerala than in West Bengal or indeed in most Asian societies. In West Bengal, the Communists, like most other parties, are headed by Brahmins or upper-caste Hindus from urban backgrounds who have few organic ties to the masses of the people in the countryside. It is true that many upper-caste Brahmins also occupy leading positions in the Kerala Communist movement, but they are more often than not people with close ties to the countryside. In part this is explained by the fact that there is relatively little separation between town and country in Kerala. Some 85 percent of the Keralans are still villagers. Their villages are not, however, concentrated around urban nuclei; rather, there is a broad ribbon of settlement that runs almost continuously for 300 miles up the Kerala coast.

To a significant extent, then, the Kerala Communist leaders speak the language of the peasant masses and have a long history of involvement with them—in this respect more closely resembling the Chinese Communist leadership of the 1930's and 1940's than any other state-level Communist leadership in India. The Kerala leaders were the first Communists in India to attempt to mobilize the landless laborers and poor peasants, starting in the 1940's. Notwithstanding occasional lapses, they have since

[11] For this insight the writer is indebted to Shri Tridib Chaudhuri, a member of the Indian parliament representing the Radical Socialist Party (RSP), which is allied with the CPI(M) in West Bengal and which has pockets of influence in Kerala as well; thus he has first-hand knowledge of the Communist impact in both states.

Table 10: Attitudes toward Governmental Authority

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
If you had some problem that you had to talk about with a government official, how do you think that you would be treated?	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Politely and with interest for your problem	11	25	5	15	63	38	13	12
Politely—with little or no interest	7	16	1	3	16	10	10	9
No interest	4	9	5	15	11	7	11	10
Rudely, in a hostile way	3	7	7	20	3	2	24	23
It depends	5	11	9	26	7	4	8	8
Politely, if I gave money	6	14	5	15	15	9	34	32
Do not know	8	18	2	6	49	30	6	6
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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Table 11: Attitudes about Voting

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or not.	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%
Agree	4	9	1	3	13	8	4	4
Depends	6	14	1	3	36	22	5	5
Disagree	34	77	32	94	115	70	97	91
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 12: Opinions on Effective Political Activity

Question*	CPI				CPI(M)			
Suppose that some action or policy or law is being considered by the government which you disagree with, because it was unjust or harmful, or something like that. What are the possible things you think you could do about it?	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%
1. Work with local group of friends and neighbors	15	34	14	41	38	24	32	30
2. Work through a political party	3	7	13	38	19	12	60	57
3. Work through any organization	13	32	9	26	31	19	8	8
4. Work by yourself by writing letters	6	14	2	6	20	12	9	8
5. Work by yourself by talking to the government departments concerned	7	16	1	3	11	7	4	4
6. Take the matter to court	—	—	—	—	2	1	3	3
7. Vote	5	11	—	—	4	2	3	3
8. Do something very strongly such as, march in a demonstration, but not rebel or assassinate	4	9	13	38	20	12	40	38
9. Others	1	2	—	—	2	1	2	2
10. Don't know	5	11	4	12	31	19	8	8
11. Nothing	7	16	2	6	30	18	6	6
BASE	44		34		164		106	

* Multiple answers were allowed.
SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 13: Attitudes toward Law

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
In your opinion, should people always obey all the laws of the country?	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%
Yes, unqualified	17	39	5	15	47	29	10	9
Yes, conditionally	8	18	17	50	22	13	44	41
Not sure, it depends	13	30	1	3	63	38	6	6
No, conditionally	5	11	11	32	19	12	41	39
No opinion	1	2	—	—	13	8	5	5
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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paid far more consistent attention to the political importance of rural elements than Communist leaders elsewhere in India. To cite a significant example, only in Kerala have the Communists established a social science research institute one of whose express purposes is to study class configurations in the countryside.

This leads to the fourth, closely related and perhaps most obvious explanation for the greater degree of politicization among the Kerala Communist voters than among the West Bengal voters. Kerala is unique among Indian states in that for the past two decades it has been the scene of more or less continuous struggle for land reform led by the Communists. When the CPI (then representing all factions of the party) first came to power in Kerala in 1957, its leaders introduced agrarian reform legislation that would have set ceilings on holdings, given occupancy rights to tenants and sharecroppers, and confirmed the ownership rights of landless laborers to the huts in which they lived. These and other reforms were delayed after the party was removed from power in 1959, but the fact that the Communists were the first to introduce them greatly increased support for the CPI among the landless and semi-landless after 1957. This was apparent from a sizable increase in the Communist share of the vote in the elections of 1960, when the CPI was only prevented from regaining a share of state power by the formation of a coalition against it. Since then, whether the Communists have been in or out of power, they have continued to agitate for agrarian reform. This has ensured them a substantial, loyal, and growing base among the rural poor of all communities.

By contrast, the West Bengal Communist leadership has been much less oriented toward the countryside, a fact which reflects in part its own social background. As is the case with all political parties in West Bengal, the leadership of the Communist movement comes from the middle and upper-middle classes—the so-called *bhadralok,* who have no real ties with the rural masses. There has been little action on the part of the West Bengal Communist leaders that can compare with the 20-year effort of the Kerala leadership to study socio-economic conditions and class formations in the countryside, to outline a program of land reform, to recruit indigenous leaders from the peasantry, and in general to politicize the rural masses.

* * *

A concluding word about the broader implications of the findings reported here is in order. Elsewhere, the writer has argued that ecological conditions unique to the "hydraulic" societies of Monsoon Asia have led to the formation of a Malthusian landless and semi-landless rural proletariat which has provided the mass base for Communist movements in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India.[12] There appear, however, to be a variety of factors that can either enhance or inhibit the revolutionary potential of this Malthusian rural proletariat. The evidence accumulated in the foregoing pages suggests the importance of literacy, leadership, and land struggles as factors that enhance the growth of revolutionary attitudes. Despite broadly similar ecological conditions in Kerala and West Bengal, the Communist movement in Kerala has emerged as a more effective and more militant political phenomenon, with much stronger rural roots than its counterpart in West Bengal—or, for that matter, than most other Communist parties in Asia. Clearly, these differences are directly tied to the fact that the rural proletariat in Kerala is literate and politically aware, is led by Communist parties oriented toward the countryside, and has participated in land struggles for more than two decades.

[12] See "The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 45, No. 1, March 1971; "Landlessness, Literacy and Agrarian Communism in India," *loc. cit.;* and "The Peasant as a Communist Revolutionary in Asia," paper prepared for the Research Conference on Communist Revolutions, St. Croix, V.I., Jan. 24-28, 1973.

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Sri Lanka's Marxists

By Charles S. Blackton

The Marxist parties of Ceylon—now Sri Lanka—have had a long history of legal participation in parliamentary politics. The advantages of this approach were underscored by Doric de Souza, the Trotskyist Permanent Secretary for Plantation Industries in the Government of Ceylon, in his elated reaction to the convening of the lower house of the island's parliament in July 1970 as a Constituent Assembly: "Paint the lines of a tennis court on the floor of Navarangahala so we'll remember we're legislating a revolution." [1] Indeed, in ensuing months, this Assembly—dominated by the ruling United Front Coalition, which combines the majority Buddhist-based Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Ceylon's two major Marxist parties, and a handful of independents—did contrive a substantial revision of the nation's Constitution and adopted a number of legislative measures which moved the nation closer to socialism under its new name, the Republic of Sri Lanka. While this program of change was being debated, however, the ruling coalition sustained—and only with considerable difficulty suppressed—an armed insurgency of "Marxist-Leninist" youth organized in the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna* (People's Liberation Front—JVP). This terrorist insurrection not only aggravated the economic and social problems of the island, but specifically posed a serious challenge to the established Marxist leadership.

Professor of History at Colgate University (Hamilton, New York), Mr. Blackton was a Fulbright Lecturer at the Peradeniya campus of the University of Ceylon in 1963-64. His return to this campus in 1971 as a Visiting Research Scholar afforded him a unique opportunity to witness the JVP insurgency at first hand. His studies on Ceylonese and Australian history have appeared in such journals as The Pacific Historical Review, The Journal of Asian Studies, *and* The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies.

The insurgency had its roots in the rising alienation of unemployed Sinhalese, Buddhist-born villagers from the established political groups and from the Westernized leadership of Ceylonese society; in economic inequalities exacerbated by one of the highest birthrates in Asia, which had created an unemployed and frustrated element ranging from university graduates to redundant rural laborers; and in the persistence of the caste system. In an attempt to solve these social and economic problems, successive governments, of both Right and Left, have maintained a welfare state, free education, and an almost free supply of rice. Although such policies have generated perpetual foreign-exchange imbalance and fiscal crisis, no government has dared tamper with them for fear of public rejection at the polls. In this exploitable atmosphere Ceylon's Marxist parties—despite their continued minority status—have been able to exert considerable influence on Ceylonese politics and, in particular, on the thinking of the powerful SLFP. Even the conservative United National Party has come to acknowledge the establishment of "socialism" as one of its permanent objectives.

While the Marxists have thus made significant gains by participating in "bourgeois" politics, both Marxist parties—the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samajist Party and the Ceylon Communist Party—have experienced periodic internal conflicts over the question of whether to use parliamentary or revolutionary strategies and, in particular, their practice in recent years of making a political alliance with the non-Marxist SLFP. The JVP insurgency has reopened these disputes about Marxist strategy. There is concern among established Marxists that the JVP may,

[1] Mr. de Souza confirmed having made this comment during a subsequent (1971) interview with the author in Colombo. The term *Navarangahala* means "new performance auditorium" and refers to the Colombo theater in which the Constituent Assembly met.

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indeed, be speaking the language of the future. If the youth movement should resurface, the Trotskyist and Communist parties must either join in a second repression of the JVP or try to coopt its members—possibly by modifying or abandoning the long-term involvement in parliamentary and coalition politics. While such a move might be the only way for the old-guard Marxists to regain leadership of the revolutionary movement in Sri Lanka, it incurs the risk of alienating the majority of Ceylonese voters and diminishing Marxist hopes for the attainment of ultimate national power. The Marxists' dilemma is further complicated by the fact that while there is wide public support for some of the government's recent socialist legislation redistributing land and incomes, the public is also visibly concerned about the trend toward authoritarianism in recent security measures and press controls, which it tends to identify with influential Marxist ministers in the government. This alarm is particularly evident among leaders of the Buddhist *Sangha*,[2] even though the Buddhism of the majority Sinhalese has been given pride of place in the new Constitution.

The Origins of Ceylonese Marxism

In order to comprehend the acts and dilemmas of the major Marxist parties and movements in the politics of contemporary Sri Lanka, it is necessary first to trace their origins and political profiles.[3] A formal Marxist movement first appeared in Ceylon in 1932, when Colvin R. de Silva formed the Wellawatte Mill Workers' Union. The next year he joined with a number of other Western-educated intellectuals to organize the successful *Surija Mal* (Sunflower) protest, which combined peaceful resistance to the British with popular nationalism. These same groups were mobilized to help malaria victims during the disastrous epidemic of 1934–35. From these organizational beginnings there emerged in December 1935 the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)—a pluralistic association ranging in ideology from social reformism to communism, but united in its opposition to imperialism.[4]

A decisive split in Ceylonese Marxism occurred five years later—a rift which has never been completely mended despite various subsequent alliances of expediency between the two resulting parties. In that year (1940), the LSSP expelled its Stalinist, Moscow-oriented minority and explicitly declared its own Trotskyist orientation. The expelled Stalinists immediately regrouped as the United Socialist Party, and one of its leaders, M. G. Mendis, organized the Ceylon Trade Union Federation. A series of strikes promoted by this organization led to a crackdown on the USP by the colonial administration in 1942, but the party resurfaced in 1943 as the Ceylon Communist Party (CCP). Unlike the LSSP, whose leaders had been imprisoned and which had been officially proscribed in 1942 for denouncing the Allied war effort against Germany and advocating "revolutionary defeatism," the CCP now embraced the war effort and abjured the use of strikes. It took over the "Anti-Fascist People's Front" in Ceylon and exploited the absence of active LSSP rivals to make some gains among the port and transport workers' unions.

The LSSP reappeared in 1945, only to be hit by several secession movements. First de Silva led away a group calling themselves the Bolshevik-Leninist Party. Dr. N. M. Perera succeeded in wooing them back to the LSSP in 1950, but only at the price of losing another group around Philip Gunawardena, which hoisted the rubric of the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP). Between 1952 and 1956, the VLSSP formed and then broke a working pact with the Ceylon Communist Party.

While Ceylon's Marxists vainly sought to forge unity amidst endless factional and doctrinal struggles, a new political force emerged on the center stage of opposition to the conservative United Nationalist Party (UNP), which had monopolized power

[2] *Sangha* is a collective term for the Buddhist orders in Ceylon. The largest of the sects is the Siam, which is open only to the dominant Goigama (cultivator) caste. The Amarapura sect is dominated by the important but smaller Salagama, Karava and Durava castes. Members of all castes are accepted by the smallest and newest sect—the Ramanya.

[3] Among the best studies of Marxism in Ceylon are: Robert N. Kearney, "The Communist Parties of Ceylon: Rivalry and Alliance," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, 2nd rev. ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 391–416; and "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon," in P. Brass and M. Franda, Eds., *Radical Politics in South Asia* (forthcoming); W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, chap. 5; Calvin A. Woodward, *Growth of a Party System in Ceylon*, Providence, R.I., Brown University Press, 1969; and Hector Abhayavardhana, "Categories of Left Thinking in Ceylon," *Community* (Colombo), No. 4, 1963, pp. 31–57.

[4] George J. Lerski's *Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon: A Documentary History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935–1942* (Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968) examines the rise of the largest Marxist party in Ceylon. For a Sama Samajist view, see Leslie Goonewardene, *A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party*, Colombo, Gunaratna Co., 1961.

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since independence in 1948. This was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which won a massive election victory in 1956. The SLFP proclaimed a Buddhist welfare state and promised land for the peasants, justice for the workers, and "nonalignment" in international affairs—the latter underscored by a demand for withdrawal of British forces from the island. This program attracted the Sinhalese majority of Ceylon by its moderation and emphasis on nationalism and Buddhism, and its social goals also undermined the Marxists.

Toward Political Alliances

The SLFP triumph brought home to the Marxists the marginal character of their own influence on Ceylonese voters of the 1950's and confronted them with the choice of making alliances or no-contest pacts with the SLFP or of fading into the limbo reserved for politicians without live issues. Even prior to the 1956 election, Gunawardena's VLSSP had recognized this logic and had joined with the SLFP and the Sinhalese-language exclusivists of the Bhasa Peramuna to form the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) electoral coalition. For the first time since independence, Marxists were cooperating with non-Marxists, including even the communalist members of the BP, despite the long-standing tradition of opposition to communalism and racism among Ceylon's Marxists. Meanwhile, Dr. Perera and the regular LSSP continued to resist the logic of electorial politics and to remain aloof from the SLFP. However, by the start of the 1960's, the LSSP had accepted the principles of parliamentary governance in Ceylon and, in practice, cooperated with the Bandaranaike program even while still reserving the right to criticize it sharply.

An attempt to merge the political efforts of the LSSP and CCP was made in 1963—in the form of the unsuccessful United Left Front. But another period of dissension and disunity was close at hand. Among the sources of trouble were the left-wing members of both parties, who distrusted the ULF concept and the growing commitment to parliamentarianism. Younger Marxists in particular complained that leaders of the LSSP and the CCP had begun to falter in revolutionary ardor and to sacrifice doctrinal orthodoxy. Behind these ripples of unrest came the shock waves of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which washed over Ceylon in 1963. Amid scenes of violence widely publicized in the press, the CCP expelled a pro-China group led by N. S. Shanmugathasan, General Secretary of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, who promptly formed the Ceylon Communist Party (Peking).

The LSSP experienced its own crisis in 1964 when Dr. Perera finally agreed to enter a coalition with the SLFP government, a step which marked the end of the United Left Front of 1963. In response to this step, purists within the LSSP—led by Edmund Samarakkody and Bala Tampoe (leader of the Ceylon Mercantile Union)—seceded from the party to form the LSSP (Revolutionary). The Fourth (Trotskyist) International recognized this new body and expelled the majority LSSP for its alliance with the "bourgeois" SLFP. (In a further step in 1968, Samarakkody, the "ideological purist" among the old Trotskyists, deserted the LSSP[R] and formed a minute Revolutionary Samasamajist Party.)

The CCP soon followed the LSSP in endorsing parliamentary means for achieving socialist ends, a posture signaled in deeds, if not in words. Shortly before the 1965 elections, the CCP signed a no-contest agreement with the SLFP-LSSP coalition. Although neither Marxist party fared well in the election (won by the UNP), they did survive, whereas the CCP (Peking), the LSSP(R) and other splinter groups failed to gain appreciable electoral support, forfeited their election deposits, and failed to reappear in the 1970 elections.[5]

During the 1960's the LSSP and CCP had some success in expanding their bases of support among university students, intellectuals and workers. Party leaders adopted a benign attitude towards Buddhism, and even attended religious festivals. Members of Buddhist groups were encouraged to visit Buddhist centers in the Soviet Union in an attempt to assuage Buddhist suspicion of Ceylon's Marxists.

While thus improving their public image, the LSSP and CCP moved toward an ever closer alliance with the powerful SLFP, now led by the widow of S.W R.D. Bandaranaike (who had been assassinated in 1959). The Marxists justified this tactic by pointing to the presence of "leftward-moving progressive elements" within the SLFP. Indeed, a secession of right-wing members from the latter party in 1965 did open the way for a number of ex-Marxists to

[5] It is interesting to note that in April 1972, while Shanmugathasan was on a visit to Albania, elements within the CCP (Peking), led by Watson Fernando, endorsed the United Front coalition. See *The Times of Ceylon* (Colombo), April 24, July 10 and 18, 1972.

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

Members of the Kandy branch of the Ceylon Communist Party (identified in Sinhalese and Tamil on their banners) demonstrate on behalf of the United Front coalition government in Kandy in late March 1971—the last Marxist rally there before the insurgency of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.

—Photo by Charles S. Blackton.

emerge as spokesmen and candidates of the party. The SLFP began to display a stronger commitment to socialism—evidenced by the frequent substitution of Marxian phrases for the lucid Oxfordian terms in which S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had expressed the original political rationale for the party's existence. This progressive "radicalization" of the SLFP paved the way for the formal entry of the CCP into the SLFP-LSSP coalition, and in early 1967 Mrs. Bandaranaike, leader of Ceylon's Opposition, announced formation of a United Front comprising the SLFP, the LSSP and the CCP. Although the United Front experienced a serious internal rift in 1968, when the LSSP and SLFP clashed with the Moscow-oriented CCP over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the coalition survived the crisis and was able to score a landslide victory in the May 27, 1970, general election.[6]

While the two major Marxist parties—the LSSP and the CCP—were moving closer to political cooperation with the SLFP in the second half of the 1960's, more radical elements despaired of the leadership of the two organizations and turned toward secret anti-establishmentarianism. Frustrated leftists attacked "imperialist enemies," the sins of the established Marxist leaders, and the slow pace of Ceylon's advance toward socialism in discussions among rural and middle-class youth at the universities and in study groups. It is likely that such disaffected elements were instrumental in bringing about the decision of impatient radical students to organize the JVP.[7] This movement apparently grew out of a branch of the CCP (Peking) after the secession of the Premala Kumarasiri group in the mid-1960's had permitted the elevation of young Communists to leadership of the pro-Peking party. One such leader, Patabendige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera—alias Rohana Wijeweera—an ex-student of Moscow's Lumumba University, advanced a plan for quick seizure of the government by force. This scheme was opposed by the professed Maoist, Wimal Ranasinghe, who advocated careful, long-range planning for a mass-based revolution. The dispute led to Wijeweera's expulsion from the CCP (Peking) and caused him to set up a new group allied with the followers of "Castro" Dharmasekera, which aimed at implementing a lightning "one-day revolution" to win power in Ceylon. The Senanayake (UNP) Government imprisoned Wijeweera as a security threat in the late 1960's but later released him in response to heavy pressure from the major Marxist parties. Wijeweera resumed his planning and reportedly intended to launch an uprising in April 1970 against the conservative UNP Government. His propaganda, aimed at an audience of rural Sinhalese, stressed the case against the Goigama caste, the Tamils, the Christians, the rich, and the privileged. However, weakened by the defection of Dharmasekera's group and faced with imminent general elections, Wijeweera evidently cancelled the attack order.

Although some members of the JVP advocated a vote for the UNP with the aim of increasing "corruption" and thereby generating an ideal climate for revolution, the majority (headed by men of Wijeweera's Karava caste) lent strong support to the 1970 election campaign of the United Front coali-

[6] This election brought the political demise of Philip Gunawardena, whose VLSSP had broken with the SLFP in 1959 and more recently had renounced Marxist principles in order to ally with the UNP on Buddhist communalist grounds.

[7] For materials on the origins of the JVP movement, see testimony before the Criminal Justice Commission, as reported in *The Times of Ceylon* from July to September 1972. See also Politicus, "The April Revolt in Ceylon," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), March 1972, pp. 259–74, for an interesting report from the CCP viewpoint. The author's own on-the-scene evaluations, "The Ceylon Insurgency, 1971," from which some material (in revised form) has been incorporated in the present article, appeared in the July-August 1971 issue of *Australia's Neighbours*, published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne.

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tion. However, Wijeweera warned the UF that it had better produce real socialism in a year, or the JVP would do so by direct action. When the coalition's decisive election victory was confirmed on May 28, mobs (including many young activists) provided a preview of things to come in the form of violent and threatening victory demonstrations.[8]

Before examining the role of the LSSP and CCP in the coalition governments of Mrs. Bandaranaike and discussing the dramatic insurrection raised by the JVP in 1971, it would perhaps be useful to provide brief contemporary profiles of the three Marxist movements.

The LSSP: A Profile

The Lanka Sama Samaja Party is the oldest and strongest Marxist group in Sri Lanka. Although traditionally a small, elite party led by a formidable corps of dedicated and learned socialists noted for parliamentary wit and verve, the LSSP has seen its membership swell to over 4,000 since the 1970 victory of the United Front. Consistently the best-loved party among Ceylon intellectuals, the LSSP has until recently been the choice of activist university undergraduates as well.

It would be hard to find in any parliamentary society a party distinguished by more acute, articulate leaders than the LSSP.[9] As a group they are Low Country Sinhalese, from middle-class origins, and usually of Buddhist stock. Some of the founding members were trained in Harold Laski's famous seminar at the London School of Economics. In spite of recently acquired wealth, they retain links with the Sinhalese-speaking masses and enjoy a reputation for political integrity and—as elected officials—for devotion to their constituents. Three of the present leaders hold key posts in the United Front Cabinet—Dr. N. M. Perera is Finance Minister, Colvin R. de Silva holds the portfolios of Plantation Industries and Constitutional Affairs, and Leslie Goonewardene is Minister of Communications. They are familiarly known as "N. M.," "Colvin," and "Leslie" by UF and non-UF voters alike.

[8] Lake House, the office of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Ltd., was sacked by young—possibly JVP— supporters and members of the United Front coalition parties. The JVP may have played a more significant role in marches of militant students, faculty and coalitionists in Kandy, during which the militants, in Red Guard style, harassed middle-class persons.

[9] See, for example, the Goonewardene book cited in fn. 5 above.



Leaders of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party prominent in the United Front coalition government of Sri Lanka: left, Dr. N. M. Perera, Minister of Finance; and right, Colvin R. de Silva, who—as Minister of Constitutional Affairs—drafted the Constitution of Sri Lanka promulgated on May 22, 1972.

—Photos by UPI and Charles S. Blackton.

Although the future of democracy in Sri Lanka may now hang in the balance, its survival for 25 years must in part be credited to the moderate wing of the LSSP. The spectrum of LSSP ideas extends from Marxism-Leninism at one extreme to a form of humanistic socialism or social reformism with strong elements of democracy and individualism at the other. The party's staunch anticolonialism links it to the Buddhist revival and the nationalism of Anagarika Dharmapala.[10] The LSSP remains basically Marxist, but it has adjusted its ideology to permit working with the non-Marxist majority in Ceylon. Hence, Dr. Perera has persistently advocated the expansion of socialism, usually through nonviolent methods. The goals have included the nationalization of plantations and of some industries, the establishment of collectives for peasant proprietors and of state collective farms, and the setting of ceilings on incomes and limits on landholdings. In the recent past, the LSSP has promised that if it gained control of the government it would guarantee the political rights of other parties and would yield office if legally voted out.

The continued existence of a wide range of political views within the LSSP has been fostered by

[10] The Anagarika (devotee) Dharmapala, born in 1864 as David Hewavitarane, wealthy and Western-educated, was an active promoter of Buddhism, Sinhalese nationalism, temperance, and anti-imperialism. The beliefs of this hero of modern Ceylon are stridently set forth in his book, *Return to Righteousness*, Colombo, Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1965.

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democratic procedures whch have always allowed members a voice in party decisions. However, this lack of doctrinal rigidity has not preserved the LSSP from factionalism, which has emerged on both personal and doctrinal grounds. The moderate views of some members from academic and cultural circles tend to clash with the more doctrinaire Marxist attitudes of worker-members. As a consequence, the party has normally consisted of a majority of moderates employing democratic means to attain revolutionary objectives, and a smaller and more revolutionary wing, the extreme tip of which breaks away every few years.

The Sama Samajists hold only 19 seats in the 157-member National State Assembly of Sri Lanka, but as indicated, they hold three strategic cabinet posts. In the 1970 elections, they received 433,224 votes (8.8 percent of the total popular vote). The support was largely centered in the Low Country Sinhalese, Buddhist districts in urban coastal areas from Colombo to Galle, where there are concentrations of the important Karava, Salagama and Durava minority castes. They hold another pocket of strength east of Colombo running from the interior of Western Province to the western slopes of the mountains of Sarbaragumuwa Province. In this region the voters, predominantly members of the majority Goigama caste, appear to vote LSSP more on the public service records of N. M. Perera and others than because of Marxist affiliation.

Typically, the Sama Samajist power base is urban—in the trade unions,[11] among lower governmental officials, intellectuals, and students. This spotlights the party's special problem, an inability to win village and up-country votes. Support from the Tamils of the north—based on the LSSP's anti-communalist position—vanished when the LSSP yielded to political expediency and started to support the "Sinhalese Language Only" policy. The LSSP has found little support in the Sinhalese Christian belt north of Colombo or among Muslims (Moors or Malays). All these groups have tended to vote UNP, and when they shift, as many did in 1970, they vote for the non-Marxist SLFP.

Public service trade unionists of the Government Workers' Trade Union Federation and the Government Clerical Service Union are strongly Trotskyist, but the party's principal worker base lies in Dr. Perera's Ceylon Federation of Labor, among the port and transport men, and—at times—in Bala Tampoe's Ceylon Mercantile Union. The LSSP Young League has usually been highly active, and the party is backed by papers such as *The Nation.* Although the journal *Young Socialist* expressed the views of left-wing Sama Samajists for a time (1964–67), it has since supported the moderate majority of the LSSP.

[11] See Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon,* Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1971.

The CCP: A Profile

Turning to the Ceylon Communist Party, one finds a number of inconsistencies: the existence of a parliamentary and a revolutionary wing, the championing of civil rights in recent debates and the issuance of rabble-rousing slogans in party manifestos. For nearly a decade, the CCP has had a working pact with the SLFP, an admission of the fact that it cannot achieve power in Ceylon on its own.

Discipline is a distinctive characteristic of the CCP. Its Politburo rules over an obedient, pro-Soviet membership. Unlike the LSSP, the CCP is dominated by only three leading personalities, perennially in charge of party affairs. The CCP President, Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe, is from a traditionally important family in Akuressa and brings his party the support of a voter bloc in far southern Ceylon. Pieter Keuneman, until a few months ago the General Secretary of the CCP and one of the few remaining Dutch

Leaders of the radical and moderate wings, respectively, of the Ceylon Communist Party: left, Sugiswara A. Wickremasinghe, Secretary General of the CCP since September 1972; and right, Pieter Keuneman, former Secretary General.

—Photos by Pan Asia and from *Horizont* (East Berlin), No. 23, June 1969.

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burghers in Ceylonese politics, contributes an elegance of figure and speech which recalls his distinguished career at Cambridge. As head of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, M. G. Mendis brings in a substantial worker vote.

Although the CCP often adheres to the line of the Soviet Communist Party, it is, like the LSSP, essentially Ceylon-oriented, and few believe that it wishes to introduce a strong Soviet influence into Ceylon. Party goals include nationalization of all means of production, revolutionization of all trade unions and of the working class in general, and achievement of prosperity through meeting the needs of workers and peasants and thereby encouraging greater productivity.

In 1970, the CCP reached its highest popular vote (169,229) and placed six delegates in the House of Representatives (now the Sri Lanka National Assembly). Like the LSSP, the CCP has its main power base in the Low Country Sinhalese areas of the south. The 1970 vote reflected the tendency of both Marxists and traditionalists to back a "big man" from the local elite. Thus, there is a Colombo stronghold sustained by Mendis' workers and the Keuneman charisma. In addition to a substantial base of support among the workers, the party enjoys the suport of intellectuals, students and members of the urban middle class, although the Communists periodically seem embarrassed by the presence of such white-collar elements in their "proletarian" party. CCP attacks on "feudal landlordism" have not gained up-country support except among some estate workers, but the party's calls for public takeover of banks and large estates and the import-export trade have evoked some enthusiasm in coastal areas.[12] Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese Christian voters are highly resistant to the CCP, and Buddhist Sinhalese focus their anti-Marxism on the Communists rather than on the LSSP.

The major channels of CCP recruitment are the Federation of Communist and Progressive Youth Leagues and, especially, the Ceylon Trade Union Federation. These bodies have constituted a force not only against right-wing coups, as in 1962, but also against the left-extremist uprising in 1971, in effect keeping the CCP on the side of law and order in Sri Lanka. Among Communist publications is the paper *Aththa* (Truth).

Both the LSSP and the CCP have tended to discount the revolutionary potential of rural Ceylon and therefore to ignore the progressive radicalization of unemployed rural graduates of the nation's universities which became manifest with the emergence of the JVP. From 1962 on, Marxists on the campuses have succeeded in staging increasingly violent annual student strikes, and those most receptive to this radical rhetoric have been students from rural areas who chose to take their studies in the so-called "Sinhala stream"—*i.e.*, in the Sinhalese language.[13] These young villagers, brought to the overcrowded universities in the early 1960's by the egalitarian SLFP Government, found that their degrees did not assure them employment because access to job security was largely reserved for youths from three influential Sinhalese castes or from Ceylon's Tamils, wealthy Muslims, and Dutch burghers. They therefore were receptive to Marxist denunciation of class exploitation and of bourgeois economics, but they came to regard the spokesmen of the major Marxist parties as mere rhetorical radicals and "cocktail Communists" who were drifting gradually toward social democratic positions.

The JVP rapidly took root in such fertile ground, particularly at the University of Ceylon's campus at Peradeniya and at Vidyodaya University during 1970. According to the subsequent testimony of a state's-evidence witness—the *Bhikkhu* Minipe Sobitha—both secular and religious undergraduate groups recruited for the JVP. Among the former were the All-Universities Undergraduate Movement (*Ekabadda Bala Mandalaya*), the Ceylon National Union of Students—later expelled from the CCP because of its JVP leanings—and the student-body officers of Vidyodaya, led, according to Sobitha, by the JVP's second-in-command, Mahinda Wijesekera. Student-*bhikkhu* bodies, such as the *Samajawada Sangamaya* and the *Deshapremi Bhikkhu Peramuna*, gave money, provided cover for JVP fugitives by reopening and manning abandoned temples as insurgent hideouts, and spread the word about the National Liberation Front program.[14] As noted above,

[12] See R. N. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon," *loc. cit. supra.*

[13] Courses at the University are offered in three "language streams"—Sinhalese, Tamil and English. Registration in the English "stream" fell off sharply by 1963–64, largely because of the heavy influx of rural students opting for Sinhalese. The author recalls that students from the rural areas never appeared comfortable on University campuses and moved in nervous groups which rarely mingled with the socially assured youths from Westernized elite backgrounds. The radicalization of the rural students is discussed in the testimony before the Criminal Justice Commission (see fn. 7).

[14] Reported in *The Times of Ceylon*, Aug. 17–18, 21, 23, and Sept. 5 and 9, 1972.

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the JVP's power among the educated youth of Ceylon was apparently demonstrated in the 1970 elections, in which newly-enfranchised 18-year-olds helped to give a landslide victory to the United Front coalition.

A United Front Government

As a result of the General Election, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike became Prime Minister of Ceylon in June 1970 at the head of a "broad-based government" which contained an unusually wide representation of the nation's castes, in addition to representatives of Muslim, Tamil, Catholic, and Protestant Christian elements. As noted previously, some very important posts went to Marxist members of the coalition. The United Front's election Manifesto had promised to take Ceylon out of the British Commonwealth, to establish a socialist state featuring mass popular participation in political action, to readjust foreign policy to identify closely with the socialist countries, to carry out extensive nationalization and expand the public sector of the economy, and to end inequality in incomes and landholdings. There was a general expectation that the left-of-center government would apply methods of social democracy in achieving these ends.[15]

Although the transfer of power to the coalition was peaceful like the four previous post-independence changes of government, the outbreak of violent post-election demonstrations indicated a potential for disruptive action from the left. However, the Ceylonese could find reassurance in the presence of many factors supporting the continuation of the rule of law in Ceylon. As noted by legal expert Dr. L. J. M. Cooray, these include: 1) the absence of a revolutionary tradition and the existence of a large educated elite versed in British parliamentary traditions; 2) the presence of a superior civil service, one of the most literate electorates in Asia, and free education; 3) the common cultural background of the leaders of all parties; 4) acceptance of the spirit of constitutionalism by leaders of the left; and 5) the obedience and unobtrusiveness of the numerically small armed forces.[16] In addition, a Public Security Ordinance invested the government with crisis powers which presumably could be used to assure survival of the British-type Constitution.[17]

Although committed to constitutionalism, the new government did move to effect major constitutional changes. This effort was centered in the person of Colvin R. de Silva, who served as Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the new government. In this capacity, the LSSP leader attacked many aspects of the existing constitutional order—"entrenched" legislation benefiting certain favored minorities, the practice of judicial review which negated the will of the legislature, obstruction of the popular will by Ceylon's Senate, the overrepresentation of conservative rural voters in electoral districts, and an outdated administrative system.[18] While the public was debating these issues in the fall of 1970, however, a much more ominous political development began to loom on the horizon. This was the rapidly growing strength of the JVP, with its call for revolutionary violence as the answer to footdragging by the government in the pursuit of socialism.

Shortages of food, the government's altered perception of issues once it was in power, and the need to convince and mollify the large non-Marxist majority had, in fact, slowed the progress of the United Front program, and thus spurred the JVP's inclination toward violent revolution. Despite reports of numerous JVP meetings of a seditious and insurrectionary nature, the public continued to hope that the "impossible"—armed insurgency—would not occur. Although Wijeweera denied it as late as February 1971, it now appears that the JVP had indeed decided in late 1970 to overthrow the government, to execute all officials and police, to capture or assassinate the Prime Minister, and to seize control of all administrative posts. Some conspirators allegedly advocated killing all persons over 45 to ease overpopulation and unemployment. The great tea estates were to be uprooted and planted with yam or manioc to symbolize the end of "feudalism," colonialism, and European "history" in Ceylon.[19]

[15] For an analysis of the United Front coalition and its program, see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Ceylon, a New Government Takes Office, *Asian Survey*, February 1971, pp. 179–80.

[16] See Cooray's "Constitutional Government in Ceylon," *The Ceylon Daily News* (Colombo), Sept. 5, 1970.

[17] *Ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1970.

[18] A. J. Wilson, *op. cit.* De Silva and fellow Bolshevik Leninists picketed the 1948 independence ceremonies (presided over by the Duke of Gloucester) and shouted the slogan: "A Drunken Duke and a Fake Independence."

[19] See the Report to the Criminal Justice Commission by Inspector General of Police Stanley Senanayake, quoted in *The Times of Ceylon*, June 12, 1972. The hearings of the Commission revealed various other details of the insurgents' plans, training and objectives. They also connected Wijeweera with N. Shanmugathasan, then head of the CCP (Peking), although they did not implicate the latter group in the uprising of April 5, 1971. See *ibid.*, June 14; July 17, 18, 21, 23; Sept. 5 and 9, 1972.

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A striking aspect of JVP activities in late 1970 and early 1971 was the enticing of groups of 5–25 youths in the age-range from 16 to 20 to JVP mountain or jungle hideouts, where masked teams of activists presented a series of indoctrinational lectures.[20] Speaking on the topics of freedom, the economic crisis, the left movement in Ceylon, Indian expansionism, and the armed seizure of power, the lecturers appealed to the youths to renounce parental and Buddhist authority and join the JVP. Intimidation was used to silence doubters, and the meetings succeeded in recruiting thousands into cells, where they were instructed in the use of weapons, karate, and guerrilla tactics. Shotguns and homemade bombs were to be the main weapons of the insurgents. The movement simultaneously stepped up its efforts to infiltrate the ranks of younger college and school teachers and public service officials.

Although the government knew about the meetings and at least one police report labeled the JVP as seditious, there was a reluctance to recognize the writing on the wall. In November 1970 the UF government finally authorized arrests of some JVP members under the extended powers of the Public Security Ordinance.[21] Members of the Cabinet alternately warned and chided the JVP, and they even dropped unofficial hints that the movement was backed by capitalists, the UNP, and even the American CIA—all in an attempt to discredit the JVP. More and more citizens grew alarmed at the activities of the insurrectionaries, or "Che Guevarists" as they were described, and fears were expressed that "something is going on; something is going to happen."

On February 11, 1971, the Prime Minister ordered an armed forces alert. In early March some Army units were deployed, and police held an all-island alert. An explosion at Esalamulla, which killed several young bomb-makers, underscored police warnings of an arms buildup. A "Maoist" group of some 200 attacked the US Embassy in a move calculated more to embarrass the government than to attack the United States.[22] On March 12, the government arrested Wijeweera at Amparai. An explosion at Marrs Hall on the University of Ceylon's Peradeniya campus (near Kandy) forced the government to end its ban on police searches of the University and resulted in the discovery of stockpiles of explosives in several dormitories, previously kept secret by intimidation of students and faculty.[23] With such evidence of widespread subversion, the government rounded up known JVP leaders and prescribed the death penalty for offenses against life or public property.

The JVP Insurgency

However, these actions came too late. As later investigation revealed, the JVP originally planned to rise in rebellion on April 14, 1971 (when the country would be deeply involved in the travel and celebrations of the Sinhalese New Year), but they initiated action early, on April 5, presumably because of defections or information leaks. Within several days, some 90 police stations and substations were attacked by the insurrectionaries (some in uniforms). The police held on where they could, principally in the larger towns such as Polonnaruwa. The Army, shore parties of Navy bluejackets, reserve and volunteer units were ordered into action, but at first even they could barely contain the armed thrusts of the "terrorists." The Prime Minister gave the staff of the Embassy of North Korea (which country had reportedly encouraged the JVP guerrillas) 48 hours to leave Ceylon and called upon the world community for help.[24]

Exploiting their initiative, JVP fighters destroyed communications between Colombo and most provincial areas, wrecked rail lines, and cut telegraph wires. Road traffic was blocked by the wholesale felling of trees and the damaging of bridges (the JVP proved incapable of destroying them). Major efforts were concentrated, at the outset, on attempts

[20] It was reported in the spring of 1971 that these sessions were advertised by a code transmitted throughout Ceylon via the nightly obituary notices on the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation program. See the reference to this report in *The New Statesman* (London), Oct. 8, 1971, p. 468.

[21] This was reported in a very useful summary of events published in *The Daily Mirror* (Colombo), May 27, 1971.

[22] This was indicated by the fact that while two old cars in front of the Embassy were burned, several newer ones went untouched. On the other hand, the stabbing to death of an off-duty Sinhalese police officer who attempted to restore order indicated the demonstrators' aim of violent confrontation with the government.

[23] The author was on the Peradeniya campus when the Marrs Hall explosion and subsequent police takeover occurred. By this time, according to *The Ceylon Daily News* of May 17, there had already been over 30 arrests for illegal possession of weapons in various parts of Ceylon.

[24] According to Politicus (*loc. cit. supra*), Mrs. Bandaranaike had advised the Embassy of North Korea prior to the outbreak of insurgency that certain of the Embassy's acts were giving encouragement to terrorists and that it should desist from such activity. *The Times of Ceylon* reported on July 11, 1972, that the Sri Lanka Ministry of External Affairs had rejected a request by the Government of North Korea to reopen the Embassy.

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to control the towns of Kegalle, Kurunegala, Maho and Monaragala, which control the roads leading from the main areas of the island to the port of Trincomalee, and the areas surrounding these towns remained among the most stubborn centers of terrorist activity.

However, as hoped-for external aid did not materialize, JVP fortunes declined. Governmental and army resolve, bolstered by large-scale military assistance from abroad[25] and the generally negative reaction of the public to the JVP action, ultimately doomed the insurgency, although the outcome remained in doubt until late April. No towns except the small town of Elpitiya actually remained under rebel control for any length of time, but the terrorists continued to dominate outstation regions of the South, the Kandy area (but not the high plantations), and the Dry Zone northward to the southern limit of Tamil settlement.

By the end of April, rebel offensive power was spent, food raids began, and rebel mistreatment of rural people—avoided by the JVP during the early stages—was reported. Village vigilance committees helped government forces, though some peasant families did give food and shelter to rebel sons, thereby keeping alive a rebellion they may have fundamentally abhorred. The complex pulls of civil war became manifest as the government threatened death to "terrorists" yet called for the rescue of Ceylon's "misguided youth." With the insurgents giving ground, the Prime Minister proclaimed (on Radio Ceylon and by leaflet air-drop) an open period for surrender, which began on May 1 and was kept open until June 10. The first few days saw some 4,000 come in—mostly the timid, the sick, and those kidnapped into the movement—while the tough incorrigibles fell back into the Sinharaja forest in the South, the Ritigala range near Kurunegala, the steep hills around Kegalle, and the vast jungles of Wilipattu National Park. By August 1971, about 15,000 rebels had surrendered or been captured, though combined operations by infantry and helicopter forces continued against rebel pockets through the fall of 1971. Rebels killed added up to 1,500–2,000. A few diehards, including escaped convicts and identified killers, continued to hole up in jungle or urban hideouts.



—Adapted from a map published in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1971.

The JVP insurgency might have had greater success if it had been staged against a UNP government. As it was, the mass of urban workers stood by the United Front. Unlucky timing, the basic opposition of Sinhalese villagers, and the rapid dispatch of military assistance by outside powers also contributed to the JVP's demise. In any case, the unsuccessful insurrection left the island nation with serious economic and psychological problems and also deeply troubled the membership of the established Marxist parties.

The revolt has exacerbated the economic crisis facing the United Front government, forcing it to set aside plans to dispense with aid from Western powers. As a result of the insurgency, moreover, the government has moved toward both tighter controls of political activity as well as toward socialism. While the latter may seem desirable to the Communist forces within the United Front coalition, the former may ultimately redound to the disadvantage of the parliamentary Marxists. Sri Lanka is uncertain

[25] Ceylon received helicopters from India, Pakistan, Britain (American-made) and the Soviet Union, while the US provided spare parts and ammunition. More spectacular, if less useful, were five MIG-17 fighter planes furnished by the USSR together with 60 maintenance personnel. Some of the Soviet aircraft were adapted for US-type ammunition. The United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia sent nonmilitary assistance. All of this was evidence of a broad international decision to sustain the government.

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how to deal with the 15,000 JVP prisoners. A body of 250 senior civil servants in 1971 interviewed and classified them, and some prisoners are being tried, while others have been permitted to work out their debt to society by repairing the damages they caused. The memory of the JVP violence will haunt the Sinhalese for many years, yet some politicians are already anticipating the recruitment of youthful ex-terrorists as future voters and deem it desirable to "blame someone else" for the rebellion.

In fact, the identity and degree of involvement of the JVP insurgents remain somewhat unclear and confusing. Members of the movement were popularly referred to by the Sinhalese as *Trastavadi* (literally, "those who subvert by ideas"), and the leaders appear to have come from the universities, from the CCP (Peking), and from among disaffected lower-level officials of the United Front government.[26] The rank-and-file recruits were mainly youthful villagers of depressed Sinhalese castes longing to escape from an unpromising life in a socially and economically unequal system. Many were discontented former members of the Land Army Program, which had been pursued with success by the UNP during its 1965–70 rule, but which the United Front unwisely liquidated shortly after taking office. Such youths presumably joined the JVP from frustration rather than ideological conviction.

The centers of bitterest revolt were areas such as Elpitiya, Kegalle and Kurunegala with large concentrations of depressed Sinhalese castes; yet caste was apparently not a factor in JVP recruitment in the North Central Province. Although the rebellion generally treated Buddhism with contempt, the rebels themselves were almost exclusively from Buddhist families. Some young Buddhist *bhikkhus* even took up arms, but those of the largest sect—the Siam—seemed strongly opposed to the insurgency.[27] Sinhalese Christians, Muslims and burghers kept clear of the movement, as did Tamils, who encountered considerable hostility from the terrorists.

Ceylonese government troops guard youthful members of the April 1971 insurgency after a battle in the jungles.

—Wide World Photos.

For the Marxists, the government's victory raised deep problems and concerns, for despite elements of fascism, Maoism and Guevarism, the insurgency was basically a revolution of radical Marxists against the established left. The Marxist parties in the United Front must therefore have been deeply troubled as they grimly supported the efforts of the government and army to smash the uprising, thus helping to erase a revolutionary opportunity and abetting the killing or imprisonment of young leftists who might have strengthened the LSSP or CCP.

Legislating Socialism

The Marxist members of the United Front nevertheless continue to renounce revolution in favor of attempting to influence future development from within the ruling coalition. The Marxists and their dominant partner, the SLFP, seemingly need to assure the country that the direction of change is still consonant with the old-style democracy which the Ceylonese people still seem to desire. In the process, the Marxists must continue to push social and political programs designed to neutralize the JVP and even to coopt its members. Hence the constitutional debates and proposed new legislation of 1971–72 have had an air of special urgency and

[26] Only one member of Parliament, Vasudeva Nanayakkara, a member of the LSSP who had been active in the Sama Samajist youth movement, was among those arrested. When he was released on April 25, 1972, he was greeted by leaders of his party. See *The Times of Ceylon*, April 26, 1972. However, according to U. Phaednis, "Trends in Ceylon Politics," *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), April–June 1971, there was a meeting of 13 United Front members of Parliament held at Ratnapura in midsummer 1970 to call for a speedy radicalization of Ceylon.

[27] Ceylonese are still puzzled by the mysterious appearance of red robes (rather than the traditional saffron) on a number of novices and young *bhikkhus* in the Kandy area in the years preceding the 1971 insurgency and the abrupt disappearance of such robes when the fighting broke out. No one knows whether or, if so, how this phenomenon was connected with the JVP movement.

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fatefulness not only for Sri Lanka as a whole, but for its Marxist parties in particular.

As noted above, the principal architect of the new Constitution has been Colvin R. de Silva. He shepherded the new document through 22 stormy months, from the planning stage through debate in the Constituent Assembly to final promulgation as the law of the land on May 22, 1972. To the dismay of the opposition, he pushed ahead with the process even during the 1971 insurgency of the JVP when, under emergency rules, any disagreement with the government was hazardous, and he used the large United Front majority to push through the basic draft with few amendments.[28]

Although the influence of the Marxist minority parties in the government was substantial in framing the new system, the changes in the political structure are not of themselves revolutionary. The Republic of Sri Lanka is now a unitary state with a unicameral legislature (the National State Assembly). The government is headed by a president appointed by and under the guidance of the premier. Renamed Sri Lanka, the nation is a self-styled "socialist" state which has made a "rightful place for Buddhism." The checks and balances of the old constitution have been weakened by the abolition of the Senate and of the practice of judicial review of legislation. On the other hand, popular participation in government is to be fostered by the creation of "Janatha (People's) Committees" at local and regional political levels, and of councils of workers and government employees. The functions of these bodies are to include informing the government of local views, combatting black marketeering, improving the efficiency of production and of governance, and encouraging support for the regime.[29] The principle of nonalignment in foreign affairs has been reaffirmed, although Sri Lanka retains Ceylon's membership in the British Commonwealth while persisting in its leftward-leaning foreign policy orientation.[30]

The Constitution itself is perhaps less controversial than other aspects of the United Front program, in particular the five-year economic plan, the Criminal Justice Commissions Act and associated interpretative Ordinance, and the Press Council Bill. As will be seen, on some of these measures the SLFP majority has faced opposition from Marxist members of the United Front coalition as well as from elements of the political opposition.

The coalition has remained essentially unified on the economic program, which seeks to achieve a 6-percent annual growth rate and to provide 80,000 new jobs by 1976. The program involves the training of workers, promotion of new exports, and reduction of the extent to which the government subsidizes the public rice supply—a move suggested by Professor Dudley Seers and the World Employment Program of the International Labor Organization.[31] Meanwhile, other measures are effecting a wide redistribution of wealth and land. A heavy wealth tax and other levies, forced savings, demonetization (*i.e.*, currency reforms aimed at ferreting out unreported wealth), stiffened exchange controls, and ceilings on incomes and landholdings are hitting hard at the 50,000 wealthy Ceylonese and undermining the large plantations, while presumably providing the government with funds to create new jobs and investment as well as with land for distribution to the poorer peasants. The LSSP is closely identified with this program through its leader, Dr. N. M. Perera, who is Finance Minister of Sri Lanka.[32] There also are plans to increase government participation in public and private industry and to establish a Charter of Workers' Rights.[33] Collectivization has been endorsed as a means to end private exploitation of economic resources.

Leaders of private industry have criticized the economic program. They insist that overtaxation, the establishment of land and income ceilings, and the threat of increased governmental control of companies (through the Business Undertaking Act) make it impossible to plan creatively or to invest with

[28] *The Daily Mirror* for May 12 and 21, 1972, carried reports of appeals by citizens to the Prime Minister to postpone the constitutional deliberations until normal conditions were restored.

[29] See A. J. Wilson, *loc. cit. supra.*; and *The Ceylon Daily News*, Oct. 4, 1970.

[30] Although Sri Lanka continues to lean leftward in its foreign policies, Mrs. Bandaranaike has rejected pressure from leftist colleagues to move still further left. She firmly put down Dr. Perera's attempt to link the JVP with "American imperialism." See her statement in *The Times of Ceylon*, May 4, 1972, in response to Dr. Perera's May Day comments (reported by UNP Member of Parliament R. Premadasa in *ibid.*, May 8, 1972).

[31] Professor Seers, Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, England, led an ILO mission to Ceylon in the spring and summer of 1971, to advise the government on means of combatting the serious problem of unemployment there. See *The Ceylon Daily News*, May 1, 1971.

[32] According to *The Times of Ceylon*, June 19, 1972, the Finance Minister set a 50-acre maximum per person or per family. Excess land would revert to the state, and ex-owners would receive "a piece of paper" rather than an immediate financial settlement.

[33] A. J. Wilson presents a detailed report on this program in "Ceylon: A Time of Troubles," *Asian Survey*, February 1972, pp. 109–15.

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confidence. Some Chamber of Commerce critics have warned that under the new measures the government can acquire any property it wishes from any citizen. When queried on this issue by UNP Leader Senanayake, Colvin R. de Silva quipped, "This does not mean the collectivization of your toothbrushes." [34]

A Fissure in the Front

While the coalition is agreed on its economic program, the Criminal Justice Commission Bill has created some dissensions within the Front. Led by S. A. Wickremasinghe, the CCP Politburo decided to oppose this legislation, which it viewed as potentially threatening to the trade unions as well as to dissenters within the Front itself. The issue brought to the surface old differences between Wickremasinghe, who has favored establishing the CCP as a third force outside the Front, and Pieter Keuneman, who favors continued unity. When the bill came to a vote early in April 1972 and the government mobilized the United Front "steamroller majority" to get it through the Parliament, Keuneman was abroad, two other CCP MP's were absent, two abstained from voting, and only one—B. Y. Tudawe—voted for the bill. The four MP's from the CCP who did not vote were then suspended by the United Front's Parliamentary Group, while the CCP Politburo, on the other hand, asked Tudawe to explain why he should not be expelled from the party for defying its decision to vote against the bill.[35]

At the height of the quarrel, CCP leader Wickremasinghe was denied an exit permit to leave for Romania for medical treatment, though he was subsequently permitted to go, returning from Europe in mid-May. The Front leadership then turned down a CCP request for a conference to iron out CCP—Front differences. As this period (April–May 1972) also saw a stormy rift among the UNP Conservatives, it may be that moderates in the United Front hoped that the UNP leader J. R. Jayawardena might be persuaded by the downgrading of the CCP's role in the Front to bring his group over to the government in the spirit of his call to all parties to end "political party warfare for a specfied period." At the same time, a pro-China group within the United Front urged the expulsion of the Moscow-oriented CCP, but the champions of unity (including Keuneman) defeated the move, and the crisis blew over.[36]

Outside the government, it is not easy to find support for the Criminal Justice Commissions Bill. It has been denounced by the CCP-dominated Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions as well as by the LSSP's Ceylon Federation of Labor and Ceylon Mercantile Union as a measure which might be used against the workers. Inevitably the opposition parties—the UNP and the Federal Party—and their affiliated trade unions and youth groups have warned that the law would constitute a threat to democracy and the rights of citizens, and some UNP spokesmen have even likened it to Hitlerite totalitarianism.[37]

The *Ceylon Daily News* lead editorial for April 4, 1972, the eve of the parliamentary vote on the bill and of the first anniversary of the JVP insurgency, warned that to remove democratic rights, as the bill seemed to do, would undermine the loyalty which ordinary citizens had demonstrated during the 1971 insurgency. The newspaper observed that the measure would prevent the courts from pronouncing on the legality of any executive act performed under legislation that included the expression: "shall not be called in question in any court." It further urged that the principle of habeas corpus—"the cornerstone of individual liberty"—be protected under the terms of the new law. The Ceylon Bar Council warned that innocent persons might soon be convicted on unreliable evidence, while the Civil Rights Movement of Ceylon predicted the rise of unchallengeable bureaucratic "despots." [38] Even the pro-SLFP All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, which in 1970 had approved the new Constitution because of its recognition of Buddhism, sensed in the proposed law a threat to freedom of worship, press, speech and expression, habeas corpus, and "Buddhist principles." [39] Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the meas-

[34] See *The Ceylon Daily News*, Jan. 22, 1971. For critiques of the program, see *ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1971, and *The Times of Ceylon*, June 2, 1972.

[35] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), April 22, 1972, pp. 14–15.

[36] The CCP clash with the United Front leadership is reported in *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 1972, and *The Times of Ceylon*, April 20–24, 1972. As will be noted below, the crisis and stresses within the CCP have continued to smoulder.

[37] The UNP statement is noted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 22, 1972, pp. 14–15.

[38] *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 1 and 3, 1972. On the former date, Dr. Cooray also contributed an article on habeas corpus in which he was no longer as optimistic as he had been in 1970 concerning constitutional rights in Sri Lanka.

[39] On January 2, 1971, *The Ceylon Daily News* reported the ACBC's demand for an explanation of how the United Front would fulfill its pledge to preserve "a rightful place for Buddhism" in Sri Lanka, and a minority even demanded that Buddhism be declared the formal state religion.

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ure was "steamrollered" through the Parliament.

Still pending is the Press Council Bill, which would limit the right of the press to criticize the government and require newspapers to reveal their news sources. Opposed by most non-Marxist groups, the *Sangha,* and minorities, it also faces opposition from some LSSP elements and thereby constitutes still another threat to the unity of the government coalition. Although debate on the bill as originally proposed was suspended briefly, the government has since brought forward a substitute version which the Times of Ceylon considers "more vicious" than the original.[40]

The domination of the United Front coalition by the SLFP (which alone holds some 90 of the 157 seats in the National State Assembly), coupled with the fact that various prominent SLFP members and political *bhikkhus* have suggested that Ceylon should have a dictatorship,[41] has raised the possibility that democracy is threatened not only by the insurgent JVP. The decision of the government to defer new parliamentary elections and remain in office until 1978 to complete its programs rather than serve its normal five years (to 1975), the recent refusal by police—on "grounds of public security"—to permit a UNP rally, the possibility of arrests without warrant under the amended Exchange Control Act, and the issuance to all citizens of identity cards carrying a photograph of the bearer have all contributed to widespread public anxiety over the threat of totalitarianism. Press censorship, instituted during the insurgency, was ended on May 15, 1971, but the press is subject to "financial censorship" in the form of a nearly prohibitive 80-percent duty plus a 55-percent surcharge on imports of newsprint. Colvin R. de Silva and other members of the United Front government have attempted to give assurances to the public, but even some Marxists are wary of the direction of government policies.[42]

Thus, events since 1970 raise important questions about the future of meaningful democratic politics in Sri Lanka. Socialism seems inevitable whoever is in power, and—in the process of moving toward it—even some of the measures demanded by the JVP will probably be instituted by those who defeated the young insurgents. Meanwhile, the specter of threatening economic crisis and issues of caste, race and language at home and of preserving nonalignment in foreign policy remain the concern of all parties. In this complex political setting, the island's Marxist parties would seem to face four major, interrelated problems, the strands of which run through both the past and present of Ceylonese Marxism.

Marxist Dilemmas

The first problem facing Ceylon's Marxists has its origins in the very social and educational background of the established leftist leaders and their commitment to multiparty parliamentary politics. Raised in the traditions of Fabian socialism, these Marxists are moderate in deeds even while radical in language and ultimate political objectives. They are members of the bourgeois social establishment. In their view, the long coexistence of the parties they lead with parliamentary democracy has brought important benefits: respectability, a national podium and vast press coverage, and the opportunity to influence the course of Ceylonese democracy. On the other hand, they must question whether permanent subservience to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party will really advance the cause of communism in the island nation. Furthermore, the Marxist leaders have been alarmed by various elements of the United Front program which might be turned against them should the rural-based, Buddhist SLFP decide to eliminate the Marxists from the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, the Marxists have apparently decided to go along with constitutionalism and coalition politics for the present.

This decision gives rise to a second, related issue facing the Marxist movement in Sri Lanka. By opting to retain their ties with the ruling SLFP, the leaders of the LSSP and CCP have found themselves faced with major opposition from radical elements who have come to advocate violent social revolution. This doctrinal schism is further aggravated by social and generational cleavages. A decade ago most undergraduates carried the card of the LSSP, but young student activists today increasingly despair of the eventual triumph of socialism under present leftist leaders. Young radicals from the less-advantaged

[40] For comments on the latest Press Council Bill, see *The Times of Ceylon,* Aug. 25, 26, 31, and Sept. 1, 16, 21, and 23, 1972.

[41] UNP leader Dudley Senanayake has reminded the Minister of Public Administration, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, that the latter stated some years earlier that "a little bit of totalitarianism is sometimes necessary" (*The Ceylon Daily News,* April 6, 1972).

[42] See statements by de Silva in *The Times of Ceylon,* April 29 and May 11, 1972. Chandra Gunasekera, an LSSP member of the National State Assembly, subsequently expressed the view that socialism could not be achieved by use of the army or police (*ibid.,* July 5, 1972).

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rural areas and educated in Sinhalese rather than Western traditions are less committed to the existing social order and have turned to Marxist-Leninist doctrines of revolutionary violence as the answer to Sri Lanka's current needs. The Marxist leaders thus have a tiger by the tail. If the LSSP and CCP move leftward to preserve unity within the Marxist movement, they risk destroying their link with the SLFP, but if they stand pat, they confirm the suspicions of the young radicals. The dilemma was brought into sharp relief by the 1971 insurgency in which young Marxist-Leninists of the JVP staged Ceylon's first leftist revolution against an establishment supported by Ceylon's major Marxist parties. Its continuing presence is implicit in LSSP and CCP endorsement of new legislation which simultaneously advocates mass political participation and strong measures against subversion. It may be that the JVP does not speak for the youth of Sri Lanka and that there will not be another left-wing revolution. But should the JVP reemerge, it will view the established Marxists with great bitterness, further contributing to disunity within the Marxist left. There are signs of renewed conflict within both the LSSP and the CCP over the issue of constitutionalism and participation in the government on the one hand *vs.* more revolutionary approaches on the other.[43]

United or disunited, parliamentary or insurrectionary, Ceylon's Marxists have a third major problem—their limited success in gaining political support in the villages, where the majority of the population lives. The Marxist parties were outflanked in 1956 when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party captured the basic rural issues—the decay of village life, rural indebtedness, and land-hunger. The assassination of the SLFP's founder, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, in 1959 converted his influence into an almost religious force among the Buddhist Sinhalese, and few Marxists dare challenge his ideas or the leadership of his devoted widow, a quiet and aristocratic Kandyan lady.[44] With the major issues already preempted, the LSSP and CCP must either go along with the dominant SLFP or become a "third force" movement which might prove incapable of winning over the Buddhist Sinhalese.

As for the JVP, there was indeed heavy recruitment among radical students and other youths from rural areas. However, the basic rural population proved quite resistant to the JVP tactics of terrorism, and it would appear that many youths joined the movement either under duress or at least on a temporary, nonideological basis. In this context, it is interesting to note the growing strength of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party on some of the nation's campuses. The student council at Peradeniya—traditionally Marxist—has been captured by the SLFP, and an anti-leftist Progressive Front has appeared on the Colombo campus of the University of Ceylon.[45]

Buddhism—the Imponderable Element

The element of Buddhism, which is so evident in the SLFP program, presents the Marxists of Sri Lanka with perhaps their most complex questions of interpretation and strategy. They can view Buddhism as a major obstacle in the Communists' path to power, as a congruent philosophy with which Marxism can cooperate to the mutual advantage of both groups, or as an anti-materialist creed which is becoming obsolete and irrelevant in an age of technology and modernization.

Certainly the Buddhist revival, which began a century ago and borrowed forms from the Christians in order to revitalize the loose associations of monasteries and temples, has considerably strengthened Buddhist influence over the Sinhalese population. The recent interest in the *Kalama Sutta*—which stresses individual empirical investigation—and the growing feeling among Buddhists of the need for a new life-model suggest that Buddhism will indeed adapt itself to the requirements of modernization. There can be no question that Buddhism has become a great force in Sri Lanka politics. It was Buddhism—not Marxism—which produced the electoral revolution of 1956; in 1965 it was the conservative Buddhist *Sangha,* alarmed at the spread of Marxism, which helped return Dudley Senanayake and the UNP to power; and in 1970 it was Buddhist support which brought Mrs. Bandaranaike back to power.

When the conservative elements of the Buddhist *Sangha* sense a Marxist threat to traditional civil and

[43] Tensions within the CCP and between that party and the United Front have continued. As of September 1972, Dr. Wickremasinghe had replaced Pieter Keuneman, a standard defender of the coalition, as Secretary General of the CCP. The former and three other CCP members of the National State Assembly are still excluded from the United Front parliamentary group. See *The Times of Ceylon,* Aug. 8, 25, and Sept. 4, 1972.

[44] For various analyses of the LSSP–SLFP alliance, see Abhayavardhana, *op. cit.*; J. L. Fernando, *Bandaranaike Legacies,* Colombo, Times of Ceylon, Ltd. publishers, 1963; and Denzil Peiris, (author and publisher), *1956 and After,* Colombo, 1958.

[45] *The Times of Ceylon,* Sept. 12, 1972.

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religious rights, they have shown themselves to be a formidable force, as demonstrated in 1965. These powerful Buddhist groups are becoming critical of the United Front program, and particularly of the Marxist influence in the coalition.

On the other hand, Buddhism clearly has within it progressive forces. The fact that many of the most political and practical *bhikkhus* have been trained in Western universities and favor constitutional rather than revolutionary roads to progress may be disappointing to the more radical elements within the Marxist movement. However, there is less of a conflict between such Buddhists and many of the leading figures in both the LSSP and the CCP. The fact that such Marxist leaders still pay public homage to Buddhism at the Temple of the Tooth may be not hypocrisy but the manifestation of a residual cradle-love for the religion of their youth.[46] Furthermore, by joining forces with the Buddhist SLFP, the Marxist parties not only have helped Mrs. Bandaranaike return to power but also have advanced their own political fortunes. And in the United Front government, Marxists are at work alongside Buddhists of the SLFP legislating socialism for Sri Lanka.

The events of 1971 suggest yet a third perspective on the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and its implications for Marxist strategy. The resistance of rural Buddhism to the JVP was strong, and yet there do seem to have been important cracks in the armor. Many of the Marxist-Leninist rebels were of Buddhist stock. The fact that they ignored the nonviolent creed of Buddhism, that many novices and even some young *bhikkhus* took up arms against the Buddhist government,[47] suggests that the religion may be losing its dynamism and its appeal to contemporary youth. If this is so, the result may be the erection of an enormous vacuum which the Marxists might seek to occupy. The JVP represents an attempt in this direction, and elements within the two major Marxist parties (particularly the CCP) are also seeking to make their organizations a "third force" in Sri Lanka's political life. On the other hand, many Marxists are unwilling to abandon hard-won gains by breaking away from the United Front coalition.

On balance, the question of the proper response to Buddhism may pose the deepest dilemma for the Marxists of Sri Lanka.

[46] Reported in *ibid.*, May 30, 1972.

[47] For reports of Buddhist clerics held for suspected insurgent activities, including the manufacture of bombs, see *The Daily Mirror*, May 29, 1971, and *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 29, 1971. *Bhikkhu* Sobitha's testimony confirms the activity of Buddhists in the JVP at Vidyodaya University and in the Colombo area (see fn. 14).

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Changing Perspectives in North Korea

EDITORS' NOTE: Recent months have brought evidence of major new turns in North Korea's internal and external courses. Domestically, the goals and implementation of the Six-Year Plan for 1971-76 have shown decreased emphasis on defense expenditures and greater attention to broad-based development of the economy. In foreign affairs, Pyongyang not only has entered into an agreement with South Korea to work toward national unification but also has greatly expanded its intercourse with the non-Communist world. The two following articles seek to put these policy shifts in broad historical perspective. Mr. Kim examines North Korea's evolving approach to economic development, and Mr. Shinn analyzes the elements of continuity and change in Pyongyang's foreign policy over the years.

Approach to Economic Development

By Ilpyong J. Kim

North Korea today claims that it has effected the transition from an "agricultural-industrial" state to a "socialist-industrial" one. Official figures indicate that whereas in 1956, after post-Korean War reconstruction, industry accounted for only about 34 percent of the country's national income, by 1970 the industrial share had risen to more than 74 percent.[1] This shift entailed major economic transformations. For example, Pyongyang boasts that it now possesses one of the most developed machine-building industries in Asia. According to official reports, the production of machinery increased 100-fold between 1948 and 1967 alone, and the advance has been even more dramatic in specific categories. Tractors afford a good illustration. At the time of the Korean armistice in 1953, North Korea reportedly had just 500 tractors (of the 15-horsepower variety), but with the growth in local production, the number reached 8,053 by 1959; 15,000 in 1961; 20,000 in 1969; and more than 30,000 in 1970. The last figure means that there was about one tractor for every 169 acres of cultivated land in the country in 1970.[2]

In recent months, Pyongyang has for the first time

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[1] See Kim Il Sung, "Summary Report of the Work of the Central Committee to the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 3, 1970. Also see *Area Handbook for North Korea*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, ch. 17.

[2] Kim Il, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971–76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 10, 1970.

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permitted several Western observers, including Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times,* to visit North Korea, and while these observers have not been able to investigate the situation there sufficiently to verify Pyongyang's claims in minute detail, they have come away impressed with the nation's economic accomplishments.[3] Their judgments, in turn, suggest that North Korea's economic path merits more attention than it has thus far received from outside analysts.

The evidences of progress pose two questions of key importance. First, how have the North Koreans managed to achieve a fairly high rate of economic development since 1956 without the influx of massive aid from foreign sources? Second, precisely what kind of industrialization strategy have they employed? The present article will explore these two topics, and it will also attempt to assess what policies Pyongyang is likely to follow in its pursuit of economic development in the future.

Circumstances in the Mid-1950's

To understand North Korea's economic road during the last decade and a half, one must begin by looking at the situation in which the North Koreans found themselves in the mid-1950's. During the years immediately after the Korean armistice, reconstruction of the economy was Pyongyang's primary preoccupation. However, thanks to large-scale economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and the East European nations, the country's industrial output had, by 1956, already surpassed that of the pre-Korean War period;[4] hence, reconstruction had essentially been accomplished.

In early 1956, the North Korean regime drafted an ambitious Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1957–61. The plan's twin goals were "to carry out socialist construction of industry and socialist collectivization of agriculture." In concrete terms, it contemplated a 260-percent increase in gross industrial output and a 350-percent increase in the total value of industrial output from the 1956 level. Production of steel was to grow 3–3.5 times, and the output of electric power would reach 9.5 billion kilowatt hours by 1961. During the plan period, the production of consumer goods would rise by 330 percent. For example, the annual production of fabrics by 1961 was to be 17 meters per capita.[5]

This draft plan clearly had been formulated on the assumption that the Soviet-bloc countries would continue to furnish aid and assistance at the same level as during the post-Korean War period. But such an assumption proved ill-founded—in large part because of Soviet-Korean tensions that arose in the wake of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Nikita Khrushchev's destalinization effort at the Congress upset North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung (as well as the Chinese leaders and others), for it constituted a potential threat to his own type of rule. Indeed, he evinced a distinct lack of enthusiasm about Khrushchev's initiative in his public reactions. Consequently, when he paid a special visit to Moscow and other capitals of Eastern Europe later in the year to obtain economic and technical aid to pay for the development projects envisioned under the draft Five-Year Plan, he came back almost empty-handed. Khrushchev himself evidently criticized the goals of the plan as overly ambitious.[6]

Despite the rebuff, Kim declined to revise the plan. Upon his return to Pyongyang, he set about launching a massive program to mobilize domestic resources to finance it.

The "Ch'ollima" Movement

At a plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in December 1956, the party leadership adopted a resolution which amounted to the first step in this direction. "In order

[3] A series of reports by Mr. Salisbury on North Korea appeared in *The New York Times* between May 15 and June 7, 1972. He subsequently presented his impressions of North Korean economic development to the Columbia University Seminar on Korea on Oct. 26, 1972.

[4] In 1953–56, North Korea received an equivalent of US $1.37 billion in the form of grants and credits. Foreign aid constituted 33.4 percent of the state revenues in 1954, but by 1957 the figure had dropped to 12.2 percent." See Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 14, April-June 1963, pp. 60–62.

[5] Kim Il Sung, "Report of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party to the Third Congress," in *Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea: Documents and Materials,* Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956, pp. 44–75.

[6] On Khrushchev's reaction to the plan, see "Let Us Protect the Socialist Camp!," editorial in *Nodong Sinmun,* Oct. 28, 1963, in which the Soviet leadership was alleged to have "challenged us, saying that our Five-Year Plan was an illusion, stressing that we did not need to construct the machine-building industry, and criticizing the speed of our agricultural collectivization as too fast although they did not know the realities of our country." By 1960, all foreign aid accounted for but 2.6 percent of North Korea's state revenues. See *Area Handbook for North Korea,* pp. 369–71.

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to overcome the difficulties which have arisen in the domestic and international spheres and also to reach a revolutionary high tide of socialist construction," the resolution stressed, the KWP must mobilize the working forces and organize them so as to increase production in industry and agriculture.[7]

It was not until several months later, however, that the actual implementation of the resolution got under way with the inauguration of the "ch'ollima" (flying horse) movement. In 1958, the party elevated this movement to the status of its "general line." [8]

Like the Stakhanovite movement of the 1930's in the Soviet Union, the "ch'ollima" movement embodied an element of socialist competition as a spur to production, but the overall character of the movement most closely resembled that of the Great Leap Forward in the People's Republic of China during 1958–59. Both undertakings were designed to elicit greater productive effort by means of a psychological transformation of the working masses brought about through ideological appeals and exhortations.

Kim Il Sung outlined the basic rationale or theory behind the movement in a speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on September 8, 1958. He listed two prerequisites for the successful construction of socialism in North Korea—a cultural revolution and a technological revolution. The former entailed the eradication from the thought and consciousness of the working masses of the remnants of certain traditional feudalistic and capitalistic notions rooted in the ideas of individualism, liberalism, and conservatism; its function was to produce dedicated, selfless, and patriotic members of a socialist society. The latter involved the improvement of working techniques and skills. In his remarks, Kim left no doubt about where the priorities lay with respect to these two revolutions at the moment: "At the present stage of socialist construction, the fundamental task before us is to realize the cultural revolution in order to advance the technological transformation of the people's economy in terms of socialist productivity,



Scene from a North Korean tractor factory.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

and to consolidate further the material and productive basis of socialism," for "unless we realize the cultural revolution, we will not be able to carry out successfully the technological revolution in our people's economy." [9]

In keeping with this perspective, the North Korean government greatly intensified its propaganda activities aimed at the local populace. Premier Kim issued specific injunctions to this effect in a November 1958 speech to party activists on the subject of "education for communism." [10] Moreover, between October 6, 1958, and February 2, 1959, he reportedly attempted to create a model for the conduct of revolutionary work by taking part in the actual operation of steel plants in various parts of the country. These initiatives resulted in the popularization of such slogans as "work, study, and live in the spirit of communism." [11]

[7] *Chao-hsien shih-hui chu-i chien-she chung ti chien-li-ma tso-yueh pan yun-tung* (The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement in the Socialist Construction of Korea), Peking, Shih-che chih-shih ch'u-pan she, 1962, p. 21. (Hereafter, cited as *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement.*) This booklet is a Chinese translation of the Korean version published by the Korean Workers' Party Publishing House in 1961. The citations throughout the present article are from the Chinese translation.

[8] Ha Ang-ch'on, "The Ch'ollima Movement Is the General Line of the Korean Workers' Party in Socialist Construction," *Kyo no Chosen* (Pyongyang), No. 55, May 1961. This publication is the Japanese-language edition of *Korea Today.*

[9] See *Kin Nichi Sei Chosaku-shu* (Collected works of Kim Il Sung), Tokyo, Mirai-sha, 1970, Vol. 1, especially pp. 297, 313, 320. (Hereafter cited as *Kim's Collected Works.*)

[10] Kim Il Sung, "On Education for Communism," in *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 349–59.

[11] *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement*, p. 21.

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As the movement unfolded, however, it took on more specific features affecting both the agricultural and industrial sectors. First, the government strove to ensure that the state received more output from the peasantry. Although about 80 percent of the peasantry had already been collectivized by the end of 1956, the process was completed in the course of 1958. Also, by the close of the latter year, the 16,032 existing agricultural cooperatives had been amalgamated into 3,842 enlarged basic production units at the village (*li*) level.[12] ('t is worth noting here that this amalgamation was far more modest than that which the Chinese tried to carry out in the initial stages of their efforts to set up communes. The Chinese sought to consolidate 740,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives into approximately 24,000 "people's communes" with an average of 5,000 households each.[13]) An agricultural tax-in-kind of 22–27 percent of total grain production was levied on the peasantry,[14] and the management committee of every cooperative farm was instructed to raise the value of its farm's public properties by increasing capital investment and considerably reducing the portion of the collective's income allocated to members. "The success or failure of each cooperative should be . . . evaluated," Premier Kim declared, "not only by the amount of income shared by each member but also by the amount of each member's contribution to the cooperative savings and the capital investment of the cooperative." [15]

Second, the government instituted a national program of socialist competition in production with which the term "cho'llima" has come to be most closely associated. Under this program, work teams were organized in each production unit, and those teams that exceeded their production quotas while maintaining a high quality of work received recognition as "ch'ollima work teams." Initially, the program was confined to the industrial sector. According to one report, there were only 1,368 teams composed of 11,097 managers and technicians in 1958.[16] But the movement quickly spread into other occupational areas such as commerce, education, public health, science, culture and the arts, etc. By March 1959, the country boasted 8,620 work teams with 178,406 members. In an industrial plant, each team normally consisted of 20–25 members; in educational, cultural, and public-health institutions, they often had 50 members.[17] Official claims indicate, too, that by mid-1959 or so the campaign had embraced more than 3,242 villages.[18]

Essentially, then, the North Korean leadership up to 1960 attempted to carry out economic development by inducing the population in general and the peasants in particular to increase their output. Some technological innovations—*e.g.*, the introduction of irrigation, electrification, and mechanization in the countryside—were employed, but these were limited in extent.

Furthermore, the regime relied fundamentally on moral as opposed to material incentives to inspire the popular masses. Within the general framework of the cultural revolution, the government did devote some effort to improving the intellectual and technical level of the workers, to strengthening public-health and medical-welfare programs, and to expanding the cultural activities of the working class, but such efforts did not weigh very heavily in the overall balance.

Modifications in Approach

This basic approach evidently worked to some extent, for despite the skepticism of Western observers as to whether or not all projected targets had been reached, Pyongyang announced the fulfillment of the Five-Year Development Plan at the end of 1960, a year ahead of schedule. However, the North Koreans discovered that pursuing economic development largely through mobilization of the populace on the basis of a cultural revolution had distinct drawbacks. To begin with, there was a limit to what could be achieved through mass mobilization without corresponding attention to technological matters, because the technological and cultural revolutions constituted integral elements of a single whole. That is, they formed two wheels of the same cart, and the cart could not move effectively without both

[12] Chong-Sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea," *The China Quarterly*, No. 14, April-June 1963, pp. 65–81.

[13] See "The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960," in Jan S. Prybyla, *The Political Economy of Communist China*, Scranton, Pa., International Textbook Co., 1970, pp. 256–340.

[14] Kuark, *loc. cit.* pp. 82–93. See also *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 311–12.

[15] Speech to the administrative cadres of the agricultural cooperatives in North Korea on Jan. 5, 1959, in *Choson Chung-Ang Yon-gam 1959* (Central Yearbook of North Korea), Pyongyang, Chung-Ang Tong-sin Sa, 1959, p. 15.

[16] *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement*, p. 21.

[17] Statistics on the growing number of work teams may be found in *ibid.*, p. 35.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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wheels. Furthermore, moral and ideological appeals, even bolstered by administrative measures of coercion, did not alone suffice to stimulate the masses to rise to lofty new heights of productivity.

Therefore, the regime altered its course fairly substantially during the first years of the Seven-Year Plan (1961–67). To be sure, certain aspects of the old emphasis on the "cultural revolution" persisted. For example, the campaign to organize work teams in production units continued apace. By December 1963, there were 17,057 teams with a membership of 586,403, including 213,376 workers and clerical personnel, 232,636 members of agricultural cooperatives, and 140,396 students. As of July 1965, the work teams embraced more than a million persons.[19]

But the leadership sought to provide the populace with greater material incentives and a greater sense of participation in decisions concerning national production. These efforts took several forms. One involved the adoption of the "Ch'ongsan-ni method" with respect to the operation of agricultural cooperatives. The campaign to introduce this method actually originated in February 1960 when Premier Kim personally went down to a rural and backward village, Ch'ongsan-ni, to demonstrate how the work of rural development should be carried out, and the method took its name from that of the village. In essence, the method amounted to an injunction to party officials and administrators to pay closer heed to the problems and needs of the peasants. As Premier Kim put things somewhat later,

You should learn from the masses. Without going among the masses, you cannot learn. All of you present here are masters of farming. The chairman should openmindedly learn farm work from the peasants, while passing on to them what he knows.[20]

A major result of the application of the "Ch'ongsan-ni method" was an attempt to synthesize ideological indoctrination and material incentives as a technique for achieving such goals as increased production of food grains, better planning for cooperative management, and improved organization of the labor force in the countryside. The material incentives consisted in part of prizes, paid vacations, and honorific titles for work teams that surpassed their production quotas. Most important, however, was the so-called "independent accounting system." Under this system, the members of the work team shared and took home the extra portion of their production above and beyond their established quota. Thus, the harder the work team labored and the more it produced, the greater its share of the profits after the set quota for the team had been met. As part of the general effort, too, the central government reduced its tax in kind on the peasantry from 22–27 percent of their output to 10–12 percent during 1960–63, and it finally abolished the tax altogether at the end of 1965.[21]

Another innovation occurred in industrial management. In December 1961, Kim Il Sung visited the Taean Electrical Appliance Plant and lauded it as an example of a well-managed enterprise; shortly thereafter, the system of management that it had recently instituted became the model for the entire country. During the 1957–61 period, the industrial management system in North Korea had been based on the principle of "one-man management." That

Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, gives peasants on-the-spot guidance at Ch'ongsan-ni.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), June 1972, p. 8.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[20] See Kim Il Sung, *For the Correct Management of the Socialist Rural Economy*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969, p. 29.

[21] See Kim Il Sung's speech to the administrative cadres of the cooperative farms on Jan. 5, 1959, in *Choson Chung-Ang Yon-gam 1959*, p. 15.

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is, the manager of each factory had enjoyed full authority to make decisions and coordinate the quantity and quality of production; the industrial workers had had no voice whatsoever in these matters. The "Taean system," in contrast, involved the concept of collective leadership through the medium of the factory's party committee. In this new system, Premier Kim stressed,

the factory's party committee, as the supreme administrative organ of the plant, manages and runs the factory with direct participation of the party members, the workers, and the technicians. No single person should take the responsibility of managing the plant, but every party member, worker, and technician in the plant should take part in the operation of the factory's party committee, which is in turn responsible for the administration and management of the factory.[22]

The system, through the application of these principles, aimed at giving workers a feeling of participation in plant management.

Finally, the leadership commenced to emphasize "the mass line" as the key technique of leadership. The cadres of the central government were instructed to go down to the province and county (*kun*) levels, listen to the problems of the local administrators, and then discuss possible solutions to these problems with them. Local-level administrators, in turn, were asked to go among the masses and explain to them the government's policy line and to arouse their enthusiasm and stir them to positive action. Kim described the process as follows:

The mass line is to go to the masses and organize them to implement the party policy correctly by listening to their opinions and suggestions for the solution of local problems. And then the opinions of the masses should be projected back to the higher echelons so that the policymakers may take their suggestions into account in the formulation of developmental policies. After the formulation of policy on the basis of suggestions offered by the masses, the new directions and policy should be sent down to the masses for execution.[23]

According to the revised thinking, a true leader had to obtain the sincere, voluntary acceptance of "collective" leadership from the masses. Thus, the "mass line" did not mean a simple discussion between the administrators and the masses, but required the administrators to establish a willingness on the part of the masses to follow the guidance of the administrators. Unless the masses did so, the official view went, the "mass line" became an empty slogan.

In addition to revising its methods of dealing with the masses, Pyongyang also began to devote more and more attention to technological considerations. "During the seven-year period," Kim expounded in October 1962, "we must carry out the technological revolution and the cultural revolution throughout the country *by establishing a material and technological foundation of socialism* in order to raise the material and cultural standard of the people.[24] The specific goals were to step up the production of machinery for the continued development of heavy industry; to supply more tractors and farm machinery to carry out the mechanization of agriculture; to modernize local manufacture, particularly by expanding the food-processing industry; and to train more technical cadres by setting up more evening correspondence schools so as to provide each worker with at least one technical skill.[25]

Perhaps the strongest evidence of the growing concern with technological matters, however, came from the reorganization of agricultural administration in 1962 and the establishment of a new organ known as the county management committee of the cooperative farms.[26] To be sure, part of the rationale for setting up the management committee lay in a desire to maintain a close link between the property of "the entire people" (*i.e.*, public property) and the property of the cooperatives—a link intended to extend state control over the cooperatives. But equally if not more important was a wish to improve the efficiency of the operations of the cooperatives. The committee was supposed to close the vast gap between industrial management and agricultural administration by introducing the management tech-

[22] "On Further Developing the Taean Work System," a speech delivered on Nov. 9, 1962, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 108.

[23] "On the Improvement of the Leadership Cadres' Attitudes Toward the Party, the Class and the People and of the Management Activities of the People's Economy," a speech delivered on Dec. 19, 1964, in *ibid.*, p. 323.

[24] "On the Current Tasks of the Korean Democratic People's Republic," a speech made on Oct. 23, 1962, in *ibid.*, pp. 61–62. Emphasis added.

[25] See Kim Il Sung, "On the Further Strengthening and Developing of the County Management Committee of the Cooperative Farms," a speech delivered on Nov. 13, 1962, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 132.

[26] Ko Sakurai, "The Ch'ollima Movement in North Korea," *Chosen Kenkyu Geppo* (Korean Research Monthly—Tokyo), No. 16, April 1963.

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niques of business enterprises into the administration of the cooperatives. To do so, they had "absolute authority to supervise such administrative activities as drawing up plans, organizing the work force, improving technical skills, securing and supplying raw materials, and managing fiscal matters," [27] all of which had been handled by the central government in the past. In practice, the committee took over the operation of such state-run agencies as the farm-machine hiring-station and the irrigation management office, and it became responsible for drawing up a comprehensive plan for the entire county. Thus, the committees differed significantly from the state-operated, tractor-hiring stations once found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—they not only provided technical assistance to individual cooperatives but also had the administrative leadership to direct and coordinate the productive activities of the cooperatives.

To try to ensure that these county committees would really bring about the infusion of better managerial techniques into the countryside, the national leadership transferred the function of supervision of the agricultural sector from the Ministry of Agriculture of the central government to provincial rural management committees. The Ministry then became the Central Agricultural Commission, whose role was to conduct research on such policy questions as how the state ought to improve its agricultural techniques; how to supply and transport raw materials and farm machines; and how the state should recruit and train the technical cadres to help with rural development.

Development Strategy

This revised approach to economic development has remained fundamentally unchanged over the intervening years, except for variations in the intensity of ideological appeals which have been connected with shifts in the country's development strategy. That strategy had been fairly constant in the years prior to the inauguration of the Seven-Year Plan. Though some elements within the hierarchy had urged a relative decrease in emphasis on investment in heavy industry and a corresponding increase in attention to consumer and light industry—particularly in the 1956–58 period[28]—the government had pursued a line of rapid expansion of heavy industry, especially the machine-building industry. During the 1957–60 period, moreover, it had devoted little attention to agricultural development. For those years, it had poured slightly more than 80 percent of its total investments into industry.[29]

Under the Seven-Year Plan, it was envisaged, however, that proportionately greater stress would be placed on building up consumer and light industry and improving the performance of the agricultural sector. For example, Premier Kim emphasized the intention to expand small-scale local industry and to construct large-scale industrial plants in order to raise the production of consumer goods. (By 1963, local industries were in fact turning out 59 percent of all consumer goods and accounting for one-third of total industrial output.) Kim also indicated that the productivity of the agricultural sector was to be improved by increased supplies of farm machinery and chemical fertilizer.[30]

During the 1961–63 period, this strategy was apparently implemented with considerable vigor. For instance, the government boosted the average annual share of the state's total capital investments going to the rural sector to close to 20 percent.[31] But during the ensuing years, the strategy shifted to a further expansion of heavy industry and a defense buildup, even at the expense of light industry and agriculture. Why did such an unexpected and drastic shift occur?

In part, the change probably had to do with shortfalls in production. Under the concept of the Seven-Year Plan, the 1961–67 period was to be divided into two stages—1961–63 and 1964–67. Planning authorities intended during the first stage to bring about dramatic improvements in the standard of living of the population and technical innovations in production, through special attention to consumer and light industry and to agriculture. Then they

[27] See Kim Il Sung's aforementioned speech of November 13, 1962 ("On the Further Strengthening and Developing of the County Management Committee of the Cooperative Farms"), in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 124.

[28] See Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1963, pp. 236–42.

[29] See Joint Publications Research Service, *Development of the National Economy and Culture of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (1946–1959)*, No. 4148, Oct. 31, 1960.

[30] See "The Report of the Work of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party to the Fourth Party Congress," in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 239-41. Also see this writer's "North Korea's Fourth Party Congress," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1962, pp. 37–50.

[31] *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 326–27. See also Joseph S. Chung, "The Six-Year Plan (1971–1976) of North Korea," *Journal of Korean Affairs* (Silver Spring, Md.), Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 17.

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

Chemical weed-killer is applied to fields in Ch'ongsan-ni Township.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), September 1971, p. 34.

hoped to use this strengthened base in the second period to resume further expansion of heavy industry. Unfortunately, however, the economy performed more sluggishly than anticipated. While the Seven-Year Plan had set a target of an average annual growth rate of 18 percent, the reported figure for 1961–64 was only 14.3 percent.[32]

To some degree, this inadequate performance no doubt reflected deficiencies in execution of the plan, but it also mirrored the overly ambitious targets of the plan itself. That excessive ambitiousness, in turn, stemmed from an original expectation that the USSR would provide more aid than actually proved to be forthcoming. In 1960, Soviet aid deliveries had already dropped to less than 2.6 percent of state revenues, and while they did not totally cease during 1961–65, they constituted only a tiny fraction of state revenues.[33] This situation was, of course, the result of new Soviet-Korean tensions growing largely, but not exclusively, out of Pyongyang's support of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Yet the shift in strategy flowed at least in part from a policy dispute within the leadership and the victory of representatives of a "military-industrial" complex over advocates of more balanced economic growth. This dispute had begun to take shape at the Fifth Plenum of the KWP's Central Committee in December 1962. Such external factors as the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict (with the attendant rising competition between the two Communist powers for backing from smaller parties and regimes) and the Soviet backdown in the Cuban missile crisis (which tended to raise doubts about the USSR's resolve and reliability as an ally) provoked debates within the leadership over the proper foreign policy to follow, and attitudes on this question generated conflicting views on domestic economic strategy.[34]

One group wanted to give priority to a defense buildup—*i.e.*, to concentrate resources on expanding those sections of heavy industry oriented toward defense, especially the machine-building industry. Their chief argument was that there was danger of a possible attack from South Korea in the wake of the military takeover there in 1961, which they perceived as having been carried out with the support of the US military command in South Korea. This group was apparently led by such prominent military leaders as Kim Ch'ang-bong (Minister of Defense), Ch'oe Kuang (General Chief of Staff of the North Korean People's Army), and Ho Pong-hak

[32] See Pong S. Lee, "Overstatement of North Korean Industrial Growth: 1946–1963," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1971, pp. 3–14. Also see Chung, *loc. cit.*, pp. 20–22.

[33] On Soviet aid to North Korea, see V. V. Martynov, *Koreia*, Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1970, p. 69. Also see *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 299–306.

[34] These and subsequent interpretations of the policy conflict are based on such sources as *Yongu Nonch'ong* (Research Forum) and *Kukche Munje* (International Questions), both publications of the Far Eastern Research Institute in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

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(General Political Commissar for the North Korean People's Army), all of them five-star generals in active service. Besides pressing for the construction of defensive fortifications throughout North Korea, it should be noted, these men favored a close alliance with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet conflict; they wanted to modernize and professionalize the North Korean Army with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

The other group opposed expansion of the country's defense forces and urged continued stress on broad-based economic development. Its leaders included Pak Kum-ch'ol (Organization Director of the KWP's Central Committee and a long-time associate of Premier Kim), Kim To-man (Director of the KWP's Propaganda and Agitation Department), and Yi Hyo-sun (Director of the KWP's Liaison Bureau).

Premier Kim Il Sung, as coordinator and manager of the policymaking process, seems to have assumed a neutral and independent posture in the policy dispute for a time (though he explicitly rejected proposals to back Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute). However, with the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 (which paved the way for an easing of Soviet-Korean discord), the escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965 and South Korea's decision to send troops there to support South Vietnam (which the North Koreans interpreted as indicative of Seoul's readiness to engage in military adventures beyond South Korea's borders), Kim appears to have shifted somewhat toward the position of the first group, eventually adopting a compromise policy. While he insisted on a "self-reliant" approach to North Korea's economic development, he endorsed a major strengthening of the national defense forces and a greater degree of cooperation with Moscow. In accordance with this decision, he announced in October 1966 that the time limit for the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan would be extended to 1970.[35]

During the 1967–69 period, then, the primary concern was with increasing output in the defense-related portions of heavy industry. One can get some notion of the efforts and resources expended to this end from the jump in military expenditures to 31.1 percent of the total national budget in the fiscal year 1967–68, as compared with only 19 percent in 1960–61.[36] (The years 1967–69, it should be recalled, witnessed North Korea's adoption of a highly militant posture toward the United States and South Korea. Not only did the North Koreans seize the US intelligence ship Pueblo, but they also sent agents into Seoul to try to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee.)

But 1969 brought with it developments that foreshadowed a possible new stage in North Korean economic strategy. At the Fourth Party Conference of the North Korean People's Army in January of that year, Minister of Defense Kim Ch'ang-bong and other leading proponents of a military buildup during the mid-1960's were dismissed from their posts. According to Premier Kim's criticism of the group, they had pressed hard in the 1964–68 period for an alliance with the USSR in order to obtain equipment for the modernization of the North Korean military forces, but even though Pyongyang had bettered its relations with Moscow, it had not managed to secure the military and economic aid required from the Soviet Union to carry out the proposed modernization. Moreover, the group's insistence on attaching prime importance to modernization of the military forces had put them in conflict with Premier Kim's views on how best to prepare for conventional warfare. He held that it was vital that recruitment for the worker-peasant militia not be neglected and that



A North Korean stamping press with a slogan exhorting the workers to greater effort.

—Eastfoto.

[35] Kim Il Sung, "The Present Situation and the Task Confronting Our Party," report delivered at a conference of the Korean Workers' Party on Oct. 5, 1966, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 103–85.

[36] Kim Il, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971–76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," *loc. cit.*

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the militia's strength must be maintained at one and a half million.[37]

As a result of the purge, Ch'oe Hyon (a member of the Politburo and a former Minister of Defense) once again became Minister of Defense; O Chin-u (General Chief of Staff of the North Korean ground forces) took over as General Chief of Staff of the North Korean People's Army; and Kim Yong-chu (previously Organization Director of the KWP and a member of the Politburo) became General Political Commissar of the North Korean People's Army. In the light of ensuing events, it would appear that this ascendant group had been counseling a return to a less militant line toward the external world and to a more balanced development strategy. At any rate, the North Korean government subsequently announced that whereas defense expenditures had amounted to 31.3 percent of its total budget in 1969–70, such expenditures would total only 17 percent in 1972.[38]

The downgrading of defense considerations, however, did not settle all matters of controversy with respect to a revamped strategy of development. A group of developmental theorists including Yi Chong-ok (Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Commission), Kim Kuang-hyop (Vice Premier and a former Minister of Defense), Sok San (Vice Premier and Minister of Social Security), and Han Sang-tu (a former Minister of Finance) advanced the "revisionist" proposition that the regime should in the future set more modest targets for growth than it had in the past.[39] They argued that the expansion of consumer and light industry and the improvement of performance in the agricultural sector would necessitate acceptance of lower rates of growth than had prevailed in earlier years.

Premier Kim rejected this line of argument, although he endorsed the desirability of paying increased attention to consumer and light industry and to agriculture. He held that North Korea could sustain a high rate of growth through continuing efforts to mobilize the revolutionary zeal and enthusiasm of the population and through programs to develop local small-scale industry.[40] His position clearly carried the day. All the top "revisionists" just mentioned lost their jobs when the North Korean cabinet was restructured in July 1970. Moreover, the new plan for 1971–76 established a highly ambitious target of 14 percent as the average annual growth rate for the period.[41]

Prospects

In turning now to a brief assessment of the likely course of North Korea's economic development in the near future, we must recognize that the regime's current approach to effecting economic development will probably not change so long as Kim Il Sung remains on the political scene. Kim continues to believe that the ideological commitment and moral dedication of human beings can play a major part in the achievement of rapid economic progress; consequently, he places great stress on "the ideological and cultural revolution to remold the consciousness of the people and enhance their technical and cultural level."[42] Thus, a blend of moral and material incentives and of elements of both a cultural and a technological revolution appear to be inevitable. The concrete features of such a blend have been laid down in present policies, and these methods have been described as Kim's original contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

As for the strategy of development, the new Six-Year Plan charts a course which aims primarily, according to Vice Premier Kim Il, to "consolidate further the material and technical foundation of socialism and free the working people from arduous labor."[43] While the development of heavy industry still plays an important role in the overall picture, consumer and light industry and agriculture are to get a greater proportion of total investments than

[37] Kim Il Sung's speech to the Fourth Party Conference of the North Korean People's Army in January 1969 was made available to this writer by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, Korea. The author is particularly grateful to General S. K. Yoon, one of the directors of the Agency's Bureau, for his assistance.

[38] See Kim Kyong-yon, "The Execution of the Budget of 1972 of the Korean Democratic People's Republic," report of the Finance Minister to the Supreme People's Assembly on April 29, 1972, in *Gekkan Chosen Shiryo* (Monthly of Korean Materials—Tokyo, Chosen Mondai Kenkyujo), July 1972, pp. 64–92.

[39] See Takehiko Hayashi, *Kita Chosen to Minami Chosen* (North Korea and South Korea), Tokyo, Saimaru Publishing Society, 1971, pp. 205–08.

[40] Kim Il Sung, "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," answers to questions raised by scientific and educational workers on March 1, 1969, in *Juche: The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung*, New York, Grossman Publishers, 1972, pp. 127–47.

[41] Kim Il Sung, "Summary Report of the Work of the Central Committee to the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," *loc. cit.*

[42] "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," *loc cit.*

[43] See his report on "The Six-Year Economic Development Plan (1971–1976)," in *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 10, 1970.

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Actual and Planned Output for Certain Industries, 1961–76

	1961 Output	1967 (1970) Target[a]	1970 Output	1976 Target
Electricity (in 1,000,000 kwh)	9,700	16,000-17,000	16,500	28,000-30,000
Coal (in 1,000 tons)	12,000	23,000-25,000	27,500	50,000-53,000
Steel (in 1,000 tons)	790	2,200-2,500	2,200	3,500-3,800
Chemical fertilizer (in 1,000 tons)	700	1,500-1,700	1,500	2,800-3,000
Cement (in 1,000 tons)	2,400	4,000-4,500	4,500	7,500-8,000

[a] In 1966, the government extended the date for the completion of the Seven-Year Plan from 1967 to 1970.

SOURCES: The figures for 1961 output and the Seven-Year Plan targets for 1967 output come from Kim Il Sung's report to the Fourth KWP Congress on Sept. 11, 1961. See *Kin Nichi Sei Chosaku-shu* (Collected Works of Kim Il Sung), Tokyo, Mirai-sha, 1970. Vol. 2, pp. 223-359. The 1970 output figures and the Six-Year Plan targets for 1976 output are from Kim Il's report, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971-76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," in *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 10, 1970.

they have in the past. In line with this commitment, for example, investments in the latter sectors rose from 20 percent of the total state budget in 1970 to 22 percent in 1971–72. During the plan period, the value of consumer goods turned out is supposed to increase by 100 percent (compared with a target of 60–65 percent in the previous Seven-Year Plan). As a result of this growth, by 1976 the output of household refrigerators is to rise to 126,000 units, that of washing machines to 110,000 units, and that of television sets to 100,000 units. By 1976, too, the country's production of food grains is to reach 7–7.5 million metric tons. During the plan period, the differences between industrial workers and agricultural workers are supposed to be eliminated, and the income of the cooperative farmer is to increase by 50 percent.[44]

Whether the strategy set forth in the plan will continue to be operative until 1976 depends essentially upon two factors. The first has to do with the plan itself. As already noted, the document calls for an average annual rate of growth of 14 percent. This figure may prove difficult for the regime to attain. During the 1961–70 period, for instance, the reported average annual rate of growth was only 12.8 percent, against a planned figure of 18 percent.[45] The 1971–76 plan's targets for industrial output seem particularly high in light of the record during 1961–70. As the table above shows, the targets for 1976 entail at least as great a rise in output in six years as most industries registered in the previous 10 years. If shortfalls in production occur, particularly in heavy industry, the regime could well decide to revise its investment plans and cut down on inputs into consumer and light industry and agriculture.

The second factor is the international environment. Any drastic change in the degree of threat that Pyongyang perceives from the outside world could induce it to spend more money on defense. Such a decision would obviously necessitate a reallocation of available resources.

With the general easing of tensions in the Far East because of improved US-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese relations and the opening of dialogue between North and South Korea, the chances of the international environment interfering with the plan appear fairly remote at the moment. Whether or not the regime persists in the current strategy, then, will probably be determined by the ability of the North Korean economy to perform well enough to meet the plan's optimistic goals.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

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Foreign and Reunification Policies

By Rinn-sup Shinn

On November 4, 1972, the government of North Korea signed an agreement with its counterpart in the South pledging the two regimes to cease aiming hostile propaganda at each other by radio, loudspeakers or leaflets, and spelling out in some detail the organization and objectives of a North-South Coordinating Committee.[1] This exercise in good-neighborly relations and the exploration of means to effect the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula is remarkable by any standards. To the casual observer, such a venture may seem to signify a major departure in the foreign policy of the Communist regime in Pyongyang, and in fact, if the talks are to produce any meaningful outcome, they doubtless will entail dramatic adjustments in North Korea's foreign and domestic policies. Yet, the vaguely defined goal of *minjok t'ong il* (national unification) has long been professed by both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea)—indeed, if anything, Pyongyang has outdone Seoul in this rhetorical contest over the years.

It seems particularly appropriate at this point, when events on the Korean peninsula appear to be taking a dramatic turn, to undertake a critical reexamination of the record of Pyongyang's international and inter-Korean policies over the years. By concentrating on a chronological, situation-by-situation approach emphasizing events since the mid-1960's, one may hope to sharpen the reader's awareness of the causes and effects of the many shifts and turns in North Korean foreign policy, to provide a clearer picture of the elements of continuity and change, to determine what policy options Pyongyang has and will have available in light of its objective capabilities and limitations, and above all to dispel some unwarranted assumptions about North Korean foreign policy in general. Only then can one essay judgments concerning the sincerity of the North's commitment to the talks on unification, the prospects for their success, the potential gains to Pyongyang from an era of détente, and the changes which such a rapprochement might bring about in North Korea's long-term foreign policy objectives.

This analysis proceeds from the postulation that North Korea, like any other sovereign political entity, formulates and executes its foreign policies in order to achieve a set of rationally defined objectives. A cursory examination of the record of Pyongyang's foreign policy reveals the following, often intersecting, goals: to maximize North Korea's national security; to utilize where possible external resources—particularly those of the USSR and the People's Republic of China—to bolster its economy and enhance its military strength; to increase its domestic security and improve its international stature through unification of the Korean peninsula on its own terms—by forcing the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and/or by eliminating the South Korean counterregime; and to seek international recognition, if not as the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula, then at minimum as a coequal to the regime in Seoul in laying claim to leadership of the Korean nation.

In pursuing these ends, Premier Kim Il Sung has religiously stressed the importance of self-help as epitomized in his concept of *chuch'e* (roughly translated as "national self-reliance"). However, he has had to confront the hard reality that his attempts

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[1] *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 5, 1972.

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to have North Korea go it alone have placed certain limitations on his freedom of action, and that, in fact, the practical needs of maintaining domestic and external security have necessitated a degree of dependence on other Communist countries. But in turning to such sources of economic and military assistance as the USSR and the People's Republic of China, North Korea has always insisted that such aid be given without any conditions impinging on its sovereignty. In this respect, Premier Kim Il Sung's doctrine of *chuch'e* has shielded his regime from unwelcome intrusions of Soviet and Chinese influence.

The Insecurity Factor

However, this emphasis also has its drawbacks. Exposed to the combined military might of US and ROK forces to the south, uncertain about the firmness of fraternal support from Moscow and Peking in the event of a major crisis, and dismayed by the deteriorating relations between his two Communist patrons, the North Korean leader has experienced a chronic feeling of insecurity. One of the burdens of the present study is to demonstrate that this insecurity stemming from inadequate economic and military strength has been at the root of the seemingly unpredictable foreign policy behavior of the North in recent years.

It is important that one not ignore this North Korean perspective in examining the current North-South search for reconciliation, for although the talks began in earnest in August 1971, about a month after President Nixon announced his intention to visit Peking, the recent developments in Korea can hardly be attributed solely to this change in US Asian policy. The post-1971 dialogue with the South is only the latest in a long series of efforts by North Korea to regulate its relations with the ROK—be it through negotiation or subversion—in such a manner as to achieve greater security for itself. In order to understand the present direction of Pyongyang's policies, therefore, one must examine the ways in which the DPRK pursued its foreign policy objectives prior to 1971.[2]

One can trace the evolution of North Korean foreign policy through a number of distinct stages. The first stage, from 1945 to 1950, was characterized by the primacy of a pro-Soviet orientation in Pyongyang's external posture, reflecting the fact that the

[2] The best study on the pre-1969 phase of North Korean external relations is Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea*, New York, Praeger, 1969.



Once a "bridge of no return," this span connecting the Demilitarized Zone with North Korea has now become a channel for North-South communications. Here, North Korean guards admit negotiators from the South.

—Robert Lebeck of *Stern* via Black Star.

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USSR was the only source of essential economic and military assistance available to the fledgling North Korean polity. If Premier Kim Il Sung had any reservations about Moscow's politically domineering and economically exploitative policies toward his regime during this period, he remained silent.

Apart from cultivating the Soviet link by fervent public protestations of fidelity to Stalin, Kim's major concern in this period was to strengthen the relative position of his government by attempting to subvert the counterpart regime in the South through insurrectionary tactics carried out by Pyongyang's political arm there, the South Korean Labor Party. However, this party was outlawed in late 1948, and with the tactic of revolution from below bogged down, North Korea turned to the tactic of united front from above with a strong appeal to nationalist sentiments in the South. It repeatedly declared that the problem of Korean unification should be solved by the Korean people themselves, that US troops and the United Nations representatives should be withdrawn from the South, and that South Korea should consent to the establishment of a unified government through political negotiations.

A Costly Gamble

Frustrated in these efforts, North Korea launched an effort to solve the Korean question once and for all by direct military means. This costly and unsuccessful war effort—lasting from June 1950 to July 1953—all but sealed the fate of Korea as a permanently divided nation, particularly because of the legacy of mistrust and bitterness left by Pyongyang's invasion among the South Koreans, which has frustrated repeated subsequent North Korean proposals for peace and brotherhood. Moreover, North Korea has had to live down its negative image as the aggressor in the Korean War and hence an international outlaw—a factor that has hampered its efforts to make friends among non-Communist nations.

The war had other sobering effects. It resulted in the prolonged stationing of US troops in the South, which not only nourished North Korea's sense of insecurity but also put constraints on the realization of Pyongyang's reunification ambitions. Furthermore, the war taught Kim Il Sung an important lesson in international politics—never to take anything for granted even in relations with fraternal countries. Stalin's failure to provide all-out support during the crucial first two months of the war drove home to Kim the practical limitations of "proletarian internationalism" and appears to have bolstered his conviction that North Korea's own survival would be in peril if it did not achieve economic and military self-sufficiency. His heightened resolve to practice *chuch'e* in foreign policy, as in other areas, would soon take on the characteristics of national exclusiveness and would come to strain Pyongyang's relations with its major Communist allies.

The following stage in the foreign policy of the DPRK (1954-1960) featured a concerted peace offensive toward the ROK, which was designed primarily to ease tensions in Korea so that Pyongyang could concentrate on postwar economic reconstruction in relative security. In a scheme for peace and unification unveiled at Geneva in April-June 1954, North Korea called for the formation of an all-Korean commission which would adopt measures to initiate economic and cultural cooperation and exchanges and to terminate the garrison-state atmosphere in North-South relations as early as practicable. Pyongyang's scheme called not only for withdrawal of "all foreign troops" from Korea but also for reductions in the armed forces of the two sides to 100,000 men or less within a year.[3]

Not surprisingly, South Korea rejected the overture as propaganda; in the immediate postwar climate of mutual hatred, no amount of honeyed rhetoric from Pyongyang would have been palatable to the South. However, a critical examination of the circumstances under which the Geneva proposal was put forward (and elaborated through the remainder of the 1950's) suggests that North Korea may well have been sincere in its efforts to reduce tensions on the peninsula. For it was in 1954 that the Pyongyang regime was faced with the decision of Communist China—which had pulled North Korea from the jaws of certain total defeat in October 1950—to withdraw all of its troops from the peninsula by the end of 1955, without any assurances of a reciprocal withdrawal by the United States.[4] By October 1954, China already had withdrawn 87,900 men, and an additional 52,200 were pulled out between April and October 1955. China's military phase-out

[3] *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan, 1967-68*—One Korea Yearbook, 1967-68, Tokyo, Toitsu Chosen Shimbunsha, 1967, pp. 178-89. See also Han K. Kim, Ed., *Reunification of Korea; 50 Basic Documents*, Washington, DC, Institute for Asian Studies, 1972, pp. 30-31.

[4] *Pukhan Ch'onggam* (General Survey of North Korea), Seoul, Kongsankwon Munje Yonguso, 1968, pp. 842-43.

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was reportedly delayed until October 1958 in response to the urgent request of Kim Il Sung.[5] This unilateral withdrawal posed a grave potential threat to Pyongyang's security and was no doubt the reason why North Korea further offered in August 1955 to foreswear the use of force against the South in return for similar assurances from Seoul. The repeated proposals for peace and mutual force reductions also reflected Pyongyang's need to reduce defense spending and to divert scarce manpower to economic reconstruction. In May 1956, a unilateral demobilization of 80,000 men was announced in the North,[6] and six months later Pyongyang called for a North-South conference on disarmament.

The North continued to elaborate on these themes of accommodation and mutual force reduction until August 1960, when Kim Il Sung came forth with a new "confederation" scheme designed to promote cooperation and mutual understanding as the basis for reaching the distant goal of reunification. This proposal, which has served as the model for other subsequent North Korean proposals, was predicated on the assumption that both Koreas would retain their existing political systems and their respective "independent activities." The two sides would be linked by a joint intergovernmental Supreme National Commission, which would be responsible for regulating economic and cultural matters, but not political affairs. If the South would not consent to formation of such a commission, an alternative nongovernmental "purely economic commission" might be formed to facilitate mutual economic cooperation and assistance. Kim also proposed establishment of links in the fields of science, literature, the arts, and sports. As always, the issue of North Korea's security was also broached—in proposals for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the South and a reciprocal North-South force reduction to 100,000 men or less on each side.[7]

This proposal not only was in keeping with the then-current Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, but was also consonant with Pyongyang's own economic and security objectives. Another compelling reason for proposing a confederation was Kim's realization that his efforts to take over the South would continue to be fruitless so long as the South Korean people feared and distrusted his regime. That this was indeed the prevailing sentiment in the South had become glaringly clear during the first half of 1960. When student uprisings toppled Syngman Rhee's unpopular regime in April 1960, it seemed to North Korea that the opportunity had finally arrived when the anti-Communist ROK could be overthrown by a popular revolution which would create a government either neutral or friendly toward Pyongyang. However, despite the North's intensified exhortations to the people of the South, nothing of the sort occurred.

In the Shadow of Clashing Allies

To these problems there was soon added another, more serious matter—the growing Sino-Soviet dispute—reactions to which dominated the next stage of North Korean foreign policy. The opening of a rift between Peking and Moscow, two capitals on which North Korea still felt forced to rely for protection against a perceived threat from the South, introduced a new element of anxiety into Kim Il Sung's security calculations. He spent the next five years (1961-65) attempting to compensate for this adverse development by encouraging revolution in the South (albeit with minimum visible involvement of the North) and by trying to accelerate defense and economic construction at home despite his limited resources.

Initially, it seemed as if the widening Sino-Soviet split would have no adverse effects. When a military regime came to power in Seoul in May 1961, Kim Il Sung was able to extract prompt commitments of military support from the USSR and the People's Republic of China under separate mutual assistance treaties. But the North Korean leader soon found good cause to question the reliability of such pledges when the Soviet leadership decided not to support China in the Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962 and Khruschchev apparently lost his nerve during the Cuban missile crisis of the same month. Almost immediately, Kim rushed a military delegation to Moscow, but it evidently failed to bring home anything to soothe his anxiety.

As a result of these jolts, the KWP in December 1962 announced its grim resolve to achieve a "self-reliant" defense posture through a new military line which sought to strengthen the ideological commitment of every soldier, to modernize the North's arms and equipment, to arm the entire population, and to transform the whole country into an impregnable

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[6] Broadcast of the Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 8, 1969.

[7] For excerpts from this proposal, see Han K. Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-44.

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fortress.[8] Viewed in the context of the events of 1962, Pyongyang's increased attention to military preparedness since December 1962 can be interpreted more as a defensive reaction to the perceived unreliability of the Soviet Union as an ally than as the start of preparations for yet another invasion of South Korea.

While attempting to strengthen the North against the potential threat to its security posed by the new military regime in the South, the North Korean leadership also intensified its efforts to unify the peninsula on its own terms. As outlined by Kim Il Sung at the September 1961 Fourth Congress of the KWP, the strategy adopted involved the organization in the South of a "revolutionary party which takes Marxism-Leninism as its guiding principle" and which would strive to form a broad anti-US "national-salvation united front" in the South. Kim envisaged a three-stage advance to unification: removal of US troops from the South under pressure of the united front, seizure of power in the South by the "people," and finally "peaceful unification" of the peninsula through negotiations between "the patriotic, democratic forces of South Korea and the patriotic, socialist forces of North Korea." [9] Although this three-stage unification formula contained no explicit reference to the use of violence, Premier Kim Il Sung was not so naive as to expect that the South Korean people could overthrow the military regime in Seoul without aid from North Korea or without resorting to a combination of armed insurrection, sabotage and terrorist tactics. Thus, "peaceful unification" related only to the negotiatory third phase which would follow establishment of a people's regime in the South, and it did not necessarily preclude violence in the earlier phase—as long as North Korea was not directly implicated.

The contradictory nature of North Korean objectives vis-à-vis the South was demonstrated in Kim's October 23, 1962, call for good-neighborly relations with the ROK. On the one hand, noting that "the Korean people do not want a fratricidal war, nor do they want to squander the precious fruits of their labor in a civil war," he disavowed any intention to impose communism on South Korea and claimed that the question of whether communism was appropriate in the South should be freely decided by the South Koreans themselves. He proposed a mutual nonaggression pact and mutual force reductions that would enable the North and South "to build the national economy and improve the living conditions of the people." But at the same time, he exhorted "people of all walks of life in South Korea—workers, peasants, soldiers, youth and students, intellectuals and others—" to rise up and "isolate the US imperialists and [forces of] internal reaction and prevent the reactionary rulers from relying upon outside forces."[10] If Kim was genuinely interested in resolving the division of Korea by peaceful means, such simultaneous appeals for goodwill and for struggle were mutually self-defeating.

As the months and years rolled by without any sign of the emergence of a revolutionary party in South Korea, Kim Il Sung became convinced that unification could not be achieved merely by propaganda and that more positive action was required. In February 1964 he outlined a blueprint for revolution in the South which stressed the need for "three revolutionary forces"—North Korean, South Korean, and international. According to the principle of *chuch'e*, the first two would have to become strong before they could seek international assistance. He once again called on South Koreans to

North Korean troops on duty along the 38th parallel.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), September 1971, p. 35.

[8] *Nodong Sinmun*, Dec. 16 and 17, 1962.

[9] Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 212, 219, 221-22.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 356-57, 360, 362.

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organize their own party and to initiate diverse struggles combining both peaceful and violent means based on their own strategic and tactical perceptions. Although Kim Il Sung stressed that actual revolutionary struggles should be carried out by the South Koreans themselves, he also made the significant admission that the North would extend assistance and suggested that the "nuclear leadership" in the South should be composed of "superior persons from among North and South Koreans." [11] According to a subsequent North Korean account, revolutionary forces in the South formed their first political instrument—the Revolutionary Party for Unification—shortly thereafter, in March 1964.[12]

In the meantime, North Korea's domestic and external situation had been deteriorating. At home, unrealistic planning, structural imbalances, scarcity of labor and resources, inadequate capital inflows from abroad, and stagnation of agricultural production were resulting in a slowdown of economic growth[13] at a time when the ROK showed no signs of internal collapse. Furthermore, North Korea could not very well turn to the USSR for aid inasmuch as the emergence of a number of political and ideological differences between the two countries had led many—including the Kremlin leaders—to believe that the DPRK was siding with China in the strife between the two Communist powers. Kim Il Sung, of course, denied this on the grounds that he had merely exercised his self-reliance in foreign policy on the basis of his own independent judgment of the issues involved. But such *chuch'e posturing, however gratifying psychologically,* was no substitute for much-needed economic goods, arms and materiel. Consequently, North Korea was finally constrained to set aside its ideological and political differences with Moscow. Although Pyongyang's adoption of a more tolerant attitude toward "revisionism" (read "the Soviet Union") clearly displeased Peking, it did serve to bring Soviet Premier Kosygin to the North Korean capital in February 1965 with promises of economic credits and arms assistance.

Thus, the stage seemed set for a period of consolidation during which the DPRK would concentrate its energies on economic development and defense preparations while maintaining a low profile in its relations with the South by relying mostly on low-key clandestine operations there. Indeed, this option was apparently advocated by some elements within the KWP leadership, notably by Im Ch'un-ch'u, then head of South Korean operations. However, by the end of 1966, North Korean foreign policy had launched into a period of extreme bellicosity, even recklessness. What caused this sudden, dramatic reversal of earlier trends?

A Shift to Militancy

The major new element in North Korean calculations was South Korea's widening military participation in the Vietnam conflict,[14] a development which could only have been viewed in Pyongyang as an indication of Seoul's military aggressiveness and hence as a threat to North Korea's national security. Pyongyang also saw it as a blow to North Korea's international standing, particularly since the South was contending that its role in Vietnam had "remarkably" increased Seoul's "international stature." [15] Even more important, the DPRK had reason to fear that the ROK would be strengthened militarily and economically as a result of the Vietnam involvement. Such anxieties were fueled by reports emanating from Seoul in early 1966 that the United States would not only assist the South's economic development but also provide considerable military assistance grants for the modernization of ROK armed forces.[16] Furthermore, South Korea stood to earn considerable sums of foreign exchange on its own right in Vietnam.[17]

Under these circumstances, Premier Kim Il Sung evidently sided with those elements in the KWP

[11] *Kim Il Sung Chojak Sonjip* (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), Pyongyang, Inminch'ulp'ansa, 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 46-49, *passim.*

[12] Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) broadcast in English, June 20, 1970.

[13] *Pukhan Ch'onggam*, pp. 322-23.

[14] For a comprehensive account of the circumstances leading to the ROK's involvement in Vietnam, see United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1971, Vol. II, Parts 5-11, pp. 1519-1768.

[15] Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, Feb. 7, 1966.

[16] *Korea Herald* (Seoul), Jan. 27, 1966, and Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, Feb. 23, 1966. The US military assistance grants to the ROK related to the Vietnam action totaled $1,453,900,000 from fiscal year 1966 through 1971. See US Agency for International Development, *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971)*, Washington, DC, AID, 1972, p. 73.

[17] From September 1966 through September 1971, South Korea earned $764,195,000 in connection with commercial exports, military commodity procurement, war risk insurance premiums, contracts for services, construction contracts, and remittances of military and civilian personnel connected with the Vietnam action. See *Shin-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Nov. 10, 1971.

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Table 1. North Korean Subversive Activity (1965-72)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972[a]
INCIDENTS								
Significant incidents south of the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)	42	37	445	486	87	66	37	0
Significant incidents inside the Republic of Korea (ROK)	17	13	121	143	24	47	10	0
Exchanges of fire in the DMZ	23	19	122	236	55	42	31	0
Exchanges of fire inside the ROK	6	11	96	120	22	26	6	0
Total of incidents	88	80	784	985	188	181	84	0
CASUALTIES								
North Koreans killed in the ROK	4	18	228	321	55	46	34	0
North Koreans captured in the ROK	51	21	57	13	6	3	2	0
United Nations Command (UNC) military personnel killed in the ROK	21	35	131	162	15	9	22	0
UNC military personnel wounded in the ROK	6	29	294	294	44	22	47	0
ROK National Police and civilians killed in the ROK	19	4	22	35	19	7	8	0
ROK National Police and other civilians wounded in the ROK	13	5	53	16	17	17	6	0
Total killed, wounded, and captured	114	112	785	841	156	104	119	0

[a] Through August 18, 1972.

SOURCE: *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session, Supplement No. 26 (A/8026)*, New York, 1970, p. 29, and *Report of UNCURK, General Assembly Records, 27th Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/8727)*, New York, 1972, pp. 16-17. The latter source noted that "no significant event was reported . . . after the end of October 1971. The absence of incidents coincided with favorable developments in the Red Cross talks and the secret negotiations leading to the announcement of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. . . ."

leadership that argued that the North's interests would best be served by staging militant diversionary actions against South Korea. At an important conference of the KWP held in October 1966, he announced that the seven-year economic plan due to be completed in 1967 would be extended three more years in order to allow for a larger allocation of resources to the defense sector. Predictably, this victory of the hardliners led to the removal in March 1967 of more than 100 leading moderates (including Im Ch'un-ch'u) from the KWP hierarchy.[18]

The repercussions of this shift in North Korean foreign policy were soon felt. In 1967 and 1968, the level of Pyongyang's belligerent actions directed against the South rose sharply (see Table 1). The two regimes came perilously close to armed hostilities on January 21, 1968, when a 31-member commando team attempted to assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee, a mission which Pyongyang has maintained was the work of South Korean guerrillas.[19] North Korea was also reported to have begun training would-be guerrillas and revolutionaries from national liberation movements and leftist extremist groups the world over, and even to have sent a small number of psychological warfare cadres to the jungles of South Vietnam to work on South Korean soldiers fighting there.[20]

Kim's regime simultaneously manifested increased bellicosity toward the United States. Two days after the commando attempt on Park Chung Hee, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo off Wonson, and on April 15, 1969—in a move apparently timed to coincide with Kim Il Sung's 57th birthday—the North Koreans downed a United States EC–121 reconnaissance plane over international waters. Although it is not clear whether these two incidents were planned at the highest echelons in Pyongyang or merely resulted from overzealousness on the part of local commanders in implementing militant statements originally designed primarily for their deterrent psychological impact on would-be "aggressors," they certainly imparted a cutting edge to Pyongyang's concurrent propaganda and diplomatic effort aimed at isolating and condemning the ROK as a lackey of American "imperialism" and at arous-

[18] Kim T'ae-so, "The Northern Puppet's Self-reliant Line as Seen from a Policy Point of View," *Kukche Munje* (Seoul), May 1971, p. 26.

[19] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Dec. 28, 1968.

[20] *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Dec. 18, 1969, and Jan. 8, 1970. Also *Kyunghyang Sinmun* (Seoul), May 11, 1971.

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ing international opinion—particularly in the Third World—against the continued American military presence in South Korea.[21] The goal—as presented to Asian, African and Latin American countries in the words of Kim Il Sung—was for all small countries to pool their strength in order to "tear off the left and right arms of US imperialism, tear off its left and right legs, and behead it. . . ." [22]

In taking this militant line, North Korea sought to pose as the most reliable anticolonial, anti-imperialist friend of the small developing nations. To highlight this claim, Pyongyang was not above assailing the USSR for its "line of compromise with imperialism," and China for its "practice of fearing to fight against imperialism by deeds while only talking big of opposing imperialism." [23]

On balance, one may question whether North Korea profited from this militant policy line. For example, one cannot with any certainty credit Pyongyang's diversionary provocations with bringing about South Korea's decision not to send any additional combatants to South Vietnam after late 1967. To be sure, North Korea succeeded in attracting worldwide attention and in emerging from its former obscure position in the shadow of its better-known rival in the South. During 1966–68, Pyongyang did succeed in establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, Burundi, Somalia, Iraq, and South Yemen, in developing consular ties with Pakistan, and in opening trade missions in France, Kuwait and Lebanon (see Table 2). Yet North Korea's growing reputation for reckless, irrational behavior could, in the long run, only impede efforts to make new friends abroad.

Nor did Pyongyang's anti-ROK campaign appreciably weaken Seoul politically, economically or militarily. President Park Chung Hee was returned to power in the May 1967 elections, South Korea's economy continued to grow by leaps and bounds, and foreign confidence in the ROK was reflected in a steadily rising level of foreign investments in the South. The US military presence in the South remained credible, and the ROK's arms buildup continued apace—thanks in part to North Korea's belligerent posture. Pyongyang's tactics thus had the further ironic result of forcing the North to divert a still larger portion of its development resources to the defense sector in order to counteract the ROK's stepped-up defense preparations. Moreover, the North Korean campaign hardened the South Koreans' fear and distrust of the Communist government and provided fuel for the ROK government's argument that US troops must remain in the South at least until it had developed sufficient strength to counter the North on its own or until the northern threat became history. Under the circumstances, Kim Il Sung found it difficult to make any headway with the "people's democratic revolution" in South Korea.

Revival of Moderation

The counterproductive consequences of Pyongyang's hostile tactics toward the South made a shift in those tactics just a matter of time. Such a shift was, in fact, foreshadowed in December 1968 and January 1969 by the dismissal of a dozen or so high-ranking military officials (among them the Minister of Defense Kim Ch'ang-bong, and General Ho Pong-hak, head of South Korean operations).[24] On January 18, 1969, the Pyongyang Domestic Service broadcast a commentary which urged caution concerning tendencies toward "false leftism and rightism." Spotlighting the urgency of lowering Pyongyang's own risky "support" profile in the South, the broadcast stated:

All the facts indicate that the revolutionary forces in South Korea are required to make preparations more intensively than ever before.

In response to this call for greater self-help, the clandestine Revolutionary Party for Unification announced its first "manifesto" in August 1969 along with a 12-point action program and the establishment of a "central committee." [25]

[21] Despite the testimony of Pueblo Commander Bucher before a naval court of inquiry that his ship had been spotted by North Korean "fishing boats" the day before its seizure and that, therefore, "Pyongyang must have had enough time for deliberation" (cited in B. C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," *Asian Survey* [Berkeley, Calif.], April 1969, p. 276), the crew of the North Korean vessel which seized the Pueblo stated that they had not been notified of "any foreign vessel" approaching Wonsan (Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, April 11, 1968). Thus, it would appear that zealous North Korean crewmen had merely seized a slow-footed, lightly-armed "sitting duck." As for the EC-121 incident, this author is inclined to accept the view that the downing of the plane was perhaps meant to be a birthday surprise (see *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 17, 1969, and *The New York Times*, April 19, 1969).

[22] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Oct. 9, 1968.

[23] *Kim Il Sung Chojak Sonjip*, p. 309.

[24] Kim T'ae-so, *op cit.*, p. 26.

[25] As noted by Pyongyang, KCNA in English on June 20, 1970.

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In concrete terms, the shift in Pyongyang policy meant a sharp drop-off in the level of subversive activity aimed toward the South during 1969—a trend which continued in 1970 and 1971 (see Table 1). Pyongyang also resumed in 1969 its overtures for the peaceful unification of the peninsula. For example, in a memorandum prepared for the United Nations' General Assembly session of October 1969, the DPRK stressed the sincerity and reasonableness of its many previous unification proposals and claimed that it had refrained from making any further such proposals in recent years because of alleged provocative war maneuvers by the US and South Korea.[26]

While North Korea was coming to its own conclusion that a less bellicose foreign posture would best serve its national interests, other international developments were prompting both Korean regimes to turn their attention at once inward and toward each other in a spirit of realistic accommodation. Of particular importance was the announcement by US President Nixon at Guam in July 1969 that he intended to reduce the American military presence in Asia. Although pleased at this evidence that US power had "reached the limit," Pyongyang suggested that the Nixon Doctrine was really a "crafty ruse" designed to revitalize the US military alliance system in Asia and even to arm "the Japanese militarists as a shock brigade in aggression against Asian countries." [27]

In fact, North Korea's long-cherished goal of obtaining the early withdrawal of US forces from South Korea began to seem less desirable to Pyongyang the more it became a real possibility. This was because South Korea began to intensify its own efforts to achieve self-sustaining economic growth and build a self-sufficient defense establishment in order to offset the adverse effects of an eventual reduction in the US military presence on its national security. In January 1970, South Korean President Park Chung Hee bluntly warned the North that it would have to renounce its aggressive designs because Seoul would soon far outweigh Pyongyang in economic and defensive strength.[28] In effect, Seoul was throwing down the gauntlet for competition with the North on the basis of the formula "construction first, unification later." [29]

This initiative became explicit on August 15, 1970, when President Park ended Pyongyang's long-standing monopoly on the rhetoric of "peace and unification" by calling upon the North to join in "a bona fide competition in development, in construction, and in creativity." Park declared his readiness

Table 2: North Korea's Expanding Foreign Relations

Countries which have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK (listed chronologically):

1948	USSR	1967	Burundi
	Mongolia		Somalia
	Poland	1968	Iraq
	Czechoslovakia		South Yemen
	Hungary	1969	Zambia
	Romania		Sudan
	Bulgaria	1970	Central African Republic
1949	Albania		Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) [a]
	China (PRC)		Equatorial Guinea [b]
	East Germany	1971	Maldives
1950	North Vietnam		Yugoslavia
1958	Algeria		Sierra Leone
	Guinea		Malta
1960	Cuba	1972	Cameroon [c]
	Mali		Rwanda
1963	Yemen		Chile
	Egypt		Senegal
1964	Indonesia		Upper Volta
	Mauritania		Pakistan [d]
	Congo (Brazzaville)		Zaire [c]
1965	Tanzania		Malagasy Republic [b]
1966	Syria		

Countries which have established consular relations with the DPRK:

1961	India [d]	1969	Singapore [e]
	Burma [d]	1971	Mauritius [b]
1969	Nepal [d]		

Countries in which the DPRK has established trade missions:

1967	France [c]	1969	Finland
1968	Lebanon [e]		Austria [b]
	Kuwait		England [c]
1969	Switzerland		Libya

Countries in which the DPRK has opened an information office:

1970	Sweden [b]	1972	Norway [c]

[a] Diplomatic relations have since been suspended.
[b] Also has diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) but no resident ROK diplomatic mission.
[c] Also has diplomatic relations with the ROK and a resident ROK mission.
[d] Also has consular relations with the ROK.
[e] Also has a resident ROK trade mission.

[26] For the text, see Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 8, 1969.

[27] *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 28, 1970. Interestingly, ROK President Park made a similar statement at this time about the US reaching the limits of its strength, but in the context of his regime's search for a new self-reliant means of survival and for strengthening regional collective security in Asia. See *Dong-A Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 1970.

[28] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 1970.

[29] This formula was cited in *Hankook Ilbo* (Seoul), Jan. 1, 1970.

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"to suggest and implement epochal and more realistic measures" for the gradual removal of artificial North-South barriers and to support North Korea's right to participate in the United Nations debate on the Korean question. In return, he demanded that Pyongyang cease all provocations—including guerrilla infiltration—against the South, renounce its policy of communizing the South through violent revolution, and accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question.[30]

Kim Il Sung was hardly likely to accept these politically humiliating demands at any time, and certainly not in 1970 when North Korea was striving to complete its ambitious 1961–67 economic plan, already extended three years. Furthermore, Kim was about to stage the Fifth Congress of the KWP (the first such party gathering in nine years), at which a new long-term economic plan for North Korea would have to be approved. He therefore needed the continued specter of a threat from the South to tighten internal controls and to prevent party and government officials from becoming lax at this critical juncture.

Consequently, Pyongyang initially dismissed Park's proposal as an attempt to dupe the South Korean people, to hamstring their struggle for liberation and unification, and to mislead world opinion. The KWP called on Seoul to accept the North's peace proposals of the past, suggesting that the South should agree to "humanitarian" measures and set aside "political questions" for the moment.[31]

However, by the spring of 1971, North Korea's position had improved: the Seven-Year Plan had been concluded and the Fifth KWP Congress successfully staged; there were now firm indications that some American troops were indeed going to be withdrawn from the South; and the Sino-American "ping-pong diplomacy" of April 1971 was interpreted as a gain for Peking and, by extension, for Pyongyang. Therefore, North Korea felt secure enough to respond to Seoul with its own "eight-point unification formula." Although there was nothing new in the concrete measures proposed, North Korea's stated willingness "to accept anyone's suggestion helpful to the unification of the country" and to hold "heart-to-heart talks with South Korea at Panmunjom (in the Korean Demilitarized Zone) or in a third country "at any time" was a significant departure.[32]

As it edged closer to meaningful negotiations with Seoul, the regime in Pyongyang felt a clear need to protect its institutions and ideological foundations against potentially corrosive influences from the South and to guarantee that its defense forces were adequate to preserve national security. Thus, in February 1971, it proclaimed its firm resolve both to tighten control of the population and to prevent any "revisionist" or "bourgeois" tendencies from corrupting the spartan North Korean way of life.[33]

The 1971 budget, unveiled the day after the eight-point unification program, reflected the regime's continued "strategic line of carrying on economic construction parallel with defense building." [34] National defense expenditures were to amount to about $850 million, or roughly 30 percent of the 1971 budget expenditure. Though this was about the same percentage as in 1970, it represented an absolute increase of some $114 million. The stated objectives of the continued heavy defense outlays were: "to make perfect war preparations more perfect; to further strengthen self-reliant defense work; to produce adequate high-performance weapons and technical combat equipment suited to the peculiar conditions of our country; to secure reserves of war materials in all fields, and to guarantee wartime conditions." [35] It can be reasonably assumed that Pyongyang's concern over its defense capability had been heightened by reports in November 1970 that the US had pledged some $750 million for modernization of ROK forces.[36]

Like the Nixon Doctrine, the evolving Sino-

[30] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Aug. 15, 1970.

[31] See the *Nodong Sinmun* editorial broadcast from Pyongyang by KCNA in English, Aug. 22, 1970.

[32] The eight points were: 1) withdrawal of US troops; 2) reduction of armed forces of North and South Korea to 100,000 or less each after the US departure; 3) termination of the ROK-US mutual defense pact and the ROK-Japan treaty; 4) establishment of a unified central government by holding free North-South elections; 5) assurance of full freedom of political activity and release of all political prisoners in the South unconditionally; 6) establishment of a confederation of North and South Korea as a transitional step, leaving the differing social systems intact; 7) promotion of trade, economic cooperation, interchange and cooperation in science, culture, the arts and physical culture, establishment of mail exchanges, and permission for travel between the two sides; and 8) holding of a political consultative conference with all polticial parties and public organizations of both sides in attendance to negotiate the above-mentioned points. See Pyongyang broadcast by KCNA in English, April 12, 1971.

[33] *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1971.

[34] Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, April 13, 1971.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Nov. 19, 1970, and *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), Nov. 20, 1970. On July 1, 1971, *The Washington Post* set the figure for US aid in 1971-75 at $1 billion to $1.5 billion.

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Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, welcomes O Chin-u, Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, to Peking in the summer of 1971.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), July-August 1971, p. 9.

American détente injected new imponderables into North Korea's calculations concerning national security needs and policy toward the South. Kim Il Sung's uncertainty was evident in his slow reaction to President Nixon's dramatic disclosure, on July 15, 1971, that he would visit Peking. When Kim broke his silence on August 6, he sought to portray the Nixon visit as "a trip of the defeated . . . a great victory of the Chinese people and a victory of the world revolutionary people." The North Korean leader also apparently felt sufficiently assured to announce his readiness to talk with anyone in the South, including the ruling Democratic Republican Party, at any time.[37]

There is evidence that Kim had been reconciled to the shift in Sino-American relations by prior Chinese assurances. Indeed, on July 9—coincident with Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking—the PRC, for the first time in five years, sent a delegate to the Korean Military Armistice Commission meeting in Panmunjom.[38] The following day, a high-level North Korean delegation, headed by Kim Chung-nin (a member of the KWP Politburo and director of South Korean operations for the party), left for Peking, ostensibly to attend celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of the Sino-North Korean mutual assistance treaty.

Another clue to the emerging Sino-North Korean entente was the wide publicity accorded by Peking to Premier Kim's August 6 speech. According to a Pyongyang KCNA English-language broadcast of August 9, Peking's New China News Agency and Radio Peking reported the speech in full, and *People's Daily*, *Liberation Army Daily*, and *Kwangming Daily* likewise honored Kim's statement by "prominently" carrying the full text. (By contrast, Soviet sources maintained silence.) Furthermore, on August 18 a North Korean military mission led by General O Chin-u, Chief of the General Staff, left for Peking in order to discuss Pyongyang's security situation. On September 6, China agreed to provide military aid—of undisclosed amounts or types—to the North gratis under an accord signed that day.[39]

Heightened Diplomatic Activity

As indicated above, the increased tempo of international activity in the 1970's has presented Kim Il Sung with new opportunities and new challenges. In such a setting, inactivity and rigidity would result in isolation, a situation which could only benefit South Korea in the competition for international stature and recognition. Apparently aware of this reality, the North Korean leader has shown flexibility and agility in adjusting his policies to the rapidly changing situation both on the world scene and on the Korean peninsula.

Of particular importance have been the Red Cross negotiations between North and South Korea for the "humanitarian" purpose of reunifying families separated by the division of Korea in 1945 and the circumstances of the Korean War. This joint undertaking was proposed by South Korea on August 12, 1971, and accepted by the North two days later. Although the dialogue addressed only one small issue among the larger underlying problems confronting both Koreas, it marked the beginning of what will almost certainly be a difficult process of thawing relations on the peninsula. For the Red Cross negotiations, notwithstanding their professed purely "hu-

[37] *Nodong Sinmun*, Aug. 8, 1971.

[38] See *Chosun Ilbo*, July 10, 1971, and *The New York Times*, July 10, 1971.

[39] Peking, NCNA broadcast in English, Sept. 7, 1971.

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manitarian" character, must be viewed in the final analysis as a political exercise. From the perspective of Pyongyang, the dialogue could have a number of positive effects. Perhaps the most significant potential gain would be to remove the Korean question from the context of East-West ideological conflict and big-power politics and leave its solution to the Koreans themselves—a long-standing goal of North Korea.

Other potential benefits to the North include the projection of a new image of the North as a reformed and pragmatic entity, possibly leading to broader international recognition of the DPRK as an independent coequal of the government in Seoul entitled to be brought within the framework of the United Nations. (Even during the height of Pyongyang's aggressive posturing in 1967–68, North Korea continued to insist on its right to participate in any United Nations discussions on Korea on an equal footing with the ROK.[40])

Apart from these international ramifications, the Red Cross dialogue may in the long run benefit North Korea by moderating the South Korean people's staunch anti-communism. At the same time, Pyongyang—no less than Seoul—must be aware of the potential risks involved in opening direct contacts between North and South Koreans as envisaged by the Red Cross talks on family reunification. Will Northerners remain unquestioningly attached to their party and government after several weeks of family reunion in the relatively freer political climate of the South? What about the possibility of defections or espionage? Such searching questions doubtless commanded the attention of North Korean policymakers both before and after the start of Red Cross contacts on September 20, 1971. A sense of urgency in the face of the corrosive influences which Red Cross family exchanges might bring was implicit in a commentary published in *Nodong Sinmun* on September 25 under the title "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Creative Idea on the Revolutionization and Proletarianization of the Whole Society." It called upon North Koreans to rededicate themselves to the goal of "remolding themselves as resolute revolutionaries and as true Communists."

As the pace of events quickened on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang redoubled its efforts to broaden its international contacts, in part to counteract similar initiatives by Seoul. Singling out Africa, the Middle East, and Asia for particular attention, North Korea relied heavily on people-to-people contacts and appeals for cultural and economic cooperation, but it did not cease to promote anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle. The dangers of simultaneously pursuing such inconsistent goals were demonstrated in Ceylon, where the North Korean embassy was ordered closed and its personnel expelled in April 1971 for allegedly encouraging the widespread revolt which broke out that month in Ceylon.[41]

Attitudes toward Japan and the US

In its efforts to strengthen North Korea's international position, Pyongyang is placing increased importance on relations with Japan. Its major concern is to preclude the possibility that Japan might replace the United States as the military protector of South Korea. The North wishes to prevail upon Japan to adopt a more even-handed posture toward the DPRK and the ROK, and it has made clear that continued political and economic relations between Tokyo and Seoul—so long as they are not prejudicial to North Korean interests—need not stand in the way of rapprochement between Tokyo and Pyongyang.[42] Finally, Japan is the most significant single trading partner of North Korea among non-Communist states, and Pyongyang would like to enlist Tokyo's help in the future industrial development of the North.

To further these goals, North Korea has adopted a posture of reason and moderation toward Tokyo. This tendency was clear in a long interview granted by Kim Il Sung to Motoo Goto, managing editor of Tokyo's influential *Asahi Shimbun,* in September 1971. Kim offered to renounce military pacts with

[40] See "Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Pyongyang, May 1967, p. 7; see also *Nodong Sinmun*, Sept. 24, 1968, and Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 27, 1967.

[41] *Ceylon Observer* (Colombo), April 17, 1971; *Sun* (Colombo), April 18, 1971; *Ceylon Daily News* (Colombo), April 19, 1971; and *Daily Mirror* (Colombo), April 26, 1971. For selected foreign reactions to Pyongyang's use of diplomatic or consular missions for propaganda purposes, see *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), April 28, 1970, and *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Feb. 18, 1971. For an account of North Korea's training of about 50 Mexican students in guerrilla warfare tactics, see "North Korea—An International Guerrilla Training Center," *Journal of Korean Affairs* (Silver Spring, Maryland), April 1971, pp. 35-36. In September 1972, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) refused to let North Korea reopen its embassy in Colombo.

[42] See *Dong-A Ilbo*, Sept. 8, 1972; Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Sept. 19, 1972; and *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 26, 1972.

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the USSR and China if the ROK terminated its military alliances with the US and Japan. He also announced his willingness to promote friendship with Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and observed that trade, travel, cultural and journalistic exchanges could occur before establishment of formal diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang.[43] (The decision to grant such a long interview to a non-Communist journalist was unprecedented and appears to have signaled a new awareness by Kim that reputable international media might serve more effectively than North Korean media to communicate his preferences and intentions.)

Four months later, Kim Il Sung granted an interview to another prominent Japanese newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun,* which published his comments on January 11 and 14, 1972. The North Korean leader showed his pleasure at the fact that the recent joint communiqué of President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato (issued from San Clemente, California, on January 7, 1972) had omitted any reference to South Korea as "essential to Japan's own security"—a phrasing which had appeared in a November 1969 US-Japanese communiqué. Kim also expressed guarded optimism that North Korea could no longer be kept out of the United Nations in light of "some changes" taking place in the world organization (*i.e.,* the seating of the PRC). In a meeting with a Japanese Socialist Party official in the same month, Kim broached the possibility of a mutual nonaggression pact with Japan once diplomatic ties were established, although he claimed that he was concerned less with any threat to his own country than with the possibility that Japan might seize South Korea.[44]

On the economic front, North Korea can look forward to expanded trade with Japan under a five-year semi-official "memorandum trade agreement" signed during the visit of a Japanese parliamentary delegation to Pyongyang in January 1972. The agreement anticipates an expansion of total annual trade between the two countries from $59 million in 1971 to as much as $520 million in 1976.[45] However, the North has been unable to obtain long-term credits from Japan's Export-Import Bank for the purchase of capital goods, at least in part because of South Korean pressures on Tokyo.

[43] *Asahi Shimbun,* Sept. 27, 1971.

[44] *Shakai Shimpo* (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 1972.

[45] See *The Joong-ang Ilbo* (Seoul), Jan. 24 and 25, 1972; *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 26, 1972; and *Asahi Shimbun,* Nov. 17, 1972, for discussion of the agreement and its potential.

January 1972 also brought a subtle but important hint of a shift in North Korea's position concerning the timing of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. In his interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun,* Kim intimated that US troops need not be withdrawn until *after* North and South Korea had signed a peace pact and had issued a formal declaration of mutual nonaggression. Unfortunately, a gross but apparently honest error on the part of North Korean translators obscured this important signal in the English text of Kim's message broadcast by Pyongyang, and the *volte face* was only publicly recognized in the West two months later.[46]

This gesture was soon followed by other signs of a thaw in North Korean relations with the United States. In separate interviews granted to Harrison E. Salisbury and John M. Lee of *The New York Times* in May and to Selig S. Harrison of *The Washington Post* in June, Kim emphasized his nation's peaceful intent and called for continued, if limited, people-to-people contacts between the DPRK and the US.[47] During July and August, Professor Jerome Alan Cohen of Harvard University became the first American scholar to visit Pyongyang on his own initiative —"to explore," as he put it, "the possibilities of establishing cultural contacts with North Korea and to learn about conditions there."[48]

Defense Outlook

Pyongyang's shift toward more moderate policies had the apparent objective of allaying South Korean fears of the possible consequences of a withdrawal of US support prior to achievement of a stable peace

[46] See *Yomiuri Shimbun,* Jan. 11 and 14, 1972; *Nodong Sinmun,* Jan. 15, 1972; and Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Jan. 15, 1972. The authoritative text carried in the party daily and correctly translated in the Tokyo newspaper read: "We hold that on the condition under which a peace agreement is signed between the North and the South and the US imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea, the armed forces of North and South Korea should be cut drastically." (Translation by the author.) The KCNA English-language version read: "We hold that a peace agreement should be concluded between the North and South and the armed forces of North and South Korea be cut drastically under the condition where the US imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea." This latter, incorrect formulation had been common before January 1972. The important shift was finally clarified by Selig S. Harrison in his article "North Korea Hints Shift on US Ties," *The Washington Post,* March 7, 1972.

[47] See *The New York Times,* May 15, 17, 19-22, 26, and 31, 1972, and *The Washington Post,* May 26, June 6, 12 and 26, July 2 and 3, 1972, for reports of these correspondents.

[48] See Professor Cohen's report, "A Window Half Opened on North Korea," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 31, 1972.

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on the peninsula. Another, closely related objective may have been to bring about a further cooling-off of the arms race between North and South Korea. Ever since July 1970, when the US announced plans to remove some of its 60,000 troops stationed in South Korea, Seoul has sought to strengthen its military establishment with US help under the formula "military modernization first, withdrawal later." Increasing apprehension that the US seemed intent on "withdrawal first, modernization later" only intensified South Korea's desire to bolster its defense forces. Perhaps to weaken this resolve, Premier Kim Il Sung in September 1971 had announced that his government had "substantially" reduced projected defense outlays for the 1971–76 plan period.[49] In April 1972 he further disclosed a sharp reduction in 1972 defense appropriations: they were to amount to approximately $486 million, or 17 percent of the total state outlays for the year, as compared to actual expenditures of some $760 million, or 31.1 percent of total budget outlays, in 1971.[50]

The linkage between the new posture on American withdrawal and the policy of force reductions was made more explicit in June 1972, when Kim proposed that North and South make identical cutbacks of 150,000 to 200,000 military personnel so as "to avoid the danger of a possible war." According to Kim's scenario, this would be followed by the signing of a peace treaty, US withdrawal, and finally reduction of North and South forces to 100,000 men on each side.[51]

Taken at face value, Pyongyang's changing position on defense is open to several possible interpretations. One is that the Communist government may be satisfied with its current level of preparedness, as suggested by Chief of the General Staff General O Chin-u's statement on April 25, 1972, that "We can now confidently say that we have established a powerful all-people, all-country defense system capable of defeating any aggressors." [52] Another possible explanation may be Kim Il Sung's optimism that tensions will ease in view of increasing North-South contacts or—more cynically—his calculation that the best way to secure an early withdrawal of US forces is to lower his own military profile.

However, Kim's shift on defense may well be as much a result of economic constraints as of political prudence. At the November 1970 KWP Congress, he had acknowledged that North Korean defense expenditures had proved an economic burden,[53] and he told Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* in May 1972:

Frankly speaking, because we had to divert large sums of funds to defense construction, we ran into difficulties—to an extent—in raising the people's living standards.[54]

Thus, while the Kim regime's former policies of external militancy and increased military buildup at home may have been useful from the standpoint of tightening internal political control and mobilizing greater popular participation in the defense effort, it was now recognized that they had impeded economic growth.

The decision to curtail significantly the defense sector of the 1972 DPRK state budget thus appears to signal a new commitment to economic growth and improvement of the standard of living in the North. Such a commitment, of course, has wider political ramifications in view of the anticipated broadening of North-South contacts. Sooner or later, North and South Koreans will have an opportunity to see for themselves what the other half of the peninsula is like. Will the North compare favorably with the South in material and cultural terms? The competition that détente will inevitably bring seems likely to spur innovative efforts on the part of both North and South to improve living conditions, to tighten bureaucratic discipline and increase economic productivity, and to eliminate sources of popular grievance.

Success by the North and South in such efforts to prove the viability of their respective systems will likely evoke greater popular identification with the separate regimes and strengthen the hands of those with a vested interest in the political status quo. The legitimacy of the existing order would thereby be confirmed and could become a formidable obstacle to any scheme of unification. It would be the supreme irony for the Korean nation if the current politics of détente in Korea—extolled and rationalized in the name of national unification—actually

[49] *Asahi Shimbun*, Sept. 27, 1971.

[50] *Nodong Sinmun*, April 30, 1972. Cf., p. 64, *supra*.

[51] *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1972.

[52] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, April 26, 1972.

[53] *Kim Il Sung Tongji ui Chungyo Munhonjip* (Important Documents of Kim Il Sung), Pyongyang, Sahoekwahaksa, 1971, Vol. 3, p. 80.

[54] *The New York Times*, May 31, 1972. *Cf., Nodong Shinmun*, June 2, 1972.

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yielded the opposite effect of hardening the division of the peninsula.

Whether this irony is clearly recognized or not by the two Korean regimes, the negotiating process initiated in August 1971 has continued to move ahead.

Dialogue with the South

The North has contributed concretely to the atmosphere of détente by announcing cuts in defense appropriations and by refraining—since late October 1971—from provocative military actions against the South (see footnote to Table 2). More important, secret contacts between North and South Korea in November 1971 paved the way for talks of an explicitly political nature between the DPRK and the ROK.[55] On March 1, 1972, Seoul proposed a high-level political dialogue,[56] and two months later a South Korean delegation headed by intelligence chief Lee Hu Rak went to Pyongyang for talks that took place on May 3–4. The North reciprocated at the end of May by dispatching a delegation headed by Second Vice Premier Pak Song-ch'ol to Seoul, where talks were held during May 29-June 1. Although these exploratory contacts were held in secret, there were some signs in the press of a thaw in South Korea's attitudes toward the regime of Kim Il Sung.[57]

On July 4, 1972, these preliminaries bore their first visible fruit in the form of a North-South joint communiqué—the first inter-Korean "agreement to agree" since the country's liberation from Japan in 1945. The statement set forth certain general principles for mutual cooperation that were promptly identified in North Korea as the "Three Principles of National Reunification Set Forth By the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung." These were: (1) that

North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung hosts Lee Hu Rak, director of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, during talks in Pyongyang leading to the July 4, 1972, communiqué on North-South agreement to work toward reunification.

—Wide World Photos.

"reunification should be achieved independently, *without reliance upon outside force or its interference;*[58] (2) that unification should be achieved by peaceful means; and (3) that both parties should accentuate the cohesiveness of the Korean people despite differences of ideologies, ideas, and social systems. Both Koreas further agreed to initiate active measures aimed at easing tensions, creating a climate of mutual trust, and preventing inadvertent armed clashes; to undertake many-sided functional exchanges; to expedite the Red Cross talks on reuniting separated families; to install a "hot line" to expedite official communication between Pyongyang and Seoul; and to create a North-South Coordination Committee as the framework for further substantive negotiations between the two regimes.

[55] This early behind-the-scenes contact was disclosed by Pak Song-ch'ol (who has headed the North Korean negotiators during the illness of Kim Yong-chu—the brother of Premier Kim Il Sung) in a press conference on July 4, 1972. See Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, July 4, 1972, or *The Pyongyang Times*, July 6, 1972. South Korea has so far neither confirmed nor denied this fact.

[56] This was disclosed July 4, 1972, in a press conference by Lee Hu Rak (See *Dong-A Ilbo* of that date). The North has not acknowledged Seoul's initiative of March 1972.

[57] For example, *Joong-ang Ilbo* had published on April 13, 1972, the first of what promised to be a 50-part series on the myth and reality of Kim Il Sung. No further installments have appeared. It was also an open secret in Seoul that in early May 1972 editors of all major dailies there were instructed by authorities not to make any editorial attacks on the person of Premier Kim Il Sung.

[58] Italics added. This passage represents the North Korean English-language text, which seems most faithful to the Korean-language original. See *The Pyongyang Times*, July 6, 1972, and *Choguk T'ong Il ui Kileso Yoksajok Sabyon* (Historic Event in the Path of Fatherland Unification), Pyongyang, Minjokchinhungsa, July 7, 1972, pp. 9-12. *Cf.*, *Korean News*, No. 72, July 3, 1972, Korean Information Office, Embassy of Korea, Washington, DC, which contains the passage "unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts *without being subject to external imposition or interference*" (emphasis added). The differing wording "reliance upon outside force" and "subject to external imposition" presumably reflect efforts by the DPRK to forestall, and by the ROK to permit, the participation of the UN in a Korean settlement and the retention of US troops in the South until it is achieved.

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The most striking feature of the joint communiqué was the recognition by both sides of the strength of Korean national identity, as evidenced by their mutual agreement to make the goal of unification the basis for rearranging their relations. This is hardly to say that the opposing ideological concepts of communism and democracy or the differing structures of the two societies have become of secondary or minimal significance in the inter-Korean context. Rather it is an indication that, despite two decades of political separation, the two Koreas still find it possible to communicate with some measure of consensus on such matters as family reunion, national identity, and unification. Whether mutual awareness of a common historical, cultural, linguistic and racial heritage can lead to a blurring of political, social or ideological differences, of course, remains to be seen.

Pyongyang evidently hoped that the July 4 proclamation to the world that the Korean problem can and should be solved by the Koreans themselves—through negotiations on a mutually beneficial basis—would serve as the basis for ending United Nations involvement in Korean affairs. On behalf of North Korea, a draft resolution to this effect was presented by Algeria and other sympathetic states at the autumn 1972 session of the United Nations General Assembly. The measure failed to pass, with many nations apparently agreeing with South Korea's stand that unification should be achieved through UN-sponsored elections and that the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the United Nations Command did not constitute an "external force" on the peninsula.[59]

Since late August, the North Korean regime has repeatedly accused the South of sabotaging the spirit of the communiqué, of selling out Korea, and of obstructing unification. Political and ideological differences between the two systems have continued to be a major divisive issue. Pyongyang has called on South Korean students and the people at large to shatter what it calls the "violent anti-Communist racket and fascistizing maneuvers of the South Korean reactionaries and [to] fight more staunchly to bring earlier the independent reunification of the country."[60] The Korean Workers' Party also continues to lend moral support to the clandestine activities of the Revolutionary Party for Unification aimed at promoting a "people's democratic revolution" in the South.[61]

Despite the continuing "war of words," tempers calmed enough for the two sides to reach a "mutual understanding through frank exchange of views" at a North-South Coordinating Committee meeting at Panmunjom on October 12, 1972.[62] This meeting apparently laid the basis for three days of political talks in Pyongyang, which brought forth the agreement of November 4 mentioned at the outset of this study. As constituted by this accord, the North-South Coordination Committee is co-chaired by North Korea's Kim Yong-chu, director of the KWP's Organizational Guidance Department, and by Lee Hu Rak, director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency. In addition to an Executive Council, there are five subcommittees in charge, respectively, of political, military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural affairs. The stated duties of this joint machinery include: finding ways to bring about unification; arranging visits between individuals of the two sides; facilitating economic, cultural and social exchanges and joint cooperative projects; easing tensions, preventing military clashes, and terminating the state of armed confrontation between the two Koreas; and devising procedures by which the two Koreas can take "joint steps" in activities abroad.[63]

The latest accord was warmly greeted by DPRK Second Vice Premier Pak Song-ch'ol as further evidence that

. . . if Koreans sit around at one table and make sincere efforts with a desire to shape the destiny of the nation by ourselves, we are surely able to solve all the problems existing before the nation.

Pak spoke enthusiastically of "joint development of resources, uniform mobilization and utilization of industrial potentials, rational division of labor between the North and the South, and exchange of various kinds of goods." He also foresaw measures to standardize usages in the Korean language; to facilitate scientific exchanges and joint research; to form a single all-Korean sports team for international competition; and to ease tension by reducing arms production, defense spending, and the num-

[59] See the UNCURK Report cited in Table 2, pp. 7–8.

[60] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Aug. 24, 1972.

[61] *Nodong Sinmun*, Aug. 25, 1972.

[62] *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1972.

[63] *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1972. The North-South Coordination Committee held its first "regular session" on November 30, 1972, in Seoul (*Dong-A Ilbo*, Dec. 1, 1972).

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ber of troops on both sides "through mutual consultations." [64]

Only time, of course, will tell the extent to which these optimistic hopes will be realized. The negotiations initiated through the Red Cross talks and the July 4 communiqué may herald the beginning of a new era on the peninsula, but they really constitute only a symbolic beginning. Genuine progress in reunifying the peninsula will require mutual tolerance and the avoidance on both sides of impatience which begets frustration, irrationality, and aggressiveness. The situation calls not only for mutual understanding between North and South but also for circumspection on the part of interested foreign powers. Any actions by outsiders that tend to heighten tensions on the peninsula will almost certainly disturb the fragile Korean dialogue. Of course, Premier Kim Il Sung and President Park Chung Hee will probably continue to differ as to what sorts of outside actions constitute a source of tension in Korea. Such differences may be resolved or narrowed at the conference table if both sides truly adhere to the spirit of the July 4 communiqué.

Despite North Korea's confident statements about the new era of détente, it is not at all certain that the developments since mid-1971 have eased the deep sense of insecurity which has been at the root of Pyongyang's foreign policy from the outset (or for that matter that they have diminished South Koreans' distrust of the North). Conscious of its economic limitations, of the presence of US troops and growing ROK forces in the South, and of the apparent reluctance of its Soviet and Chinese associates to become involved in any military clash with the US on the Korean peninsula, the DPRK has been obliged to act defensively—although this basically defensive posture has at time manifested itself in a guise of aggressiveness.

Despite the limitations inherent in dependence on the USSR and the PRC, North Korea will continue to rely on these major socialist states for economic and defense support, particularly in light of the uncertainties of current great-power politics in East Asia and the newly-initiated contacts with South Korea. Pyongyang may be expected to double its efforts to bring about a more favorable Japanese policy toward the DPRK, both for reasons of security and in the hope of enlisting Japanese participation in North Korea's economic development. The United States is also likely to become a major target of North Korean diplomacy, at least of the people-to-people variety. In this case, the objective will be to assure the Americans that US troops are no longer needed in South Korea as a result of the North-South commitment to ease tensions, to trust each other, and ultimately to unite into a single nation.

The likelihood that the Korean nation will unite under a single political system admittedly appears remote at present. Although neither side has shown a willingness to admit publicly the necessity of an indefinite coexistence of two Koreas as separate, independent states, North Korea—amid indications that neither Pyongyang nor Seoul can impose its own will on the other, independently or otherwise, by peaceful or violent means—seems to have reconciled itself to that reality.[65] Significantly, North Korea's new "socialist constitution," adopted on December 27, 1972, names Pyongyang, not Seoul (as did the former constitution), as the capital of the DPRK.[66] This change would appear to suggest that the DPRK claims jurisdiction over just the northern half of the peninsula it now controls, thereby implicitly recognizing Seoul's authority over its half of the peninsula.

Like the South, moreover, North Korea seems eager to prove the advantages of its particular way of life. Indeed, there are preliminary though admittedly inconclusive signs that the DPRK is shifting its attention from defense-building to economic development. For example, Im Ch'un ch'u, who apparently lost his position as head of South Korean operations in 1957 for advocating such a course, has now been restored to high office as Secretary of the new Central People's Committee, a high-powered inner cabinet chaired by Kim Il Sung.[67]

To the extent that the present atmosphere of détente on the peninsula proves durable, North Korea may possibly consider it advisable to continue avoiding the aggressive posturing of the past, born of perceived insecurity, in favor of lowering defense costs and devoting more of its resources to economic development. Such moves would unquestionably benefit economic performance in the North. Furthermore, they could help Pyongyang to improve its international image, provided that its foreign-policy actions remain consistent with the current atmosphere of détente.

[64] *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 7, 1972.

[65] See Richard Halloran, *The New York Times*, Oct. 31, 1972.

[66] KCNA in English, Dec. 27, 1972.

[67] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Dec. 29, 1972.

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Books

Read Marx Instead

By Richard T. De George

LOUIS ALTHUSSER and ETIENNE BALIBAR: *Reading Capital.* Translated from the French by Ben Brewster. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.
DAVID FLAKSER: *Marxism, Ideology and Myths.* New York, Philosophical Library, 1971.
KARL MARX: *Early Texts.* Translated and edited by David McLellan. New York, Barnes & Noble, 1971.

MARXIST PHILOSOPHY has been in the midst of a revival for at least the past decade. The number of Marxist positions has been proliferating and sometimes seems almost as large as the number of Marxists. Yet with some justification we can divide contemporary Marxist philosophers into three broad groups: critical Marxists, humanist Marxists, and scientific Marxists.

Members of the first group turn to Marx primarily for his critique of capitalism, which they continue to use as the basis for their attacks on contemporary Western society and its various institutions. Herbert Marcuse is one of the foremost examples of this group, which also includes members of the Frankfurt school, such as Jürgen Habermas, and those members of the New Left who find some of their inspiration, method, or vocabulary in Marx. The humanist Marxists are less concerned with criticizing Western society than with building a new society based on humanistic principles. Many of these are non-Soviet East European philosophers, such as Leszek Kolakowski of Poland; Gajo Petrovic, Mihailo Markovic, and Svetozar Stojanovic of Yugoslavia; and Ivan Svitak and Karel Kosik of Czechoslovakia. The third group, the scientific Marxists, are for the most part Marxist-Leninists. The largest portion of the group is made up of philosophers in the Soviet Union, though it includes others who follow the Engels-Lenin line of Marxist thought.

In recent years the critical Marxists have been the most vocal and radical, the humanist Marxists the most creative and experimental, and the scientific Marxists the most dogmatic and dull.

All three groups can and do legitimately go to Marxian texts to support their positions. The writings of the young Marx are the major focus for the humanist Marxists, since it is in these texts that they find Marx's concern with man, alienation, and oppression most clearly spelled out; but the values embodied in communism lead them to Marx's later writings also, which they interpret not as scientific but as humanistic. The critical Marxists make equally good use of both the young and the old Marx. But whereas the humanists are interested in the positive aspects of Marx, the critics are interested in his negative critique and in his attacks on the status quo. The scientific Marxists are primarily concerned with the writings of the mature Marx, with the laws of social development, and with dialectical materialism as developed by Engels and Lenin. It is their interest in the operation and development of the various laws which Marx and Engels describe, as well as their insistence on the truth of these laws, that have led them to assume the label "scientific."

Members of all three groups have engaged in disputes about which is the real Marx, about how the early works of Marx (many of which were first published in 1932) are to be interpreted, and about how the importance of these works is to be assessed. These are internal Marxist disputes. To the outsider the debating often appears parochial, polemical, and ideological—representing an attempt by each group to garner the weight of Marx's authority for its own viewpoint in a quarrel among any who value that authority.

ANOTHER TYPE of dispute centers on whether Marx's works and findings are indeed scientific in any strict sense of the term; and

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here the non-scientific Marxists are joined in their criticism by many non-Marxist philosophers. Most of these critics quickly dismiss professions of Marxism's scientific validity, feeling that the case against such claims has been sufficiently well made; they read the claims as ideological, or as mythical, and interpret them sociologically, psychologically, or in some similar manner. This is true, for instance, of Sartre's critique of the Marxist-Leninists, as well as of Kolakowski's.

Unfortunately the book by Flakser here under review, despite its attractive title, adds nothing either to this perspective or to Marxist interpretation in general. He maintains that all social views are ideological and at best only partially true, and that since the human subject cannot be objectified, no social theory, including Marxism, can claim to be scientific. He deals very little with either Marxism or myths and says nothing that has not been said better by others.

The growth of interest in early Marx which characterizes the non-scientific Marxists is reflected in the appearance of McLellan's translations, which were in preparation in 1967 when the larger collection of Marx's early writings by Easton and Guddat[1] was published. The latter authors consider the writings of the young Marx to end with the publication of the *Communist Manifesto,* and so include portions of *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology.* McLellan chooses to omit these two works, since they contain the beginnings of historical materialism —which to McLellan is Marxism— and since his interest, as in an earlier study, is in *Marx Before Marxism* (the latter's title).[2]

In the introduction to his volume of translations, McLellan sides with the humanist Marxists in arguing that there is no break between the young and the old Marx, *Capital* being a continuation of Marx's earlier works. McLellan bases his thesis not only on an analysis of the early and later writings; he puts special emphasis on Marx's *Grundrisse,* which was written in 1857–58, and which he claims is as Hegelian as the *Paris Manuscripts,* though it serves as the basis for *Capital.*

THIS POSITION is implicitly challenged by Louis Althusser—one of the coauthors of the third work under review—who uses the *Grundrisse* to argue precisely the opposite thesis. In an earlier study, *For Marx,*[3] Althusser had already attacked the humanistic interpretations of Marxism, argued for a radical break between the writings of the young and of the mature Marx, and defended the claims of Marxism to be scientific. In *Reading Capital,* he and Etienne Balibar each continue these themes in their separate essays, as they analyze the epistemology which underlies *Capital.* The reading they present is philosophical, not economic or sociological. They are interested in disclosing not only the logic or methodology underlying *Capital,* but the sense in which it represents a radical break with Marx's predecessors in the realm of political economy. Althusser insists that in making this break, Marx produced a theoretical revolution, modifying the very object of economic theory, and hence producing a new system, a new theoretical domain, with certain structures and an internally defined terminology. Althusser claims that Marx is therefore the founder of a new science, comparable in this respect to Galileo or Lavoisier. The thesis of the break from the young to the old Marx is hence crucial for Althusser, for it is the concept of the break that makes possible the claim that Marx founded a new science by opening up a new theoretical domain. If he merely continued what others had done before him, the claim would not stand.

The question of whether there really is a break between the young and the old Marx, however, remains moot. It may be true that Marx supplies us with a new problematic; but it is not at all clear that Althusser's attempt to draw an analogy between the impact of Marx's work and of Lavoisier's chemistry is apropos. We know that once Lavoisier's work was done, it was taken up by others with tangible results of a kind that later Marxists simply have not produced. The results we are to look for—according to Althusser—are theoretical, not practical. But the question which he raises and never satisfactorily settles is the question of just what constitutes theoretical scientific knowledge, and how we are to know when we have it in the domain Marx has delimited.

If Althusser has not made entirely good his claim to have escaped from the realm of ideology into the realm of scientific knowledge, he has at least shown that scientific Marxism need not be as dull as it has been for so long in the hands of its Soviet expositors. The close readings of *Capital* which

[1] *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,* Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1967.

[2] London, Macmillan, 1970.

[3] London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969.

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Althusser and Balibar give us help clarify the function of Marx's concepts of surplus value, productive forces, social relations, law, and tendency, and indicate how complex and intricate the various levels of society which Marx mapped out but did not analyze actually are. The suggestion that each level of society has its own structure and its own historical time for development points to a vast region for potential future investigation along Marxist lines, an endeavor which promises to be more intrinsically interesting and useful for understanding society and ourselves than sterile quibbles over which is the real Marx.

WHAT BECOMES clear from both McLellan's discussion of the *Grundrisse* and from *Reading Capital* is the fact that Marx, despite his enormous labors, had really only begun the work of social analysis, that *Capital* was only the initial step. A reading of *Capital* indicates how difficult and painstaking Marxist theoretical analysis, and therefore Marxist philosophy, really is. The failure of many contemporary Marxists is that they have made Marxist analysis too facile, too superficial, and too easy. They have adopted Marx's results instead of following his example. The upshot is that both the early and the later works of Marx still make better reading than the writings of most of his followers.

Despite the presence of a few outstanding figures, the current Marxist revival has not yet become a Marxist Renaissance.

A Question of Science

By Rudolf L. Tőkés

ZHOREZ A. MEDVEDEV:
The Medvedev Papers, New York, Macmillan-St. Martin's Press, 1971.

(Editors' Note: Since this review was written, the Soviet government has given permission to Zhores A. Medvedev to spend one year in England for research purposes. He is now at Britain's National Institute for Medical Research.)

AS SOVIET IDEOLOGUES from Lenin on have repeatedly affirmed, one of the main objectives of the building of communism is the creation of a "new Soviet man" who will represent the pinnacle of human development under socialism. This new man is conceived as being a materialist, yet imbued with lofty moral values; an individual, yet endowed with an unlimited capacity to subordinate his interests to those of society; a person of scientific outlook, yet receptive to humanistic impulses; a patriot, yet having an empathy for the universal aspirations of mankind; and so on.

Judging from complaints in the Soviet press about the persistence of graft, alcoholism, and profligacy among Soviet youth, this ideal Soviet man still remains in the incubation period and seems likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. However, socio-political development in the USSR since Stalin *has* given birth to considerable numbers of a striking new type of individual whom, for want of a better term, we shall call *civis Sovieticus*.

What sort of person is he? In some respects, he does fulfill the requirements of the new Soviet man: he is at once a patriot who takes pride in the historical, cultural and spiritual traditions of his homeland and a socialist with a positive commitment to the ideological premises and institutional foundations of Soviet power and a belief in the eventual fulfillment of his nation's destiny under socialism. But, on the other hand, he is an individual who looks upon himself as a citizen rather than a subject of his country, as a person not only indisputably entitled to human dignity but also endowed with certain rights that he considers inalienable, universally valid, and protected by both the Soviet Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The *civis Sovieticus*, by definition, need not be a dissident. However, driven by the compelling logic of the continued denial of

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civil rights to the Soviet people by Stalin's successors, he is often presented with no other alternative but to become one of those courageous Soviet citizens who are openly challenging *the way* they are ruled and the very legitimacy of the system that has made official lawlessness possible.

The *civis Sovieticus,* as we know him, emerged during the second stage of Khrushchev's rise to power, that is, sometime in the late 1950's. At that time, destalinization was gathering momentum, and the surviving victims of Stalin's purges were beginning to rejoin the society from which they had been ostracized a generation before. These pitiful human reminders of the evils of Stalinism were subsequently joined by young Soviet intellectuals, by artists, writers, and members of the scientific elites, by religious believers and members of national minorities, to form the nucleus of a swelling movement asserting a common interest in the defense of civil rights, creative freedom, and other moral, political and economic rights guaranteed by the Constitution but routinely violated by the regime.

IT WAS IN THIS context that Zhorez Medvedev, a previously unknown biochemist, appeared on the scene with a *samizdat* manuscript on the history of Soviet agrobiology.[1] Originally conceived as an effort to evaluate the state of Soviet science in the early 1960's, Medvedev's treatise offered a documented and factually unimpeachable critique of the pseudo-scientific teachings and sinister activities of the notorious Trofim Lysenko during the rule of Stalin and later of Khrushchev. This politically explosive exposé became a *cause célèbre,* involving the author in a running battle with the state bureaucracy, conservative party scientists, his own institutional superiors, the postal authorities, and ultimately with the secret police and its infamous institution for the criminally insane.[2] As a result of this experience, Medvedev's disenchantment with the system reached the point where he felt compelled to concern himself with more than the immediate interests of his own professional community and to reexamine the values, institutions and ruling practices of the broader Soviet political world that made Lysenko possible and his own persecution inevitable.

The *Medvedev Papers* consist of two essays: "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," and "Secrecy of Correspondence is Guaranteed by Law," both of which were written between July 1967 and April 1970. In these essays, Medvedev develops four related themes—all of them bearing on the basic problem of freedom of scientific inquiry in post-Stalin Russia. The first theme revolves around Medvedev's frustrated attempts to accept an invitation to deliver an important lecture in England; the second has to do with the difficulties encountered by Soviet scientists when they attempt to participate in the professional life of the international scientific community; the third is a case study of Soviet travel restrictions and passport regulations; and the last concerns the inside workings of the Soviet postal censorship as experienced by a hapless non-recipient of personal letters and scholarly papers sent to him by foreign friends and fellow scientists.

From these essays there emerges a set of lucid, rational and extremely persuasive arguments focusing on the age-old conflict between demands for ideological orthodoxy and the requirements of cultural-scientific progress. Medvedev astutely points to the dichotomy presented, on the one hand, by the regime's sense of insecurity in internal political and external military affairs and, on the other hand, by its inherent inability—because of ideological inhibitions—to meet these challenges by means of political reform, economic modernization and scientific innovation. He contends that even a policy of freely drawing upon Western scientific and technological innovations has not succeeded in narrowing the scientific-technological gap between the USSR and the advanced countries of the West:

The scientific and technological gap between the USSR and the world level gradually increased during the years from 1946 to 1955, and this happened in spite of the free copying and borrowing of any technical achievements from abroad, supported by the refusal of the USSR to take part in international conventions and discussions on patents, licenses and priority of inventions. . . . (p. 118)

. . . as 1955 approached, . . . those running the state, like Peter I in the past, began to go abroad and see what it was like, our scientific and technological gap

[1] The term *samizdat* (literally, self-publication) applies to works that cannot be officially published but are circulated, usually in a limited number of typed copies, in defiance of official censorship. Medvedev's manuscript found its way abroad and was eventually published in English under the title *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

[2] On this episode see, Zhorez A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev, *A Question of Madness,* New York, Knopf, 1971.

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became clear. The slogan of using the scientific and technical experience of other countries was proclaimed. . . .

But, as it turned out, the practice of copying in the new conditions did not guarantee progress but only a permanent lag. The rates of technical progress in the world increased so rapidly, methods of construction and instruments changed so fast, that the process of copying turned into the copying of the obsolescent and the obsolete. (pp. 164–65)

After underlining the undesirable economic and military-technological consequences of Russia's long self-imposed intellectual isolation from the outside world, Medvedev presents the text of a memorandum which he addressed to the Ideological Commission of the CPSU Central Committee in an attempt to direct attention to the heart of the problem. In blunt language, the memorandum asserted that the criterion of ideological conformity is meaningless as an indicator of validity in the realm of the natural sciences. It went on to say:

If ideology is science, if communism is a science, if Marxism-Leninism is a science, then any criticism of any proposition in these sciences is also a science and not a "deviation." In any science, if it is not a collection of empty dogmas, certain propositions are continually going out of date and need to be replaced, new ideas, new propositions are always appearing in connection with new circumstances, new conditions, new relationships. . . . As a scientist accustomed to analyze facts, it is quite clear to me that there are no explicit criteria for demarcating the permissible forms of criticism. *(pp. 280–81; the emphasis is in original)*

The memorandum accused the regime itself of "deviationism":

The side in an argument which starts to break the law thereby adopts the method of deviation. And if a government which at a particular moment in time adopts a particular point of view uses illegal measures in its polemics against those who hold different views, encroaches upon the secrecy of correspondence, arbitrarily extends the legal functions of censorship, dismisses people from work, prosecutes them, breaking the standards of legal procedure, commits slander, restricts civil rights, and so on, then this means of ideological warfare is an ideological deviation from the ideology of communism as a whole. (p. 282)

As Marx told German readers of the first volume of *Das Kapital*, *"de te fabula narratur!"*

ONE OF THE MOST striking aspects of Medvedev's thinking is that it appears to embody widely-shared views—one might even say, a common ideological counterplatform—of the liberal Soviet scientific intelligentsia. Much as the writings of Oppenheimer, Szilard, Pauling, Szentgyorgyi, Lord Snow, Lord Zuckerman and Denis Gabor reflected the views of distinct segments of the intellectual communities in the United States and England, so Medvedev's views seem to reflect the stated beliefs of Kapitsa, Landau, Tamm, Sakharov, Chalidze, Pimenov, Tsukerman—and, very probably, the unspoken beliefs of many other members of the Soviet scientific community.

This phenomenon suggests the emergence among the Soviet scientific intelligentsia of a new sense of solidarity in quest of a moral authority and leadership that they find wanting in the professional politicians of the party apparatus. In his *Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, Sakharov looked to the "most progressive, internationalist and dedicated element" of the Soviet intelligentsia as symbolic representatives of such leadership.[3] Medvedev, in his *Papers*, looks beyond national frontiers to find in the world intellectual community the potential "motive force" of an order dedicated not to narrow class goals but to universal human progress:

There is only one social group of people in the world which, not only on account of its position in society but simply on account of the humane qualities inevitably inherent in it, on account of its selection of people for these qualities and on account of the character of its daily activity, is connected in a worldwide, mutually dependent, mutually advantageous, mutually respecting system in friendship independent of national frontiers, constantly sharing among itself all possible help and interested to the utmost in the progress of mankind, of which it is the standard-bearer and motive force. This group consists of scholars, the culturally creative intelligentsia, and not simply that class of people who have a secondary or higher education. (pp. 170–71)

Although some might regard this statement as smacking of techno-

[3] See *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968.

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cratic elitism and intellectual arrogance, Medvedev's emphasis on the need for "humane qualities" and "mutual respect" must strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of those who might be inclined to dismiss his plea as little more than a utopian flight from the realities of his still semi-Stalinist native land.

In his earlier-quoted letter to the Central Committee's Ideological Commission, Medvedev explained why the party bureaucracy would remain incapable of coping with the rising tide of public opinion and of controlling—at least as effectively as in Stalin's time—the various new channels of unauthorized communication exemplified by *samizdat*. Pointing to the inevitable social consequences of economic modernization, he argued that the provision of higher living standards, greater amounts of leisure time, and improved and expanded education had brought into being a "critical mass" of Soviet citizens increasingly concerned with public affairs, cultural-artistic development and scientific progress. He further predicted that the increasing availability of means of duplicating and disseminating *samizdat* materials (*e.g.*, typewriters, tape-recorders, and—for some people—even computer printouts) would make it impossible for the party to check the emergence of a body of well-informed and critical elite opinion—that is, short of a return to crude Stalinist methods of control.

At one point, Medvedev proffers the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that *samizdat* should be considered a perfectly legal leisure-time activity, a kind of "hobby" like "collecting stamps or matchbox labels, fishing or playing chess." No doubt, his irreverent humor is lost on the dour ideologues and KGB officials charged with curbing the circulation of uncensored materials. But certainly they should be the first to concede that the burgeoning of *samizdat* has confronted the regime with a policy problem of unprecedented magnitude the solution of which has thus far eluded them.

Chalmers Johnson, in speculating on the likely outcome of the confrontation between the specialized elite and the party over the issues of free communication and ideological purity, suggests that the logic of peaceful coexistence, involving the necessity of playing by the rules of the international market, has compelled the Soviet leadership to embark on the ideologically hazardous path of competing with the capitalist world in terms of "innovation, not just emulation." [4] Medvedev, too, suspects that the various components of East-West coexistence are inseparable and that, in the long run, the party will be forced to tolerate and accept a growing volume of ideological contraband—including *samizdat*—as part of a new *modus vivendi* with the scientists, whose full cooperation is indispensable to the regime if the Soviet Union is to survive as a global power in the decade of the 1970's.

Medvedev's *Papers* also help to shed light on many details of the daily lives of Soviet scientists, especially the lives of the hand-picked elite that work in highly specialized research institutes in the Moscow area. Living in relative isolation from the rest of the society and protected—to a degree—from immediate political control, these men constitute perhaps the only group in the Soviet Union who have both the qualifications and the opportunity to observe the system from the inside, to judge it with intellectual objectivity, and to criticize its shortcomings from a well-informed national and international perspective. To be sure, the scientists' relatively greater immunity from political harassment did not prove inviolable in Medvedev's case, but the fact remains that without these specialists the regime could not long continue to function. While the scientists are aware of this, they endeavor on the whole—in their public acts—to stay within the "grey zone" between the officially prescribed norms and the kinds of activity that invite official persecution.

BECAUSE THIS REVIEW focuses specifically on the thinking of Medvedev and his fellow scientists, it must perforce omit discussion of the other segments of the Soviet dissident community—in literature and the arts, among the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, and in the ranks of persecuted religious believers. It is probably true that the latter two groups include a good many who, in terms of commitment to the ideological and institutional foundations of the Soviet state, would not fit the description given at the outset of the *civis Sovieticus*. Nevertheless, it is important to note that members of all these groups do share common ground: whether as writers of *samizdat*, as editors or contributors to the clandestine *Chronicle of Current Events*, or as compilers of protest documents, they form the articulate vanguard of a growing democratic movement seeking to propagate a

[4] Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 23.

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new spirit of modern Soviet citizenship and a redefined sense of democratic patriotism.

It is still too early to predict whether the dissident movement in the USSR will have any significant and lasting impact on the Soviet system. For one thing, the history of Russian revolutionary and reformist movements over the last hundred years suggests that it is a slow and difficult process to overcome the political apathy of the rural and urban working masses. For another, the dissident community is still a small minority, and its different segments are far from united in their outlooks and aspirations beyond their common opposition to neo-Stalinist lawlessness and the arbitrary practices of the party and state bureaucracy. It is therefore quite conceivable that the party, by astutely manipulating the conservative masses and setting them against the liberal elites, may succeed in isolating the latter and putting an end to their fledging program of democratic reeducation. Nevertheless, man's yearning for dignity and individual freedom is not easily extinguished, and one can only hope that the courage and humanism of those like Medvedev and other Soviet liberal intellectuals will in the end bear fruit to the benefit of all their countrymen.

Moscow and Asia

By Geoffrey E. Wheeler

NORTON T. DODGE, Ed.:
The Soviets in Asia.
Mechanicsville, Maryland,
Cremona Foundation, 1972.
HARISH KAPUR:
The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations—A Case Study of Soviet Policy towards India.
Geneva and London,
Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1972.
J. A. NAIK:
India, Russia, China and Bangladesh
New Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1972.

IT IS NOW more or less generally conceded that the aims of Soviet policy in Asia—be it Soviet Central Asia or the postcolonial nations of that great territory stretching from Asia Minor to the Far East—are national rather than ideological in nature and that they bear in some respects a marked resemblance to those pursued by prerevolutionary Russia. While the constant adjustments of the balance of power in various parts of Asia in recent years make it virtually impossible to define Soviet aims with any degree of precision, one may describe them as directed, in a general way, toward achieving the same kind of influence and control over Asian affairs as Britain exercised in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and toward containing the efforts of any other power—principally China—from attaining similar sway over the region. Particularly in its postwar efforts to expand Soviet national power in all parts of Asia, the USSR has been forced to reckon with the countervailing force of nationalism, a political factor which was essentially absent when Britain was gaining her ascendancy in South and Southeast Asia. Significantly, it was when this essentially European concept began to spread through Asia (often, ironically, with the encouragement of liberal elements in England), that Britain's hold over her empire became increasingly precarious and eventually impracticable, and her influence and prestige in Asia declined accordingly.

The Soviet Union, unlike Great Britain, is a landlocked continental empire and is, moreover, apparently quite impervious to the liberal considerations which contributed to the disintegration of the British Empire. Moscow has retained control over its own inherited Tsarist dominions in Central Asia by a combination of armed force and a novel system of colonial administration and exploitation. For a considerable time, the Soviet regime believed it could also extend its control to the rest of Asia, not by force of arms, but by a new method—the propagation of its own Communist ideology and the establishment of this doctrine as the guiding political and economic principle throughout this vast area.

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By the time of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (in early 1956), however, the Kremlin had decided that communism, at least for the foreseeable future, could not by itself serve as a substitute for conventional power politics. Moscow accordingly changed its tactics in dealing with the nationalist states of Asia. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the USSR proffered moral support to Nasser's Egypt in the manner of regular power politics. Moscow sought to supplement the political capital gained from this action by extending material and technical aid to Asian states—a technique readily copied from the West. At the same time, she made a public show of desisting from subversion, of encouraging left-wing elements in Third-World states to participate in national coalition politics, and of avoiding any semblance of the kind of direct military intervention that had brought the West into such disrepute among the nationalist Asian governments. However, such approaches—even while successful in securing port and ground facilities for Soviet warships and aircraft in some areas—have failed to gain Moscow the same degree of prescriptive and proscriptive control that it enjoys, thanks to the presence of large contingents of Soviet troops, in Eastern Europe and in one Asian state, the Mongolian People's Republic. Furthermore, the benefits gained in the Middle East and Asia by using such relatively mild methods may be ephemeral, as demonstrated recently in the case of Egypt.

The growth of nationalism in the Third World, the emergence of China as a world power, and the spectre of a Sino-Japanese axis in Asian affairs all constitute formidable obstacles to the achievement of paramount Soviet influence in Asia. Nevertheless, the prestige of the USSR in the region remains higher than that of the West or of China, and in its brief history the Soviet regime has shown great flexibility in abandoning out-worn tactics in favor of new ones.

In light of these observations, one approaches with considerable interest the volumes under review, which examine Soviet tactics in Asia from such diverse perspectives as, on the one hand, those of American academic and government specialists, and on the other hand, those of two scholars from India, itself a major target of Soviet Asian policies.

The Soviets in Asia presents the edited versions of papers presented at a symposium jointly sponsored by the Washington Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, May 19-20, 1972. The contributions are organized according to four major areas: Soviet Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Taken together they provide a most useful and up-to-date guide to American thinking on contemporary Soviet policies toward Asia. The studies all are based on expert academic research as well as official expertise, and they make full use of Soviet source materials, which have become increasingly discursive and revealing during the past fifteen years. Although the number of topics is necessarily limited, the range is wide, and there is little duplication.

The papers on Soviet policy in East Asia are the most lively and controversial of the whole collection. A fundamental difference of opinion apparently exists on the issue of whether the world is now multipolar—consisting of the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan—or still displays a basically bipolar configuration dominated by the US and the USSR. The complexities facing Soviet policy toward East Asia are highlighted by papers outlining the transformation of China from an ally into an adversary and speculating on Japan's attempts to achieve *rapprochement* with both the USSR and the People's Republic of China while continuing to give priority to cooperation with the United States.

Papers on Soviet policy in the Middle East review in detail the modifications which have occurred so far in Soviet political and economic approaches and consider the chances the USSR has of successfully projecting its influence where Britain and the US have failed. Significantly, the studies in this section dispense with the old definition of Soviet aims as the perpetuation of instability (with a view to eventual establishment of international communism in the Middle East) and replace it with the simple understanding of present Soviet objectives as the achievement of political and economic control of the region. The general conclusion drawn by the contributors seems to be that the Soviet Union has had no more success than the West in filling the power vacuum left by the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, and that Moscow has proved successful in dealing with only a limited number of countries, particularly those of the so-called "Northern Tier"—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

Turning to Soviet policy toward South Asia, one notes that the contributors to the Washington symposium manifest commend-

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able caution in attempting to define Soviet aspirations in the region and in assessing their chances of realization. It is also noteworthy that in these studies little importance is attached to those local Communist parties formerly thought to be the spearhead of Soviet policies. Instead, the emphasis of these papers is on state-to-state relations and particularly on the Soviet Union's successes in cultivating such relations with India.

THESE AMERICAN appraisals provide an interesting comparison with the views expressed by two Indian observers of Soviet policies on the subcontinent. In *The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations*, Harish Kapur (writing before the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 1971) emphasized Indo-Soviet disagreement on economic matters since 1962 and India's tendency to resent Soviet interference in her internal affairs. In fact, at the time of writing, Professor Kapur believed that it was "unlikely that she [India] would ever reacquire the important position that she had [in Soviet eyes] during the Khrushchev period." Dr. J. A. Naik displays a markedly different attitude. Full of praise for Soviet adroitness and understanding of India's problems (as compared with the "miserable failure" of American "crisis management"), he performs a delicate balancing act between approval of the Soviet policy of "identifying their own interests with those of accountable regional powers" and an attempt to discount the danger of India becoming a Soviet satellite. One can only speculate on the extent to which the views of both Indian writers may have been affected by subsequent events.

In reading these two volumes, one is quite aware of the nationalism which informs Indian foreign policy and which complicates Soviet initiatives in the subcontinent. It is, indeed, surprising that the contributions on South Asia at the American symposium relegate the topic to a mere footnote which comments on "the strength of nationalism and the distaste for foreign involvement that pervades all of South Asia." Nor is this important political factor adequately addressed in the other panels on non-Soviet Asia.

When one turns to the discussion of Soviet Central Asia, however, one finds two long and well-documented studies of the persistence and growth of national consciousness in the Moslem territories of the USSR. Both conclude that increasing nationalist sentiment now offers a serious challenge to Soviet centralist policy. One also notes in these studies a tendency to deal with the emerging distinct national personality of the individual republics of Soviet Central Asia and thereby to discard the former unwarranted tendency in some circles to treat them collectively under the rubric of a hypothetical "Turkestanian" nation.

The national question has clearly not been "solved" inside Soviet Asia as Moscow claims. But it would be a mistake to regard the stirring of national consciousness there and the cultural and other concessions in which it seems to have resulted as the prelude to the same kind of nationalist movements which have elsewhere led to separation and independence. Indeed, a deliberate relaxation of Soviet centralist policy might, if skillfully handled, lead to the strengthening rather than to the deterioration of the Soviet position in Central Asia. The various shifts and ramifications of Moscow's policies here clearly require constant study of the kind focused on them by this symposium, for the experiment in the modernization of the Asian nationalities of the USSR, in spite of much misjudgment and mismanagement, remains the most remarkable and lasting of all the transformations and adjustments which have taken place in the former colonial territories of Asia during the last fifty years.

Whatever the specifics of future Soviet policy in Asia, it is safe to assume that it will continue to be oriented toward the extension and consolidation of Soviet political and economic influence. In pursuing these aims, the USSR has already exhibited significant flexibility, and in light of the obstacles so far encountered, further tactical changes will be required in the future. By far the most formidable of these obstacles is the phenomenon of nationalism, which is already firmly established in most of the countries of non-Soviet Asia and is now beginning to raise its head inside the Soviet Union itself. Interpreters of Soviet policy in Asia can ignore this important factor only at their own peril.

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Kremlinology or Behavioralism?

By Karl W. Ryavec

SIDNEY L. PLOSS, Ed.: *The Soviet Political Process: Aims, Techniques, and Examples of Analysis.* Boston, Ginn, 1971.

ROGER E. KANET, Ed.: *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies: Applications of Behaviorally Oriented Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York, Free Press, 1971.

WHILE BOTH BOOKS under review are similar in that they are collections of articles on Soviet politics, they also complement each other, for each contains studies of a different type: "kremlinological" in the case of Ploss's book, and "behavioral" in the case of Kanet's work.

The first of these "approaches" has come to be widely—and somewhat unfairly—regarded as a distinctive methodological approach employed exclusively by the scholastic soothsayers who probe the mysteries of Soviet politics. This prejudiced view, however, ignores the fact that the technique of intelligent speculation is quite commonly, if not universally, applied to the investigation of the inside workings of political elites—be it the British cabinet or any other leadership group.

The second, or "behavioral, approach—though originally, perhaps, a peculiarly American set of assumptions, methods and aims—is now widely accepted and applied by both American and non-American scholars to the analysis of politics and political systems generally. (Current political research in the countries of Western Europe provides an excellent example of contemporary behavioral techniques.) It is interesting to note, however, that the behavioral approach has also been subjected to much criticism: in the first instance, by scholars wedded to the more traditional legalistic and institutional approaches; and more recently by other scholars who claim that behavioral studies, particularly those which place heavy emphasis on quantitative data, fail to address themselves to crucial political questions or to provide basic theoretical solutions to political problems related to specific human needs. In any event, neither the "kremlinological" nor the "behavioral" approach, as well as the scholars and studies associated with either of them, can escape encountering serious questioning—and sometimes denunciations—of their basic precepts and conclusions. Some of these criticisms are of a patently ideological nature, but others do have substantive foundation.[1]

THE STATED PURPOSE of Ploss's study is to familiarize the beginning student of Soviet politics with the "craft" of investigating conflict within the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). His book is divided into three parts: the first consisting of two articles on the aims of analysis; the second consisting of three articles on techniques of analysis; and the third and longest (eight articles) providing concrete examples of analysis. Each section of the book is prefaced by an introduction written by the editor. Almost all of the articles in the collection, including three by Ploss ("The Language of Conflict," "Deadlock and the Party Presidium," and "The Rise of Brezhnev"), were originally published between 1954 and 1970. Although some of them, in this reviewer's opinion, probably do not merit reprinting now, others still retain considerable interest.

For example, the thesis set forth in Ernst Kux's "Technicians of Power Versus Managers of Technique"—namely, that experts try to shape party policies—is

[1] For criticisms of the theoretical and political inadequacies of certain trends in American political science, much of which is now behavioral, see, for example: Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literatures," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), March 1965, pp. 39–51; William E. Connolly, *Political Science and Ideology*, New York, Atherton, 1967; Henry S. Kariel, *The Promise of Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965; and A. R. Louch, *Explanation and Human Action*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1969.

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even more applicable today than when his article was originally published in 1958. Another article that still merits attention is that of David Burg and Peter Wiles assessing Khrushchev's 1962 power position. Written two years prior to Khrushchev's removal, the article develops the thesis that Nikita Sergeevich was not the absolute ruler of the Soviet Union, adducing some convincing arguments for believing that there were limitations on his power. Two other articles worthy of reprinting are Peter Reddaway's analytical article (1965) on the fall of Khrushchev and Gordon Skilling's "Interest Groups and Communist Politics" (1966), a study that was instrumental in promoting the application of group theory to the study of Soviet politics.[2]

One writer, Michael Gehlen, is represented in both books under review; his article included in Ploss's collection first appeared in 1965 and, interestingly enough, also takes a group-theory approach, realistically calling for recognition of the CPSU as "a composite of various functional groups" (p. 53). The last selection in Ploss's book is an article of his own, "The Rise of Brezhnev," which briefly examines significant post–1964 developments relating to the major issues of Soviet politics.

In sum, Ploss's study can hardly be considered a novel contribution to the study of Soviet politics inasmuch as the kremlinological method of analysis is already familiar both to those engaged in Soviet studies and to the informed public. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful and fairly cohesive selection of articles which, though uneven in quality, apply similar or at least compatible approaches to a particularly complex problem area. The second part of the book, dealing with techniques of analysis, will be particularly useful to those who are about to undertake their first research in primary Soviet sources.[3]

WHILE THE PLOSS volume makes no particular effort to "sell" the kremlinological approach, Kanet's collection appears deliberately designed to bridge what the editor discerns as "the split between political science and Communist studies" by inducing specialists in the latter field to adopt the behavioral approach of modern political science. To accomplish this, the editor presents a series of articles (some five of them not previously published) which he labels as "behavioral." As defined by Kanet, this term denotes an orientation directed toward "the observable political actions of individuals and groups and the psychological processes which influence these actions—*e.g.*, perceptions, motivations, and attitudes" (p. 5). The objective of such research is to identify uniform patterns of political behavior that can be quantitatively measured, thus providing a basis for predictive theories which are themselves capable of being empirically verified.

It is quite clear from Kanet's Introduction to the volume (pp. 1–10) that he regards the attitudes of the traditional specialists in Communist studies as primarily responsible for the "split" with political science, and he sees these attitudes as the product of three factors: (1) the difficulty of obtaining adequate empirical data for behavioral studies; (2) the tendency of the specialists to emphasize the uniqueness of Communist systems and hence the need to take an "area" approach; and (3) an over-absorption on the part of these experts with top-level policy-making, coupled with a lack of interest in—or even, sometimes, an inability to handle—the new methodological tools of political science. Kanet, however, pitches his arguments in a low and ostensibly neutral key, avoiding any direct attacks on scholars not engaged in behavioral-type studies. Moreover, he notes elements of a behavioral approach in the work of some traditional Sovietologists, citing in particular Boris Nicolaevsky's attention to groupings within the Soviet Communist Party.

The main body of the book contains a total of thirteen articles grouped in four sections. The first section consists of a single article providing a general survey of empirically oriented literature on Communist politics; the second section, of six articles devoted to political elites; the third section, of three articles under the heading of policy implementation and bureaucracy; and the last section, of three articles dealing with aspects of the Soviet role in international affairs.

ONLY A FEW of these articles can be specifically commented on here. The first essay, by Paul Shoup ("Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empiri-

[2] See, for example, H. G. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971. Ploss's inclusion of Skillings' article in his collection is somewhat curious because the study of interest groups focuses on a level of politics below the level of the Politburo, which is characteristically the primary concern of kremlinologists.

[3] Also useful for this purpose is W. E. Griffith, "On Esoteric Communications," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), No. 1, 1970, pp. 47–54.

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cal Approach"), is essentially a bibliographic survey, but it also points up certain problems and suggests directions for future research in comparative Communist studies. It is interesting to note that Shoup refers to Communist systems as a "distinct and unique response to the demands of contemporary society" (p. 29)—a description which would seem not only to be at variance with a fundamental assumption of the behavioralists, but also to accept one of the principal arguments for the "area" approach that Kanet criticizes.

Of the six articles dealing with political elites, all but one focus on the USSR, the single exception being a brief essay on Bulgaria. Three of the six, including the one on Bulgaria, are analyses of Central Committee membership and the career backgrounds of Committee members — a favorite subject of investigation for behavioralists, owing in part to the relative ease of gathering quantitative data. The two articles dealing with the Soviet Central Committee (one by Gehlen and McBride, the other by Fleron) examine the backgrounds of CC members with particular attention to the process of "cooptation" whereby members of the specialized elites are drawn into the policy-making machinery as a means of adapting it to changing needs. Gehlen and McBride realistically conclude that cooptation is becoming "rational" and meaningful as an informal process which gives the ruling elite "the advantage of increased stability and information," yet does not involve "a complementary loss of power" (p. 123). Fleron agrees with this position, arguing that while the Soviet leadership system remains essentially a non-pluralistic one in which Central Committee members represent only institutional rather than associational groups, it nonetheless satisfies some major conditions of system adaptability. He also makes the point that Communist polities can be studied more effectively if one avoids "the yardstick of the Anglo-American political culture" (p. 145).

One would not deny that detailed analysis of the individual backgrounds of Central Committee members can provide much material of interest; yet one can also legitimately question just how much such studies tell us about the actual political activities and collective goals of the body in question. It may also be noted that another article in this section—Milton Lodge's analysis of the attitudes of central party *apparatchiki* and four specialist elite groups (*i.e.*, the central economic bureaucracy, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession)—seems to suffer from a fundamental methodological flaw in that it rests on the initial and highly questionable assumption that Soviet journals accurately reflect the attitudes of the groups they ostensibly serve. This reviewer's own personal experiences in the Soviet Union confirm that all Soviet journals have on their editorial staffs persons whose job it is to see that the contents of the publication conform to the prevailing ideological line.

The six articles in the latter two sections of the Kanet volume are more varied in topic and approach than those in the first two sections. In the section on policy implementation and bureaucracy, an article by Erik Hoffmann uses the methodology of content analysis to ascertain the Soviet leadership's perceptions of "role conflict" among ideologists and other categories of officials and shows that there have been wide variations in the definition of various important roles. In another article, Robert Sharlet employs a "systems-theory" approach to explore the role of law in Soviet political development, examining the specialized systemic functions performed by different types of law—criminal, economic, and family. The author concludes his analysis with the formulation of what this reviewer considers to be some rather obvious hypotheses regarding the uses of law in Communist societies and how certain types of law will be employed in these societies to achieve different "systemic goals."

In the final section, on the Soviet Union in world affairs, the opening article by Charles Gati provides a detailed analysis of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* coverage of international affairs with a view to ascertaining the Soviet foreign policy elite's perceptions of the relative importance of different regions of the world. The analysis concludes, on the basis of volume of coverage, that Western Europe, the Far East and Pacific, and Eastern Europe (in that order) have generally been regarded as the most important areas, although there have been significant fluctuations in different periods. Again, however, it may be questioned whether the number of words devoted to different regions in the Soviet press is, by itself, a reliable measure of their relative importance in the eyes of Soviet policymakers.

In the same section, Terrence Hoffman examines the impact of East-West conflict on cohesion within the Communist system and comes to the quite predictable conclusion that the greater the conflict, the greater the intrasys-

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tem cohesion. The concluding article, by Dan C. Heldman, is a far more complex "correlation analysis" of Soviet relations with 25 developing African countries, which endeavors to construct a three-cornered model of causal relationships between the level of internal activity of Communist-oriented African groups, Soviet perceptions of internal phenomena in the African states, and Soviet and African voting patterns in the United Nations. The author employs highly sophisticated analytical techniques, but some of these seem to require closer examination (for example, one of his scales, while purporting to show "intervals" or gradations, may in fact be nothing but an ordinal scale).

AS THE FIRST book-length collection of articles taking a behavioral-quantitative approach to Communist politics,[4] Kanet's volume contains a number of studies which can be read with profit by anyone interested in this field. Nevertheless, the reviewer has reservations regarding both the uniqueness of the findings produced by this approach and the extent to which it can succeed in providing a more definitive picture of Soviet politics. In regard to the latter, it may be pointed out that the behavioral approach applies to Soviet politics methods of research that were originally applied to American politics, and that it thus rests upon the assumption, whether explicit or implicit, that the two political systems are basically similar. But while there are, to be sure, certain similarities of structure and process, one should not overlook the very important differences in political culture, ideology, and goals that determine the uses of the respective systems. These differences, though sometimes deemphasized by those who seek to analyze a sphere of activity narrow enough to permit precise formulation and quantification, are of overriding importance to the actual participants in politics in either system—both those in power and those in opposition.

A further point to be made is that whereas "traditional" studies of Soviet politics generally deal with dynamic or "moving" political processes, the newer, behavioral-type studies tend to focus on static situations or environments and—rather oddly—to omit discussion of the political process itself. The analyses of the backgrounds of Central Committee members in the Kanet volume are a case in point. Such analyses present us only with the results of political processes without giving us a glimpse of the "action" (which is often hidden from all of us). The mere fact that quantitative data are available is no reason to assume that such data by themselves reveal much of real political significance. As A. R. Louch has observed, "statistics are not relevant just because they are mathematical, probabilistic findings, but because they relate to some particular political purpose." [5] Thus, while the adoption of behavioral assumptions and methods by students of Soviet politics might serve to make such studies more acceptable to some political scientists, it is not immediately likely—in the reviewer's opinion—to add a great deal to our knowledge of the substance of Soviet political processes.

One could also ask whether the behavioral approach is not as

[4] For a collection of a somewnat more disparate nature but showing some overlap with Kanet's study, see Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969. This book was reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn in *Slavic Review* (Seattle) No. 3, 1970, pp. 539–42.

[5] Louch, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

Reviewers in this Issue

RICHARD T. DE GEORGE—University Professor of Philosophy at The University of Kansas (Lawrence); author of *Patterns of Soviet Thought* (1966), *The New Marxism* (1968), and other works.

RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut; author of *Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic* (1967) and editor of a forthcoming volume on the politics and ideologies of Soviet dissent.

GEOFFREY E. WHEELER—former Director of the Central Asian Research Center (London) until his retirement in 1968; author of *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (1966) and contributor to *Asian Affairs* and *Middle Eastern Studies*.

KARL W. RYAVEC—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst); contributor to *Soviet Studies, Slavic Review,* and *Western Political Quarterly;* author of a forthcoming book on Soviet economic reform.

Notice of Erratum

In identifying the author of the essay-review, "The Agricultural Base of China's Political Economy" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972), the editors inadvertently introduced an erroneous initial E. in the name of Werner Klatt. Dr. Klatt has no middle initial.

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culture-bound as the older legal-institutional or traditional approach it is meant to supplant. Both are developments of the same Anglo-American society, though at different points in time. The behavioral approach may derive from and serve particular American needs just as the totalitarian approach to Communist politics once did. It may even "constitute a methodical formulation of an unstated faith," [6] *i.e.*, an ideology. It should at least try to be a "responsible ideology" which strives to avoid the "twin dangers of social irrelevance and unwarranted dogmatism." [7]

To sum up, then, the two collections reviewed here have limited value measured against the purposes of their editors. Ploss's collection is not a sufficient introduction to the study of Soviet politics, although it will undoubtedly be helpful to serious beginning students who need guidance in how to go about sifting Soviet published materials, particularly the press.[8] Kanet's compilation formulates questions and presents empirical data that add to and refine knowledge already provided on a tentative basis by earlier studies making lesser claims for their methodologies, and it represents a welcome contribution on both substantive and heuristic grounds. It is not, however, a contribution of revolutionary significance, nor does it provide us with the theories of predictive power that are the stated goal of the "behavioral revolution."

This is not to imply that behavioral approaches cannot prove useful in the study of Soviet politics. The initial studies of this type do not appear, however, to fulfill the claims of the exponents of these approaches, and we must await the appearance of a new generation of such studies before we can make a definitive judgment as to how much they can contribute to the attainment of a new level of knowledge concerning the major questions of Soviet political life. This new generation of behavioral studies will depend in part on the further development of conventional research and studies, since the latter must supply at least some of the questions, data and theories for the behavioralists to build upon. It therefore seems likely that only a combination of the traditional and behavioral approaches will enable us —to borrow a Chinese slogan—to "walk on two legs" in our further exploration of the fascinating political and social questions posed by the Soviet polity.

[6] Kariel, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[7] See Connolly, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–38.

[8] Also useful for this purpose is Ploss's earlier study, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–1963,* Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1965.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be adressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

The first two letters below were received in the spring of 1972. Publication has been delayed pending receipt of a response from Messrs. Brown and Neuberger.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to call your attention to a misquotation from my article in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* in the review of this work by Alan H. Brown and Egon Neuberger in the January-February 1972 issue of *Problems of Communism*. Further, I would like to reply to the review insofar as it concerns my article.

I am very sorry that the reviewers saw fit to introduce their word "short" into a part of a sentence they indicated to be a *direct* quotation from page 443 of my original article. The misquotation gives a different flavor to my sentence than I intended. Moreover, my statement on page 439, which the reviewers characterize as an acknowledgement "at one point," is in fact the summary conclusion and appears labeled as such in section "II. Summary." The reviewers' juxtaposition of the last two sentences of the paragraph on page 443 of my article also imparts a coloration I did not intend. The last sentence of my paragraph, "The declining productivities observed for Eastern Europe reflect these considerations," refers to a number of factors discussed in the same paragraph, not just the *one* element singled out by the reviewers. The considerations I listed were indeed comprehensive ". . . scientific, technological and managerial knowledge, economies and diseconomies of scale, and all other contributing influences. . . ." Regretfully, I must conclude that the reviewer was, to say the least, confused.

Obviously, some of the countries of Eastern Europe are having difficulties digesting their capital investments, but this does not mean that capital is no longer a constraint on growth, among other constraints. If some of the latter were corrected, there would be less trouble absorbing new investment, an elasticity of substitution that "has approached zero" in Hungary notwithstanding (cited as a "preliminary" calculation by A. A. Brown, in footnote 9 of the review; Brown's paper was unavailable to me). It is at least an open question as to whether Brown's finding for Hungary would apply to all countries of Eastern Europe. It remains to be seen what Brown's calculations will show on close examination, in what prices, and for what period.

I would also like to take this opportunity to call attention to an error in my Table 7, p. 443, which crept in during the rush to get my paper to the press. For all practical purposes, this Table should be replaced by Table 6, on page 438, of my paper.

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TO THE EDITORS: Alan A. Brown's and Egon Neuberger's review of US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* in your January-February 1972 issue contains inaccuracies and misconceptions concerning my paper that should be set straight. Brown has indicated to me his personal responsibility for the comments on my work, and my rejoinder is accordingly directed to him. But I regret that Egon Neuberger did not catch Brown's errors and misguided remarks before publication of the review.

The reviewer finds it "disturbing" that my reported growth for Hungarian GNP is relatively stable in the 1950's compared to the official statistics. He points out that the latter show absolute declines in 1952, 1954, and 1956, with a "particularly sharp drop" in 1956, whereas my GNP series shows only one "very mild" dip in 1956. I regret that the reviewer confuses GNP with the official Marxist so-called net material product (NMP) concept of national income; GNP and NMP are not directly comparable. Trends in housing, government services, and other services, as well as capital consumption, which are reflected in GNP but not in NMP, dampen the fluctuations in the net value added of agriculture. Accordingly, Brown's characterization of the decline in NMP (10.8 percent, see Central Statistical Office, *Statisztikai evknoyv, 1957* [Statistical Yearbook, 1957] Budapest, Statisztikai Kiado Vallalat, 1959, p. 51) as "particularly sharp" and the corresponding decline of GNP (4.5 percent, see *Compendium*, p. 46) as "very mild" is a regrettably misleading "comparison." A decline of 4.5 percent of real GNP is a sharp drop by most standards.

To pursue the confusion further, Brown points to the weights of agriculture in the

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two measures. In the first place, most students know that it is incorrect to compare the share of agriculture in GNP with its share in NMP. But let us follow the review anyway: Brown is "particularly puzzled" by the divergence between the GNP and NMP series "when he learns that Alton's recalculated index gives a much larger weight to agriculture than does the official Hungarian index." But, what are the facts? I allow 27.2 percent of GNP in 1955 (the weight-base year) as the weight for agriculture and forestry in my index (see my paper, *Compendium,* pp. 54; 67); official figures show a much larger 33.4 percent of NMP originating in agriculture in 1955 (see Central Statistical Office, *Statisztikai evkonyv, 1949-1955* [Statistical Yearbook, 1949-55], Budapest, Statisztikai Kiado Vallalat, 1957, p. 39). On the basis of this faulty reporting, Brown calls for further "thorough" analysis. The call is well taken, but not for the reasons he alleges. In work on comparisons of growth, a spirit of modesty is recommended. At various places in my short paper I have tried to alert the reader to the relativity of statistical comparisons to such factors as the bases of valuation or the selection of index numbers.

Brown states that "it is unfortunate" that no alternative series using different weighting specifications are presented." Obviously, a short article is not a book; still, I have presented official series at several points in my paper for perspective. Elsewhere, we have tested the effect of alternative weights upon economic structure and upon calculated trends in growth. Brown might have reflected that the 10 percent return on capital used at one point is about midway between the 8 and 13 percent which he cited.

Brown laments (p. 77) that the "only clue" to the specification of the average annual rates of growth is a *footnote* in my paper (*Compendium,* p. 63). This footnote is specific to the paragraph to which it refers; to transfer its application to other contexts is unwarranted. Fortunately, readers need not be taken unawares; there are indeed more than clues elsewhere. I have indicated in the very table to which he refers (Table 15, p. 62) and also on the following page (Table 16) "compound annual rates." If I had intended this to mean rates given by least squares fit to the compound rate formula, I would have said so. In any event, the ultimate specification is to be found in the relevant indexes; recourse to them should clarify any doubts and provide the basis for calculation of whatever additional measures the reader might seek. Obviously, no single method of calculating annual rates of growth will answer all questions; detail given by one method may be smoothed out by another. The competent reader will not suffer so long as the basic indexes are available.

Despite the reviewer's suggestion to the contrary, the work I summarize in my paper has benefited at earlier stages from the participation and advice of economists experienced in the Soviet and East European economies and in index-number work. Were I to emulate the tone of the review, I should say "it is a pity" that the reviewer did not allow for differences in national accounting concepts and did not show sufficient attention to detail. "Would that" it were otherwise.

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PROFESSORS BROWN AND NEUBERGER REPLY: Our review article of the US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* was commented upon by two of the authors, Laszlo Czirjak and Thad P. Alton. Their comments call for a few remarks on our part.

The word "short" was inadvertently introduced in the quotation from page 443 of Czirjak's original article ("the real restraint of growth is likely to be the [short] supply of capital"), not by us, but by the editorial offices of *Problems of Communism.* However, the important question raised in our review is whether growth is likely to be restrained by "the supply of capital," as claimed by Czirjak, or whether the problem of growth is that capital is becoming an increasingly unsatisfactory substitute for labor. Since Czirjak's specifications of the production function do not even consider explicitly the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, his analysis cannot provide an answer to the question of whether factor substitution is a possible problem. The conclusion should be examined that "capital is becoming a less and less satisfactory substitute for labor as a spur to increase production" (our review, p. 76). M. Weitzman has presented strong evidence that the difficulty of substituting capital for labor was a key problem in the Soviet Union, whose development strategy was a prototype for East European countries (see his article "Soviet Postwar Economic Growth and Capital-Labor Substitution," in the *American Economic Review* [Menasha, Wisconsin], September 1970, pp. 676–92).

As for the confusion of the reviewers, this is hardly surprising since the reader is presented with two conflicting tables in Czirjak's article (tables 6 and 7 on pages 438 and 443, respectively). More important, however, is the fact that table 6 (which Czirjak tells us does not contain the arithmetical error of table 7 and therefore should replace the latter) implies an elasticity of factor substitution which is infinite. The reader is left wondering why the author did not consider at least some inelasticity of factor substitution. Surely, it is now accepted in the literature on productivity that the possibility of a degree of inelasticity in factor substitution is a matter which deserves serious thought in Eastern Europe.

Turning to Alton's aggregate output series, the paradox that his recalculated data make the Hungarian economy appear more stable in the 1950's than do the official series for the same period remains unresolved. This cannot be explained simply by the difference in weights accorded different sectors of the economy under the official category of net material product (NMP) and under the concept of gross national product (GNP) used by Alton. The explanation must lie elsewhere, perhaps in the statistical methodology of the author. One clue to this mystery may be seen in Alton's handling of the category of net agricultural product, which figures in both the NMP and GNP concepts.

As the accompanying table (derived from Alton *et al.,* Occasional Paper No. 14 of the Research Project on National Income, p. 42) shows, there is a marked divergence between the official and Alton's recalculated series for net agricultural output during the 1950's. Thus, unlike Alton's data, the official series

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Index of Hungarian Net Agricultural Product (1949 = 100)

Year	Official	Recalculated by Alton *et al.*	Official index as percent of recalculated index
1949	100	100	100
1950	112	98	114
1951	133	107	124
1952	83	97	85
1953	115	89	129
1954	110	97	113
1955	127	118	107
1956	106	112	94
1957	124	125	100
1958	129	130	99
1959	133	114	116
1960	119	100	119

shows drastic annual fluctuations in the early 1950's, particularly in 1952, for which the official data show a decline of nearly 40 percent. Conversely, Alton's recalculated series indicates an abrupt decline of agricultural output in 1959, whereas according to the official data output in fact increased.

Although the reasons for the divergence in data for the early 1950's remain unexplained, the apparent cause for the divergence in 1959 was the change in Hungarian official depreciation allowances and repair-and-maintenance charges between 1958 and 1959. Although such artificial measures reflect no genuine change in the output of Hungarian agriculture and were therefore ignored in the official data, Alton evidently chose to allow for them in his GNP calculations by increasing the total value of depreciation allowances from 194 to 434 million forints and by raising maintenance and repair charges from 475 to 1,062 million forints in the calculation for 1959 (see Occasional Paper No. 14, p. 115). Such arbitrary adjustments make it difficult to get an accurate picture of the fluctuations of the Hungarian economy.

As for Alton's calculation of the annual rate of growth, the reviewers remain puzzled as to why the author did not make better use of the GNP series he had so laboriously derived. In our essay-review (p. 76) we noted that Alton's use of terminal-year averaging indicated a sharp decline in the annual growth of Hungarian GNP in 1955–60 as compared with 1950–55 (3.9 percent *vs.* 5.4 percent), whereas fitting a least-squares estimate—the accepted practice in econometric analysis — to Alton's series would have indicated annual growth rates of 4.6 and 4.7 percent, respectively. Alton notes that "the competent reader will not suffer so long as the basic indexes are available," but is it not an imposition to expect the reader to calculate his own regression coefficients in order to get an accurate impression of trends in economic growth for the two five-year periods?

In sum, what one needs is a precise picture both of growth trends and of instability in the Hungarian economy during the 1950's. Without looking at the fluctuations—particularly the absolute declines of 1952, 1954 and 1956—it would hardly be possible to interpret meaningfully the story of Hungarian postwar economic development and systemic change.

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